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tao pu yuan jen jen chih 
wei tao erhyiian jen pu 
k'o 7 wei tao
The Way is not far from 
men. When men follow a way 
that is far from men, it 
is not the Way. 
Attributed to Confucius, 
Chung Yung, XIII
tao hsing chih erh ah'eng
The Way is sustained by 
being walked upon. 
Chuang Tzu, chapter 2
Abstract
This thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place 
occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly 
stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the 
wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that 
values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They 
nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and 
deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological 
considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of 
objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, 
more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in 
favour of an expressivistic understanding of value.
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Chapter 1; The Issue of Realism and Truth
1.1, Michael Dummett has defined "realism" with respect to a given class of 
statements whose status is in dispute as
the belief that statements of the disputed class possess an objective 
tmth-value, independently of our means of knowing it: they are true or 
false in virtue of a reality existing independently of us.^
The notion of evidence-transcendence^ here invoked is central to this conception of 
realism. This is not an unproblematic notion. For one thing, who are the "us" 
independence of whose epistemic resources is being invoked? My belief that another 
person has a mind would appear to be independent of my but not of their means of 
knowing that they do. Likewise my beliefs about the experiences of people whose lives 
fall either before or after my death. And indeed my beliefs about my own past and 
fiiture experiences transcend my present means of verifying or falsifying them but only 
my present means.
The denial of realism as Dummett defines it is anti-realism. This denies the 
existence of the sort of evidence-transcendent truth-conditions realism espouses. Like 
verificationism, of which it is plausibly taken to be a version, anti-realism is a semantic 
thesis. It is a thesis in which the role in the determination of meaning played (according
 ^Dummett, 1978. pl46.
 ^Cf. Crispin Wright, 1986b. p252, who defines "semantic realism" as the
truth-conditional conception of meaning, belief in the general validity 
(prescinding firom vagueness) of the Principle of Bivalence, and 
acceptance of the possibility of evidence-transcendent truth.
8to, among others, Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred Tarski and Donald 
Davidson^) by truth-conditiom is played instead by assertion-conditions!^
Another way of formulating a realist position is metaphysical. It would claim that 
the world has objective reality independently of how it is experienced and conceived. 
This sort of realism is much less obviously a doctrine concerned with truth. ^  Its most 
natural antonym is simply "idealism". Wliat this latter typically denies is the relativity 
(to persons and times) involved in the strong verificationism® espoused by anti-realism 
while accepting the weak verificationism that remains of anti-realism when this 
relativism is eliminated. For the idealist, claims about reality are responsible to all 
experiences, not just present experiences, not just my experiences and, on some 
formulations, not just actual experiences. This way, for example, statements about the 
past or about other minds come out as capable of truth, but statements about 
theoretical entities in science do not. For an idealist there can be such facts as that you 
are in pain, or that I was, or that Joan of Arc was, or, perhaps, that I would be were I 
to 0  and their truth values can diverge from what my presently available epistemic 
criteria happen to deliver.
For anti-realism, such facts are problematic and the possibility of their truth value 
diverging from their assertibility is difficult even to formulate given the absorption of
 ^See Frege, 1967. pp89-90; Wittgenstein, 1961.
esp. 4.01ff. Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages" in his 1956 and 
Davidson, 1984.
Dummett, 1976 is perhaps the locus classicus.
® Michael Devitt, in particular, in his 1984. has been strongly critical of the 
Dummettian recasting of the debate on realism in semantic terms.
® The term is Wright's- see his 1987. chapter 5.
the very notion of truth in that of assertibility/ This is where the semantic formulation 
of the issue is relevant to the metaphysical, for verificationist positions have typically 
attacked metaphysical realism at the level of intelligibility. Dummett however has 
drawn attention to a way of dealing with such facts that does not deny their 
intelligibility outright, but raises doubts about the applicability to them of the logical 
principle of bivalence, whereby they would be deemed, though undecidable, 
determinately either true or false, ter Hum non datumf The relevance of this is most 
easily seen by noting that, when the sense of a proposition P is identified on some anti- 
realist theory with something along the lines of "It is verifiable that P" or "It is 
provable that P", it yields both an internal and an external negation, thus breaking 
down the applicability of the principle to such propositions.^ Though this issue of
 ^A. J. Ayer, 1979. p278, puts the distinction clearly:
it is customary in this context [i.e. the philosophy of perception] to 
contrast realism with idealism, but a Berkeleian idealist must count for 
Dummett as a sophisticated realist, so long as he believes that every 
statement ascribing an idea to God or to the human mind has a 
determinate truth-value.
 ^See "Realism" in his 1978.
 ^The simplest example might be Protagorean relativism (see Plato's Theaetetus) where 
truth is analysed along some such lines as
P is truefor a only if BaP
10
bivalence has loomed large in recent debates on realism, it is not an aspect of that 
debate to which I shall here seek to contribute.
The British debate on anti-realism has derived very largely from the work of 
Dummett with its sources in Frege, L. E. J. Brouwer and the later Wittgenstein.^® In 
America the dominant figure has been Hilary Putnam^  ^who since the early nineteen- 
eighties has been defending what he calls internal realism which relativizes truth to our 
actual beliefs and standards of rationality as distinguished from what he calls 
metaphysical or external realism which espouses a transcendental "absolute 
conception of reality Like Dummett, Putnam concentrates on semantic arguments,
which he has formulated both in terms of informal philosophy of language and in terms 
of formal model-theory, to show that even if there were a transcendent reality of this 
sort, we could not refer to it, as reference cannot be seen as a relation capable of 
"magically" connecting our thoughts and utterances to anything so remote from the 
Lebenswelt^  ^to which those thoughts and utterances are oriented.
The right-hand side, BaP, has both an internal negation Ba-iP and an external -iBaP 
and bivalence consequently seems to fail on this analysis. But note that a Dummettian 
anti-realist would count a Protagorean as a reductionist and a realist unless he 
extended his rejection of belief-transcendence, and bivalence, to propositions about 
what is believed, to BaP, Ba-iP and -iBaP themselves, an extension which might raise 
doubts about the plausibility and coherence of just such an analysis.
See Dummett 1973. esp. chapter 13, 1976 and 1978. esp. chapters 1, 10,13, 14.
These views are developed in Putnam 1981. 1983 and 1990 among other writings. 
The model-theoretic argument referred to is stated in "Models and Reality" reprinted in 
his 1983
The latter term is Bernard Williams'. See his 1978. p64-7 and 1985. chapter 8.
Here meaning "the world as we actually experience it" (Putnam, 1990. pi 18).
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Thus much then by way of characterizing the background issues of the debate on 
realism. Such general issues will not be my primary concern in most of what follows. I 
shall rather be centrally concerned with a form of local realism- realism about values. 
This again does not signal a single clear cut issue- in the first place there is the question 
of the mind-independence of values. Are they or are they not features of the world 
independent our mental lives? Can anything other than the minds of valuers, singly or 
collectively, determine what is valuable? This is the issue of platonism which will be a 
central concern of chapter 3 below. It is distinct fi'om a different sort of mind- 
dependence issue- that of whether anything can be valuable other than in relation to 
minds? To put it in terms of G. E. Moore's helpful dramatization of the issue 
(considered in 5.9 below), could value inhere in a beautifijl, but lifeless, world?^ "^  This 
is the issue of axiological (moral, aesthetic or whatever) idealism which will 
preoccupy me extensively in later chapters. Both these questions, the question of the 
metaphysics of value and the question of its constitttency may be distinguished from 
the issue of cognitivism, generally understood as the issue of whether claims about 
what is and is not to be valued are susceptible of truth or falsity. This will be the 
leading concern of the present chapter as well as of chapter 8 below.
1.2. The issue of cognitivism is problematic and in formulating it, caution is at a 
premium. When it is firamed in terms of truth and falsehood, much of the difficulty lies 
in simply locating its relevance to the debate on moral realism. The locus classicus for 
a non-cognitivist position in the twentieth century has been the writings of Charles 
Stevenson which are the definitive statement of emotivism whereby evaluative terms 
serve not to describe the world but to express our feelings about it, attitudes which
14 See his 1903. pp83-85.
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need to be sharply distinguished from heliefs^^ and which are not susceptible of truth 
and falsity.
But having said tliis much, Stevenson goes on to offer a harmless sense in which it 
is legitimate to speak of truth with respect to moral claims.^ ® The propriety or 
otherwise of imputing truth to a given sentence is, he claims, "a purely syntactical" 
matter- these notions being applicable to all and only sentences in the indicative mood 
and serving simply to express agreement with such sentences, that agreement 
continuing to be understood as an agreement in attitude not in belief. And a similar 
willingness to allow such a harmless sense of truth is found in more recent writers. 
Thus Simon Blackburn:
It is a complete mistake to think that the notion of moral truth, and the 
associated notions of moral attributes and propositions disappear when 
the realistic theory is refiited. To think that a moral proposition is true 
is to concur in an attitude to its subject.
Stevenson's acknowledgement of the harmlessness of conceding cognitivism in this 
sense appealed to a redundancy conception of truth. Outlining a more sophisticated 
view, Davidson has stressed a similar harmlessness:
See his 1944 and 1963.
16 Stevenson, 1963. pp214-220. Alan Gibbard (1990) is the most impressive 
contemporary champion of such expressivism.
"  Blackburn, 1971. pl24. Cf. his 1984. pl96. C£ also Neil Cooper, 1981. plSOff. 
Cooper disputes however the applicability to moral judgements of Dummett's 
correspondence principle (the same as W4 below) and bivalence.
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Even if we hold that there is some important sense in which moral or 
evaluative sentences do not have a truth value (for example, because 
they cannot be verified) we ought not to boggle at '"'Bardot is good" is 
true if and only if Bardot is good"; in a theory of truth, this 
consequence should follow with the rest, keeping track of the semantic 
location of such sentences in the language as a whole... What is special 
to evaluative words is simply not touched; the mystery is transferred 
from the word "good" in the object language to its translation in the 
metalanguage.^^
But while non-cognitivists have acknowledged such harmless ways in which we may 
speak of moral judgements as true or false, the claim persists, that in some less 
harmless sense of "truth", statements about values lack a truth value. But what sense is 
this? It is not being denied by Stevenson or Blackburn, say, that evaluative statements 
can be true or false. And hence presumably it is not being denied that they can have 
truth values (for their being true or false just is having truth values). And it would not 
presumably be denied that they have truth-conditions, in the sense in which truth 
conditions are what sentences like "Bardot is good" is true if and only if Bardot is 
good" give. So what is being denied?
A plausible reading of such deflationary claims is to see the word "true" as simply a 
device for endorsing assertoric sentences. So that, in effect, there is nothing for truth, 
so conceived, to amount to but warranted assertibility.^  ^Deflationism so construed has 
recently been criticized by Crispin Wright on the basis that truth and warranted
1984. p31.
See Wright, 1992. ppl5-18.
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assertibility must diverge, at least potentially, in extension/® For given the 
disquotational schema:
"P" is T iff P.
we get:
"It's not the case that P" is T iff it's not the case that P.
and:
It's not the case that P iff it's not the case that "P" is T.
whereby, by transitivity:
"It's not the case that P" is T iff it's not the case that "P" is T.
And, when "T" is read as "warrantedly assertible", this latter is, in false in view of 
the possibility of neutral informational states with regard to at least a great many 
substituends for "P".
Rejecting deflationism on this basis, Wright does not however depart from its 
metaphysically unassuming spirit. He instead advocates what he calls minimalism 
about truth, which sees the diagnosed potential divergence in extension from 
warranted assertibility as effectively exhausting the notion of truth, at least when taken
20 Ibid., chapter 1, section HI.
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in tandem with various platitudes that capture certain basic intuitions about the way 
the truth predicate works. The minimalism then lies in the claim that:
there is no notion of genuine- deep- assertoric content, such that a 
discipline wliich exhibits whatever degree of discipline (there are firmly 
acknowledged standards of proper and improper use of its assertoric 
sentences) and which has all the overt syntactic trappings of assertoric 
content (resources for- apparent- conditionalization, negation, 
embedding within prepositional attitudes and so on)- no notion of 
genuine assertion such that a discourse with all this may nevertheless 
fail to be in the business of expressing genuine assertions. Rather, if 
things are in all these surface respects as if assertions are being made, 
then so they are.^ ^
Acceptance of this minimalist view would, Wright argues, be curtains for any attempt 
on the part of those expressivists about values who would deny the truth-aptness of 
evaluative thoughts and utterances to understand this lack of truth-aptitude as a covert 
feature of such thoughts and utterances which their syntactic surfaces may serve simply 
to conceal. For, on this minimalist view, "surface constraints of syntax and discipline" 
are just constitutive of truth-aptitude and cannot intelligibly be taken as covering its 
absence.
1.3. This position is not, I suspect, altogether convincing. But, except for noting at 1.5 
below just how much discipline can coexist with non-assertoric force, I will largely 
postpone consideration of just why until chapter 8 below. Nonetheless whether it be in
21 Ibid., p29.
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the light of Wright's minimalist arguments or of such concessions to a deflated 
cognitivism as expressivists are given to making, it begins to seem unhelpful to 
characterize "non-cognitivism" crudely as a doctrine about the aptness of moral 
judgements for the characterizations, "true" and "false", for when these terms are read 
in the wide sense averted to by Stevenson, "non-cognitivism" comes out as a doctrine 
almost nobody is defending. Non-cognitivism is thus perhaps more usefully understood 
as the view that there is available, within the set of statements to which truth and falsity 
are meaningfully imputed, a subset of these that are in some sense genuinely fact- 
stating where those outside this set are not. Statements about value are then outwith 
this genuinely fact-stating set but within the wider set. So understood, noncognitivism 
is a part of what I am concerned to defend.
Cognitivist writers have, however, sought to undermine the non-cognitivist 
position by posing searching questions as to whether the weakest conception of truth 
that can, without violence to our actual thinking about values, be assigned to 
imputations of the latter really falls short of the strongest sense of truth that can, 
without violence to certain favoured epistemological insights, be assigned to anything', 
whether the non-cognitivisf s proposed distinction between the general set of "true" 
sentences and the narrower one of "fact- stating" ones is one he is able to make out.
This line of argument, known, following J. L. Mackie, as the argument from 
companions in guilf^ receives its principle airing in the writings of David Wiggins on 
truth and value.^ Wiggins, taking his cue from certain remarks by Peter Strawson and 
Bernard Williams, begins with a characterization of the project of arriving at a 
"substantive notion of truth", and proposes that the basis for this project be found in 
the Davidsonian suggestion, already mentioned, that we explicate the meaning (in
See his 1977. p39.
^  See his 1980 and essays IH and IV in his 1987.
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Frege's terminology the "sense") of sentences by reference to their truth conditions. 
Such explication is conceived, following Davidson (and less directly Tarski), as seeking 
to provide a theory that yields for each sentence s of a given language a biconditional 
of the form
s is true if and only if p.
What, for Tarski, made this precisely a theory of truth was that p was either the very 
same sentence as s or a translation of that sentence into the metalanguage. But, in the 
context of Davidson's project of explicating meaning, appeal to the notion of 
tt anslation would be question-begging. Davidson's proposed solution to this was to 
resort to the notion of radical interpretation constrained by a principle o f charity, 
which thus becomes the key element in his attempt to give a naturalistic 
characterization of meaning. This notion is likewise proposed by Wiggins as a basis for 
philosophical inquiry into truth though, following Richard Grandy^\ he recommends 
enriching Davidsonian charity with a more generally anthropological understanding 
based on a principle o f humanity. The idea is to conceive a theory of truth as offering 
a characterization of "true" in the above quoted biconditional such as to fit it, in the 
light of the proposed anthropological constraints on interpretation, to play its intended 
role in the theory of meaning. Wiggins tentatively offers a framework for such a theory 
by proposing five marks which he takes to be fimdamental characteristics of truth.^ ® 
These are as follows:
^^See his 1973.
See his 1980 and 1987. essay III.
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Wl/ Truth is the "primary dimension of assessment for sentences". For it is a 
fundamental constraint on interpretation that users of a language be taken as 
operating in terms of a norm to utter true sentences rather than false ones. 
Otherwise there would be no empirical basis on which to relate their utterances 
to their surroundings.^®
W2/ There should be a tendency, under favourable conditions, for speakers to 
converge on agreement about the truth-value of sentences in their language. 
What seems to underlie this thought is that the criteria for appraising the truth 
values must be of a publie kind to which speakers may appeal to give their 
communication point and to which (connecting the present mark to Wl) the 
interpreter may appeal to furnish the cash-value of his interpretations. Related 
to this is the idea that the standard explanation for convergence on some belief 
that P should include appeal to P itself. It is, of course, open to dispute whether 
these considerations justify more than the weaker conclusion that convergence 
should be possible.
W3I The content of a belief should be independent of the mere fact of its being 
believed. It’s truth should be independent o f caiy given speakers mecms o f 
recognizing it. These formulations are not, on the face of it, the same. Their 
identification is presumably motivated by some such thought as that if the 
criteria for appraising the truth of sentences must be public, genuine beliefs 
must be capable of correction by those criteria and hence their truth conditions 
must be independent of any given believer's attitudes to them.
26 On this point, cf. Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in his 
1984.
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W4/ True sentences are true in virtue o f something. This is taken by Wiggins as 
summarizing W1-W3 above/^
W5/ Truth is agglomerative, that is, if P is true and Q is true, (P & Q) is true. 
Wiggins' motivations here is that this principle is a condition for beliefs being 
subject to appraisal for consistency.
Wiggins suggests that these marks furnish the basis for the sort of substantive 
theory of truth he and Strawson were indicating the need for but that they are not 
necessarily such as to exclude moral judgements from the domain of statements open 
to appraisal in terms of truth in this substantive sense (though Wiggins recognizes that 
the phenomenon of conflicting values creates related difficulties with respect to marks 
W2 and W5^ *). The challenge to the non-cognitivist is then either to build on these 
latter, or other, difficulties to divorce moral judgements from the domain of truth as 
characterized by W1-W5 or to improve on the characterization by offering some 
further marks that would permit both the characterization of some core of truths in a 
"full-blooded" sense and the exclusion from it of moral truths.
Cf. Dummett, 1978. ppl6-17.
Williams has been the most forceful exploiter of these two openings for a distinction 
between a "full-blooded" sense of truth and a weaker sense applicable to value 
judgements. See, on conflict and agglomerativity, his "Ethical Consistency" and 
"Consistency and Realism" 1973 (and cf. the discussion in Susan Hurley, 1989. chapter 
9, section 1) and, on convergence, his 1985. chapter 8 (and cf. the discussion in 
Putnam, 1990. chapter 11). I would confess myself generally sceptical about the whole 
idea of an ideal end to inquiry such as Williams' appeals to (see Wright's comments in 
his 1986a. pp 197-8 and 1992. p46; Rescher, 1984. provides extensive argumentation 
for such scepticism).
20
The argument from companions in guilt has received support in the work of 
number of other writers^ ®, notably Putnam in his vigorous attacks on the so-called fact- 
value distinction^®, his objections to this distinction relating directly to his rejection of 
metaphysical realism. The argument isn't, of course, so much an argument for realism 
with respect to values as an argument against the supposition that anti-realism with 
respect to values places beliefs about them somehow on a different footing from other 
beliefs. It works more by downgrading the sorts of truth and reality that are not 
axiological than by upgrading those that are. Thus its main upshot, if successful, is to 
subvert such traditional dichotomies as fact/value, is/ought and of course 
cognitive/non-cognitive rather than to put in place a metaphysics or ontology of value 
that is necessarily less parsimonious than any the anti-realist would be inclined to 
accept.
The challenge thus laid down to sympathizers with Stevenson can be understood as 
follows: the latter had, in admitting the applicability of truth to imputations of value, 
favoured a highly nonsubstantive notion of truth, explicitly and approvingly citing the 
redundancy theory of Frank Ramsey, to put aside the suggestion that on his revised 
view:
ethical judgements are true or false only in atypical senses of the terms- 
in senses that have little or nothing to do with those that are appropriate 
to factual contexts.
^  See e.g., Alasdair MacIntyre, 1981. chapter 7, John McDowell, 1983 and Hurley, 
1989. chapter 14, section 4.
®^ See his 1981. chapter 9 and his 1990. chapter 11 respectively.
1963. p219.
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But now the question is invited- how to characterize the difference between^c^wa/ 
contexts and non-factiial contexts, between sentences that state beliefs and sentences 
that do other things? Just this is what a substantive theory of truth was supposed to tell 
us, the suggested upshot being that, when just these differences are characterized, 
imputations of value will be most felicitously placed precisely in the cognitive, fact- 
stating part of the language.
1.4. One influential resource for such a distinction is Dummett's distinction between 
"assertions proper" and the wider set of "quasi-assertions".^^ Members of the latter set 
are characterized by the following features:
D l/ They can be "correct" or "incorrect", "represent linguistic acts of the kind 
to which the notion of assent would be appropriate." This clearly connects with 
the harmless sense of truth we saw Stevenson and others as willing to impute 
to value judgements, as well as with Wl.
D2/ Assent to them carries commitments to action: they "commit both speaker 
and hearer, if the latter accepts what is said, to a line of action, linguistic and 
non-linguistic."
D3/ They are open to appraisal in terms oîjustification (cf. W2).
D4/ They can be used to deceive.
D5/ They can appear as constituents o f complex sentences.
Dummett further offers a characterization of the sub-set comprising "assertions 
proper" or assertions in the strict sense"- a member of this set being an assertion that 
may:
32 See his 1973. chapter 10, esp. pp352fif.
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be characterized as a quasi-assertion the criterion for whose justification 
coincides with that for the truth of the thought which constitutes its
sense.
Given this characterization, the issue of realism is just the issue of whether any quasi­
assertions fall outwith the set so characterized.
In a 1986 paper, Wright takes up, à propos of the objectivity of logical necessity, 
the difficulty of furnishing an adequate characterization of the genuinely fact-stating.^ *^  
His proposal is that a set of statements is genuinely fact-stating if it is such that 
differences about their truth-values can be explained wholly by reference to ignorance, 
error, or prejudice on the part of the some or all of the disputants. If it is not genuinely 
fact-stating, disputes of this kind will be Humean, that is to say will leave a certain 
residual space for discretion even where such error or prejudice are either absent or 
mutually cancelling because equivalent.
There is an initial circularity in the appeal to ignorance and error which seems 
to presuppose the understanding of factuality these are being invoked to explain. 
Wright notes this and seeks to circumvent the difficulty by stipulating that:
the mistake is identifiable independently of any view about the disputed 
opinion.
Ibid., p359. 
Wright, 1986a. 
Ibid., pl99.
23
And similarly for ignorance. So presumably if some statement S were in question, 
something would count as a mistake in determining its truth value if it were a mistake 
whose status as such could be agreed upon, in the absence offurther error, ignorance 
and prejudice, by third parties themselves in disagreement over the truth-value of S.
Suppose someone thinks that it was not wrong that a certain person was executed. 
And suppose the reason they give for this is that they think the victim of this killing 
was morally depraved. There is disagreement over whether the victim really performed 
the actions allegedly constitutive of his depravity, but also, among those who agree 
that he did, over whether they were morally depraved. So some disagreement with the 
judgement in question will concern whether the person in question performed certain 
acts and some whether the acts in question were blameworthy or otherwise.
Now what a cognitivist will want to say about this sort of case is that both the 
various sorts of disagreement here adverted to are factital disagreements and so be 
disposed to count "wrong" judgements about either of them as being substantive cases 
of "ignorance" or "error". But neither one of them is, on the face of it, relevantly more 
"independently identifiable" as such with respect to the original disputed belief (that it 
was O.K. to hang him) than the other.
An alternative might be to disqualify fi'om consideration as subjects for ignorance 
or error, all putative facts within the general disputed set to which the putative fact in 
question belongs. This does what we want in the present example, i.e., recognizes as
The difficulty is underscored when we consider the appeal made by Wright, in 
characterizing error, to "any sort of perceptual, recollective or intellectual 
malfunctioning" for how strong are the prospects likely to be for characterizing 
"intellectual malfimctioning" independently of any appeal to standards of cognitive 
rationality whose objectivity is in question and how is perceptual or recollective 
malfunctioning to be explicated without invoking the liability to foster precisely error?
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factual only disagreement which is non-evaluative and infers the non-factuality of the 
evaluative from the discretion that is left to us when all disagreement so recognized is 
resolved.
This is roughly the line Wright considers when the idea is developed further in 
Truth and Objectivity under the heading of Cognitive Command. A discourse, he 
suggests, exerts Cognitive Command iff:
It is a priori that differences of opinion formulated within the discourse, 
unless excusable as a result of vagueness in a disputed statement, or in 
the standards of acceptability, or variation in personal evidence 
thresholds, so to speak, will involve something which may properly be 
regarded as a cognitive shortcoming.^^
The same apparent circularity arises here, this time with the reference to "cognitive 
shortcoming". Wright seeks to meet this problem, taking discourse about the comic as 
paradigmatic of something that plausibly fails to exhibit Cognitive Command. 
Considering the opposite view, held by a realist about the comic, he distinguishes, 
firstly, the view which holds that:
the cognitive shortcoming whose existence is claimed by the trivializing 
theorist must specifically and irreducibly concern comic quality.
This option, however, is hard placed to
37 Wright, 1992. pl44.
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avoid invoking the idea of a sui generis cognitive sense or faculty, 
sensitive to sui generis states of affairs?^ ^
And such invocation, he suggests, is only legitimate if
the best explanation of our practice of the discourse, and especially the 
phenomenon of non-collusive assent about opinions expressed therein, 
has to invoke the idea that such a faculty is at work/^
A requirement which is not, he claims, met in this case.
The second option he considers for the realist is to see beliefs about the comic as 
proceeding inferentially from independently justified beliefs about other non-comic 
matters, matters on which disputants are assumed arguendo in agreement. But, if an 
explanation of their disagreement about the comic is to invoke some cognitive 
shortcoming not irreducibly concerned with comic qualities, then it must presumably 
locate it in disagreement about the principles by which such inferences proceed. But 
then the same dilemma arises with our beliefs about these. Either an intuitional story is 
told with the same requirement of explanatory adequacy and no greater prospect of 
meeting it or an inferential story in which case an identical dilemma resurfaces one step 
further down the argument.
The point seems to be roughly this: if disagreement about the comic does not point 
to explanation in terms of cognitive shortcoming in the same way as disagreement 
about the natural world might paradigmatically be held to, then a prima facie case 
exists for adopting an in some way less realist attitude to the former than the latter. If it
Ibid., pl50.
Ibid., pl53.
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is maintained that it does so point then the alleged facts about the comic become sui 
generis, inferentially isolated from such paradigmatically cognitive beliefs as those 
about the natural world.
Am I not missing the point dragging in all this stuff about the natural world? After 
all, vis à vis the best explanation requirement, Wright insists that it should:
not be equated, for instance, with the claim that we require some 
naturalistic or scientifically reductive account of what the states of 
affairs in question consist in, and a causal story of the interaction with 
them that the operations of the alleged faculty involve.'*^
He also however writes however that it would be
circular, or viciously regressive, to suppose that such inferentially 
justifying beliefs can themselves invariably concern comedy.**^
And the reader might wonder at this point why the same difficulty fails to arise for our 
beliefs about the natural world, the world of physical particulars that familiarly impinge 
on us through our sensory media. For here the threat of circularity or regress is also 
notoriously present- in, for example, David Armstrong's "infinite regress of reasons". 
But what presumably distinguishes the natural realm from the comic is just the 
availability of a rich and detailed body of knowledge and theory of how that realm 
impinges on us and how our sensory faculties equip us as the objects of such
Ibid., p i54. 
Ibid., pl52.
42 See Armstrong, 1973. chapter 11..
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impinging. In this case the claimed onus on the realist about the comic would be either 
a) to provide "some naturalistic or scientifically reductive account" of it, bringing truth 
about it within the purview of what our five senses equip us to detect; or b) to invoke 
some special faculty sensitive to comic states of affairs thus involving himself in the 
embarrassment consequent on the unavailability of any clear understanding of the 
working of any such faculty remotely comparable in its power and detail to our 
understanding of our sensory capacities; or c) to provide an account that links comic 
discourse to "justified beliefs about non-comic matters"*^  ^where there matters are 
neither natural nor comic but pertain to some third realm in which case we need a 
story about the faculty that sensitizes us to this realm and the same embarrassment is 
likely to recur.
Given this reading of the matter I am not wholly convinced by Wright's insistence'*'^  
that the matter of cognitive command is altogether separate fi-om another way of 
giving a focus to disputes about realism considered in chapter 5 of Truth and 
Objectivity viz, the issue of best explanation. In this context Wright makes a useful 
proposal as to how, in the light of difficulties raised by Wiggins and Nicholas 
Sturgeon'* ,^ to fill out the notions of representation and correspondence by appeal to 
the best explanation of beliefs. The proposal is that, rather than simply invoking 
something's aptness to figure in explanations of some alleged domain of "facts", we 
question instead its Mndth o f cosmological role :
Wright, 1992, pl52. 
'*'*Ibid.,pl57.
Wiggins, 1991. Sturgeon, 1985. 1986. Harman 1977. chapter 1 is the main point of 
reference in the literature for the invocation of best explanation.
28
the crucial question is not whether a class of states of affairs feature in 
the best explanation of our beliefs about them, but of what else there is, 
other than our beliefs, of which the citation of such states of affairs can 
feature in good enough explanations.'*^
In this way we may remain unimpressed by such
kinds of explanatory citation of the states of affairs with which a 
discourse deals which are licensed purely and simply by that discourse's 
minimal truth-aptitude.'*^
In this case, then, the point is the cosmological isolation of the moral, the comic or 
whatever from the wider natural order to which the anti-realist is appealing. In the 
earlier case, the crux was that of inferential isolation. Inferential isolation was held to 
be disturbing unless we had a story to tell about some special faculty giving us access 
to an isolated sphere of sui generis facts. Were there such a realm of sui generis comic 
or moral facts and a faculty sensitive to them and were we supplied with a rich and 
detailed account of the workings of that faculty and the mechanism of impingement it 
made possible, inferential isolation would not be such a problem. And neither 
presumably would cosmological isolation. And it is because there is no such account 
that both are a problem. It is par excellence in the context of a natural order of 
physical bodies, events and causes that we best understand the idea of states of affairs 
corresponding to and represented by our beliefs, independent of the latter but causally 
impinging on us so as to feature in their explanation.
Wright, 1992. ppl96-197.
47 Ibid., pl97.
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Generalizing from these considerations, the upshot might seem to be that in 
seeking to articulate a contrast between a substantively factual domain and any which 
is not, one promising way of proceeding might be to seek to characterize the most 
uncontroversial, paradigmatic category of facts we know of, that is publically 
observable facts about causally interacting material things located in space and stress 
the difficulty we encounter when we try to extend the notion of a fact too far from this 
heartland to, say, moral categories of fact. The further we get from that heartland, the 
further "facts" gets from meaning "things like these", the greater our dependence on 
the sort of formal considerations invoked by such observations as D5 and W5 is liable 
to become and the greater the onus on the realist to explain what more them minimal 
truth he is entitled to claim becomes. As Alan Gibbard expresses it:
we easily agree on the layout of surrounding rocks and trees and these
judgements are our prime examples of objectivity.'*^
As Putnam and others have stressed, there is a problem about the objectivity even of 
the rocks and the trees; but for the present it suffices to note the extent to which the 
realist's embarrassment is consequent on the sheer causal and inferential remoteness of 
any putative domain of evaluative facts from this naturalistic heartland of basic sensory 
deliverance. In a way, all this is simply to elaborate on Hume. The gap between an "is" 
and "ought" may not be unbridgable but it is certainly tellingly big.
1.5. Should this much content us? In chapter 3 I will join other contemporary writers 
in exploiting the fertile notion of direction o f fit  and in chapter 8 1 will explain why I 
doubt that Wright's minimal realism is as fatal to an expressivist position as he
'*^ Gibbard, 1990. p249.
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supposes. But for the remainder of the present chapter, I wish to confine my attention 
to a more particular difficulty that is often raised for the non-cognitivist.
Dummetf s characterization of quasi-assertions summarized above appears in a 
discussion of the problem of how to take the appearance of allegedly non-assertoric 
sentences in indirect contexts.'*  ^The source of such problems, brought to bear on 
moral theory by Peter Geach, is the Fregean point that, if negation were taken as a 
distinct kind of force from assertion, the argument;
If not P, then not Q. Not P. Therefore not Q.
would look like this:
=> -.Q).-|P. Therefore:-! Q ”
The argument this seeks to capture is most perspicuously represented as a case of 
modus ponens, which, so formalized, it clearly fails to be, modus ponens requiring that 
the unasserted proposition in the antecedent of the conditional mean the same as the 
second premise.
In its moral variant, this problem is observed by considering the argument form:
The loci classici are Frege, "Negation" in his 1977 and Geach " Ascriptivism" and 
"Assertion" in his 1972. Notable contributions to the ensuing debate are Blackburn, 
1971. 1984. chapter 6, 1988 and 1993: Dummett, 1973. chapter 10; Cooper 1981, 
ppl59-161; G F. Schueler, 1988: Hurley, 1989. chapter 9; Gibbard, 1990. pp94-95; 
Bob Hale, 1993.
"I" for a rejection-sign follows Lukasiewicz- see Geach, 1972. p260.
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If P is wrong, Q is wrong. P is wrong. So Q is wrong.
If this is to be a valid instance of modus pomns the expression "P is wrong" must mean 
the same throughout. A fallacy of equivocation is otherwise perpetrated.
The argument seems powerful if we take the evaluative utterance as having some 
special evaluative force distinct from assertoric. For, following Blackburn's use of "H!" 
("hurrah") and "B!" ("boo") as rudimentary deontic operators^*, this would yield 
sometliing like this:
(2) (P is wrong => Q is wrong). B!(P).
Therefore: B!(Q)
Here the antecedent of the first premise cannot mean B!(P) for B!(P) signals the 
thought that P is wrong, not the supposition that it is. So the antecedent of the first 
premise is related to the second as an unasserted proposition is to an asserted one. It 
is, as it were, "unbooed". So that the argument once again eludes formalization as a 
valid instance of modus ponens.
The non-cognitivist is likely to be sceptical about this. Consider the following 
argument involving imperatives (to which non-cognitivist theories tend to regard moral 
statements as comparable):
Don't go out without locking the door. Go out. So lock the door.
There is clearly a logical relation between the premises and the conclusion. Someone 
disobeying the concluding imperative has failed to obey the premised imperatives. The
51 Blackburn, 1984. chapter 6.
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obedience-conditions of the (internal) negation of the conclusion are inconsistent with 
the obedience conditions of the premises. So why not simply reconstrue the logical 
constants as truth-or-obedience-fimctional instead of simply truth-functional, so that 
the door-locking example comes out as of the form:
(3) !(P => Q). !P. Therefore: !Q.
At a superficial glance, this resembles modus ponens but it is not. The explanation, 
we suggested, of the logical relations between sentences with imperative force was to 
be found in the logical relations that obtain between their obedience-conditions. If so, 
it should be possible to capture the former in terms of the latter. We can do this by 
means of a propositional constant "C" which is read as "All the obedience conditions of 
the relevant imperatives are fulfilled" where the relevant imperatives are just those 
whose logical relations are being appraised in a given context where C appears, but 
including only those that are issued, not those that occur in indirect "unissued" 
contexts (an "issual sign" would be no less and no more pointless in a logic that 
included imperatives than an assertion sign). Imperative forms are then replaced for 
purposes of logical appraisal by normal truth-functional forms by the substitution for 
!P of (C => P). The operation of this substitution on the form:
(4) (!P ==> !Q). !P. Therefore: !Q. 
yields
(5) (C => P) => (C => Q). C => P. Therefore: C => Q.
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which is a perfectly standard and valid instance of modus ponens. (3), on the other 
hand, turns into:
(6) (C => (P => Q)). C => P. Therefore C => Q.
which is not a standard and valid instance of modus ponens but which is no less valid 
and altogether satisfactory for that.
The motivation for the substitution is that for any imperative, !P, the set of 
obedience conditions of that command, or a consistent class of commands to which it 
belongs, will entail the satisfaction of the truth-conditions of P. On the other hand, 
however, asserting the realization of the obedience-conditions of !P does not, in any 
sense, entail !P. Acceptance of the former in no way commits one to the issuing of the 
latter, but if the logical relationships between imperatives are solely a matter of the 
logical relationships between their obedience-conditions, operation of the substitution 
method described to yield forms involving no imperatives, issued or unissued, should 
prove sufficient to capture them.
If evaluative utterances are supposed, in spite of their indicative surface grammar, 
to be more allied to imperative than assertoric utterances, similar considerations might 
be expected to apply, so that the logical relations between such utterances would be 
explicated in terms of the logical relations between the realization conditions for the 
evaluations they serve to express. And indeed Cooper, Blackburn and Gibbard have all 
offered account of this matter along roughly such lines. Here I will briefly sketch my 
own.
I will consider two cases- that of purely expressive utterances and that of mixed 
utterances. By a "purely expressive" utterance I will understand one that serves only to
52 See Cooper and Gibbard, opera cit., note 49 above and Blackburn, 1988.
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express an evaluative attitude to the eventuality that its propositional content be true.
In the terminology I will borrow from G. E. M. Anscombe in chapter 3 below the 
thought expressed is one with only world-word direction of fit. Constructions apt for 
this purpose are rare in English at any rate but those involving such expressions as 
"hurrah for" and those involving optative constructions ("would that", etc.) would 
seem to fit the bill. In Blackburn's notation we might represent such thoughts simply by 
the forms B!(P), H!(P).
In the case of such pure attitudes it might not be clear that there's much to be said. 
For it isn't obviously true that any logical impropriety is involved in having such 
attitudes that conflict. Just this happens to G. F. Schueler, who apparently combines a 
healthy appetite with a concern for his weight, almost every time he passes the cookie 
jar.^  ^Nonetheless, it is correct to say that a norm of consistency does at least a great 
dead o f the time properly constrain our evaluative thinking. Up to a point, Schueler is 
logically perfectly entitled to want to have his cookies and eat them but this is not a 
want he can implement. Once we move from a state of mere wishfulness to an 
engagement in serious practical reasoning, we are in a position where the critical 
appraisal of our attitudes for consistency is indeed appropriate. That it is not always so 
appropriate need not prevent our seeking to elucidate the workings of such appraisal in 
cases where it is.^ '*
That done, let us consider the following piece of syllogistic reasoning:
EXAMPLE I AH philosophers should be shot.
Lenman is a philosopher.
Therefore: Lenman should be shot.
Understood as purely evaluative, we might plausibly represent this thus:
“  Schueler, 1988. p500.
Compare Blackburn, 1988. pp508-509.
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(x)H!(Px=> Sx)^ ^
Pa
Therefore; H!(Sa)
And it's certainly puzzling, at first glance how to appraise this for formal logical 
adequacy. But, as just noted, a norm of consistency is supposed operating and we 
might remember to mention this. What this norm demands is the coherent possibility 
that any such evaluative attitudes as are currently under appraisal are realized. So let 
"Nc" stand for the proposition that they are so realized. Now example I can be treated 
along similar lines to our handling of imperatives above, representing the logical 
relations that interest us by substituting (Nç => P) for H!(P) throughout. Thus:
(x)(Nc => (Px => Sx))
Pa
Therefore: N(] => Sa.
This is entirely sound and exhibits the connection between realization conditions in 
virtue of which example I seems an acceptable piece of reasoning.
There does seem to be a problem though, perhaps best focused by stating a 
dilemma which Bob Hale^ ® takes to place the expressive theorist in some difficulty. On 
horn one talk of "logical relations" between evaluative attitudes is unpacked, in the 
spirit of Blackburn's earlier Spreading the Word treatment, in terms of higher order 
attitudes expressing approval or disapproval of certain combinations of attitudes with 
other attitudes or with beliefs, thereby constraining our attitudes in various ways. The
I take this to be a more plausible representation of the thought in question than 
H!(x)(Px “> Sx) as the latter is consistent with the preference ranking (All 
philosophers are shot) > (No philosophers are shot) > (Some but not all philosophers 
are shot) and a natural reading would not, I suggest, be so consistent.
In his 1993.
36
difficulty on horn one is for the expressivist to explain how this constraint works. And, 
if the expressivist is, like Blackburn, some kind of quasi-realist, the difficulty will also 
be to explain how its working succeeds in being a matter of logic rather than of some 
kind of attitudinal ethics and moreover not just a matter of logic but, in a given case, a 
matter of just whatever logical principle (modus ponens or whatever) the initial surface 
appearance of the argument would appear to be exhibiting. To Hale this seems an 
insuperable difficulty. On horn two, exemplified in Blackburn's later "Attitudes and 
Contents"^ ,^ the logical relations that interest us are taken to be of just the familiar kind
1988. The account of these matters presented in this paper is an interesting one quite 
different from what follows here. Blackburn broadly follows Jaakko Hintikka's (1969) 
model-set-theoretic deontic logic in constructing a logic of attitudes. In this a notion of 
validity is invoked, following Hintikka's 0969) "deontic validity" that gains its content 
effectively from the idea of co-satisfiability he accords with Cooper, Gibbard and 
myself in appealing to. Blackburn's principle modification of Hintikka's system is one I 
tend to agree with Hale 0993. esp. pp349-350) in thinking an unfortunate one- the 
denizens of successive approximations to paradise plausibly move a great deal. At the 
same time, it might be said that Hintikka's original system can easily seem a little unreal 
in construing moral opinions as effectively characterizations of deontically perfect ideal 
worlds. Such world are plausibly just too remote from this frequently horrible place for 
such characterization to get much grip upon our actual practical reasoning (or even 
perhaps on most of our wishful fantasies). The notion of deontically perfect worlds 
also appears to rely on an unstated assumption that the deontic merit of world is a 
concept with an intrinsic maximum and this is by no means intuitively obvious.
37
valid in just the familiar way. So that the logic is all very hunky-dory but where has the 
expressivism gone? In particular, one way he considers horn two might be taken is 
simply by adopting a descriptive reading of the evaluative components of the formulae, 
thus both reaping its rewards and suffering its drawbacks in particularly 
straightforward ways. Isn't this just what I'm suggesting? For, after all, my conclusion 
is Nc => S(a). And this for the expressivist is hardly the same thing as H!(Sa) which is 
what is needed.
Well no, it isn't the same thing. But it's rather close. For expresses the 
realization conditions of a norm of consistency to which, ex hypothesi, our reasoning is 
committed. We may thus appeal to what I will call the Nq principle'.
that someone who is thus committed to endorsing a norm 
of consistency with realization conditions Nç; is 
thereby committed, given that => P, to the 
endorsement of
An obvious realist rejoinder to that is now shouting at you and I shall shortly deal 
with it. But I want to shelve it for a few paragraphs and explain first how my treatment
Hale notes (pp347-8) that Blackburn's account is going to have problems with 
iterated attitude operators. It seems worth suggesting that the best way of dealing with 
such iterations might simply be to rule them out completely as ill-formed. Expressive 
attitudes just fail intelligibly to embed inside themselves (on this point see Cooper, 
1981. pp76-80).
Here, of course, as with the N principle below, “H!(P)” refers to and does not 
express an evaluation of that form.
38
extends to mixed evaluations. A mixed evaluative utterance, HI(P) say, I take to 
involve the utterer in the following:
N=>P; H!(N); H!(P)
where N is the statement that certain norms accepted by the speaker are realized.^  ^
These may well involve far more substantial matters than mere consistency. Or they 
may not. The exact meaning of "N" will vary greatly from context to context. Indeed in 
many contexts the meaning of "N" may well not be particularly exact. The point is 
simply that in saying H!(P), a speaker expresses a positive valuation of P in virtue of its 
being consequent on the realization of some norm to which he thereby also expresses a 
positive valuation. Now we can deal with a case of modus ponens:
EXAMPLE n  Courage is a good thing
If courage is a good thing, organized games 
should be on school curricula.
Therefore: Organized games should be on school 
curricula.
As I read it, the utterer of a mixed evaluation expresses a belief and a couple of pure 
evaluations, a descriptive and an evaluative ingredient. The logical relations of the 
latter are problematic. So let's just forget them for a bit. If we simply leave otd the 
evaluative ingredients of premises and conclusion and read "C" as "Courage abounds" 
and "G" as "Organized games are on school curricula" we get simply:
N=>C
(N=>C)=>(N=>G)
Therefore: N => G.
59 Here I am indebted to Gibbard, 1990.
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Which is of course as straightforward a piece oï modus ponens as anyone could wish 
for.
EXAMPLE III If Jones stole the money he ought to be 
punished.
Jones stole the money.
Therefore: Jones ought to be punished.
Given the same treatment yields:
S=>(N=>P)
S
Therefore: N => P.
Again just the modus ponens it might look like to an innocent logician's eye.
Something similar works with much "thicker" moral concepts also. Thus let Nl  be 
the statement that the norms constitutive of some notion of loyalty are realized. We 
can thus extract from the following:
EXAMPLE IV It is disloyal to betray a friend.
For Freddy to tell Toby Gina's shamefid 
secret would be to betray a friend.
Therefore: For Freddy to tell Toby Gina's shamefiil 
secret would be disloyal, 
the following form:
N l  —i B
T=>B 
Therefore: Nl  => -iT.
Note that for a certain kind of externalist moral realist (along the lines of Philippa 
Foot or David Brink) the argument forms I have extracted from Examples II-IV would 
be the whole story of the reasoning involved in these examples. But for the expressivist 
it cannot be. So that it looks as if we are taking horn two of Hale’s dilemma. Where
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has the expressivism gone? Once again, it must be said, N => G is one thing, H!G quite 
another.
Yes indeed. But again they are rather close together. For N expresses the 
realization conditions of some norm or norms to which, ex hypothesi, the speaker is 
committed. And we may thus appeal to what I will call the Nprinciple:
that anyone who is thus committed to endorsing a norm 
with realization conditions N is thereby committed, 
given that N => P, to the endorsement of H!(P).^ **
Of our two principles, the N ç principle and the N principle it is clear that the 
former is simply a special case of the latter. So that in effect we are relying upon a 
single principle- the N principle.
Following the N principle takes us, given commitment to an appropriate norm 
from H!(N) and (N => P) to H!(P). This is not, naturally, a matter of our rehearsing an 
argument that goes as follows:
Anyone who is thus committed to endorsing a 
norm with realization conditions N is thereby 
committed, given that N => P, to the 
endorsement of H!(P).
I am committed to endorsing a norm with 
realization conditions N.
N=>P.
Therefore: I am committed to endorsing H!(P).
See note 58 above.
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Rather the form of argument which we need is simply:
H!(N)
N=>P 
Therefore: H!(P).
The N principle is intended to characterize the principle followed by someone who 
rehearses this latter argument but it is not, plainly, itself a premise in this argument. 
Analogously it is a principle of theoretical reason that anyone who makes an assertion 
with truth conditions T is committed, given that T => P, to the assertion of P. But that 
is not to say that this analogous principle is represented as a premise in such theoretical 
reasoning- the conclusion of such an argument is never “I am committed to the 
assertion of P” but simply P.
This brings me to the realist rejoinder I left dangling earlier. It is simply- but what 
about the N-principle itselp. What is its logic? What story do I propose to tell about 
the logic of the form of argument we rehearse when we follow the N principle that will 
steer a course between the horns of Hale's dilemma, given that I cannot appeal without 
circularity to N or, in particular, to Nç? If (horn two) H!(N) is given a sufficiently 
realist reading to give us simple truth-preserving modus ponens again, then any claim 
to expressivism must vanish for good. And if it is not (horn one) are we to read the 
“therefore” in the foregoing argument as expressing a logical connection or some kind 
of a moral or otherwise evaluative one?
Given the need to avoid circularity, the latter option seems the more appealing. 
That still leaves dangling the question just how we should read the “therefore”. And 
here, for now, I go agnostic. I don t  know what the best story is about the status of the 
N principle. The point I am concerned to make is rather just that the N-principle is
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highly economical and immensely plausible. Given this plausibility, there is a strong 
case for simply taking it as basic, as fiindamentally constitutive of attitudinal reasoning, 
the whole point o f which is to direct us to the consistent realization of the norms we 
accept.
The analogy with simple imperative logic is clear here. For just as the N 
principle is needed to bridge the gap between N=> P and H!(P) so we need to assume 
a principle, the C principle if you like, to take us from C => P to !P. And, in the same 
way, the plausibility of the analysis is saved by the sheer plausibility and economy of 
the C-principle. The problem with imperatives is to show how 
“Don’t go out without locking the door. Go out. So lock the door” is good reasoning 
while “Don’t go out without locking the door. Lock the door. So go out” is not. The 
argument obtained by substitution of (C => P) for all !P shows how this is just what it 
appears to be, a matter of the logical relations between the contents of the premises. 
The invocation of the C principle reconciles this with respect for the non-assertoric 
character of both premises and conclusion. The latter part of the story respects the fact 
that it is not in virtue of preserving truth that the one argument is better than the other; 
while the former shows how that superiority is nonetheless a matter of logic. Invoking 
the C principle leaves some questions unanswered of course but we don’t need to wait 
for these answers to see that logic is indeed at work here. Likewise, mutatis mutandis, 
for the evaluative case.
Again an analogy suggests itself with respect to theoretical reasoning where a 
norm of consistency may be said to play a governing role. And here too there are 
questions for philosophers to raise about the status of any such norm. The questions 
are hard ones and nobody, least of all myself, is altogether clear how they may be 
answered, but that such questions wait for answers is not yet of course a good reason 
to think ourselves wrong to follow such a norm.
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So that, though I don’t here have a story to tell about the exact status of either 
the C principle or the N principle, I don’t think, for my present purpose, I need to tell 
one. For that purpose is just to show that the Geach problem does not constitute a 
refutation of non-cognitivism. My main point here is effectively a strategic one, 
suggesting that the best account of logical arguments with evaluative components is a 
two step analysis working as follows.
First we get from the premises of our original arguments a set of 
straightforwardly factual statements- on the one hand the originally factual premises 
and on the other statements corresponding to the evaluative premises that state their 
realization to be implied by N. In general, one simply substitutes (N => P) for all H!(P) 
(and (N => -iP) for all B!(P)). The evaluative ingredient in the meanings of the 
premises is simply ignored at this point because logically speaking it does no work 
here so that there is no puzzle about how it could. In this first step I am effectively 
following Cooper, Gibbard and the Blackburn of “Attitudes and Contents”, in taking 
Hale's horn two; but I avoid its pitfalls by putting the expressive aspect of the meaning 
of the premises to work in the second step which simply applies the N principle, here 
taken as primitive.
The point of the first step is that it shows how to explain how the working of 
the arguments in question can be seen as a matter of logic, thus removing the main 
sting fi'om the first horn of Hale’s dilemma. But this doesn’t squeeze the expressivism 
out of the picture in the way Hale thinks it should. For here we need simply stress that 
the first step is not the whole story. If you want to know where the expressivism has 
gone, the answer is the business of the second step, where the N-principle is invoked. 
The proposal is thus is effect to take both horns of the dilemma but sharply to 
distinguish the parts of the story at which they are respectively grasped.
There remains a problem of explaining exactly what the status of this principle 
is. I don’t purport to deliver this explanation but here appeal simply to the plausibility
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and economy of the principle itself. But of course the philosophical problematicity of 
the N-principle scarcely shows that it’s mistaken. Analogously the fact that I (like 
everyone) am unable to give a wholly satisfying account of the character of logical 
necessity does not, nor should it, undermine my confidence regarding what I commit 
myself to by the joint assertion of the mortality of all men and the humanity of 
Socrates.
The N principle is plausible but its status is unexplained. So the second step of 
the analysis is incomplete. But we don’t need to wait for its completion to see how the 
kinds of arguments given in the examples succeed in being logical arguments. For that 
explanation is given by the first step of the analysis. Given the incompleteness of the 
first step the Geach problem stays with us as a problem in the philosophical 
interpretation of the logic of evaluative attitudes. But given the way the second step 
dovetails with the first it is not a convincing reason to doubt that there is any such 
thing as a logic of attitudes. So that while I wouldn’t claim that the foregoing 
considerations constitute a solution to the problem Geach identified, I would claim 
that, as far as the credibility of expressivism is concerned, they put it in its place.
45
Chapter 2; Objectivity and Rationality: Some Naturalistic Views
2.1. The words "subjective" and "objective are subject to a dangerous variability of 
meaning. Some help is given by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord who, in his study of the 
"conceptual cartography" of moral realism* characterizes subjectivism as a variety of 
realism, one on which moral claims do have truth conditions, but that these are mind- 
dependent, that they
are literally true, when true, but only because of the subjective states of 
someone (e.g., the desires, preferences and goals of the relevant 
person.).^
On this definition, welfarist theorists, for instance, even if they are realists, count as 
subjectivists. But a theorist such as Mackie who, having disavowed realism, accepts 
that on his view "moral values...are in some very broad sense subjective"  ^would not.
We may recognize the ambiguity here by adopting the terms positive subjectivism 
and negative subjectivism, corresponding to the "traditional" and "positivistic" senses 
of the word. The first is cognitivist, seeing value judgements as in some sense offering 
descriptions of the subjective attitudes of people. The second is non-cognitivist, taking
* Sayre-McCord, 1986.
 ^Ibid., pl3. As examples of subjectivism so defined he cites Hobbes, Spinoza, 
Gauthier, Brandt, Perry. One might also mention Richard Taylor, 1984 and Lewis,
1989. See also R. M. Hare, 1989. pp 18-24, who emphasizes that the 
subjectivist/objectivist distinction "is a division within descriptivism."
 ^ 1977. pl8.
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them as expressions of such states of mind. Both views espouse mind-dependence, 
making the activity of valuing conditional on the existence of minds and their attitudes 
but on nothing else. But the first is realist in a way the second is not.
Between "objectivism" and "subjectivism" is what Sayre-McCord calls 
"intersubjectivism". It is in the business of
spelling out the truth-conditions of moral claims in terms of the 
conventions or practices of groups of people.'*
This can see moral claims as simply descriptive of, "(about and not merely reflecting) 
the conventions and practices" of the society in question. This I will call positive 
conventionalism. Such theories identify morality with the social morality, the shared 
morality of the group.
Analogous to my distinction between positive and negative subjectivism is a 
distinction between his intersubjectivism and a variety of what Sayre-McCord calls 
instrumentalism, that is a form of non-cognitivism whereby moral claims reflect (and 
do not merely describe) the conventions and practices of society. This position might 
be called "negative conventionalism".
Also intersubjectivist are theories that make moral truth "the product of 
convention", no mere description of thereof, that argue that:
the correctness of a moral principle...depends on its falling within the 
best coherent justificatory theory available (in principle) for the 
practices, conventions and principles we happen to embrace.^
'* 1986.pl3.
'  Ibid., pl4.
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This the sort of position I will call critical conventionalism as opposed to what might 
be called crude conventionalism that simply takes the prevailing social values for 
granted. The same distinction may be drawn within subjectivism: we can have an 
account of morality couched not in terms of people’s desires but of those desires under 
rational constraints- a theory which identifies the good with "the fine ordering of 
responses"^, what people would desire if their desires were so ordered, if they were 
fiilly informed, if they satisfied the demands of deliberative rationality. We could call 
such theories critical subjectivist theories of value as opposed to crude subjectivist 
theories.
About the crude variants of positive subjectivism and conventionalism, I will have 
little to say as they have little to recommend them. I certainly do and should not 
resolve puzzlement in the face of a moral problem either by introspecting my desires or 
by an exercize in sociological research to ascertain the received wisdom of my peers. 
And of course the difficulty these views face in making sense of moral disagreement, 
be it interpersonal or cross-cultural, are notorious. The view of values I shall myself 
defend in coming chapters contains elements of both negative subjectivism and 
negative conventionalism. I shall seek moreover to show that, given certain conditions, 
it recognizes much that is correct in the critical variants of both subjectivism and 
conventionalism. The main purpose of the present chapter is however to highlight 
some difficulties with the following views as other writers have defended them: critical 
positive conventionalism, of which more will be said in discussing extemalism in 
chapter 3 below, which is represented here by the view of Susan Hurley; and some 
rather different forms of critical positive subjectivism, represented mainly by the work 
of R. B. Brandt, David Lewis and John McDowell.
I. A. Richards, 1926. p62.
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2.2. The word "objective" may be just a bad word 
because it's never clear whether it's an 
epistemological or a metaphysical notion.
Putnam, like Sayre-McCord, is concerned, in these remarks ,^ to note the lack of 
univocality in the notion of objectivity. The sort of opposition to objectivism that is 
found in Mackie, for example, is opposition primarily to objectivism conceived as an 
ontological thesis ,^ a thesis about "the furniture of the universe". The views I will 
consider in this chapter seek to articulate conceptions of objectivity that thus avoid the 
metaphysical extravagances of platonism. All seek to defend the objectivity of value 
from a naturalistic perspective, the commonest strategy being to claim, while seeking 
to avoid large ontological or metaphysical assumptions, that certain evaluative 
principles are in some way rationally required of us (such requirement being 
presumably, in some sense, an objective matter).^
The problem already considered of what sort of truth is appropriate to evaluative 
contexts, is salient here also. By way of analogy, without accepting an extravagant 
platonistic ontology, I might believe myself rationally compelled to accept certain 
mathematical and logical truths. I may then think of these truths not as descriptions of 
some arcane metaphysical realm of numbers and logical necessities but as statements of 
rules I am rationally compelled to follow in my thinking. And likewise I might think of 
certain moral claims, say, as statements of rules I am rationally compelled to follow in
 ^From a seminar given at St Andrews, 2nd November, 1990.
 ^Cf. Mackie, 1977. pl8.
 ^The point about ontology is well made by Smith (1993) which provides a good 
example of the kind of rationalism I have in mind.
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my actions (and so, presumably it is true that I am rationally compelled to follow 
them).
We should begin by noting that such a view raises deep questions about just how 
we should take the whole notion of rational compulsion to which it appeals and any 
claim thereby made to objectivity. When Lewis Carroll’s tortoise proposes to refiise 
acceptance to a simple piece of syllogistic reasoning, Achilles feebly replies:
Then logic would take you by the throat and force you to do it! 10
It was a central point of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations^  ^that logic 
doesn't force us to do anything. On Wittgenstein's view, rules such as we follow in 
performing mathematical or logical operations are not objective features of reality over 
and above the practices whereby we follow them. There are not, on the one hand, our 
rule-following practices and, on the other, the rules they conform to. Rather those 
practices are all the reality those rules have and are constitutive of them. Just what we 
cannot do is compare our practices to the rule, conceived as something distinct from 
them, to see if they agree. It is, on the contrary, the fact that we agree, in those 
practices, among ourselves, that makes normativity possible.
The central thought may be expressed as follows: we can only distinguish correct 
from incorrect ways of going on in accordance with a rule by reference to that very 
rule. But in order to make such a reference we need to understand it, to interpret it.
Carroll, 1895. p280. Cf., Wittgenstein, 1956. sections 113-117.
See his 1956 and 1953. Detailed references are provided at the start of Wright,
1980. chapter II, which gives a useful account of the matter. Paul Boghossian's 1989 
provides a general survey of the contemporary discussion.
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But just what gives meaning to the interpretation^ to "the substitution of one 
expression of the rule for another"
any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and 
cannot give it any support/^
And how could we distinguish a correct from an incorrect interpretation of it, if not by 
reference to the use we put it to in following it and the use to which we put the words 
in which we frame it, both in so framing it and elsewhere? The rules that govern our 
linguistic practices, that make up our meanings, are of a kind with any others and our 
ways of going on, quite generally, serve uniquely to determine what is signified by the 
rules we bring to bear in evaluating and describing those very ways of going on.
The precise upshot of the rule-following considerations in moral philosophy as 
elsewhere is a matter of great controversy. Certainly it is implausible to see them as 
successfully undermining the very idea of meaning and the very practice of rationality 
as any argument with such a conclusion would plausibly be self-refuting. Rather, I 
would suggest, the following four related morals may be entertained:
(1) The immanence of rules/meanings. These do not transcend, are not external to, 
the practices that embody them. Thus, in one sense of the word, they may be said to I
fail in point of objectivity. j
(2) The possibility of rules/meanings is thus the product of system, of complexity : jI
What, in a complicated surrounding we call "following a rule" we |
should not call that if it stood in isolation. j
Wittgenstein, 1953.1, 201. 
Ibid., I, 198.
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Language, I should like to say, relates to a way of living.
In order to describe the phenomenon of language, one must describe a 
practice, not something that happens once, no matter of what kind.^ '^
It is from considerations like this that Wittgenstein seems to conclude that language- 
use must be not only intersubjective (the "private language argument") but also 
extended in time."^^
(3) The central point that interpretation itself stands in need of interpretation, 
together with the impossibility, in principle, of meaning being intrinsic to the thought 
or expression that bears it, yield the Wittgensteinian moral that "interpretation comes 
to an end"^ :^
When I say "If you follow the rule, this must come out", that doesn't 
mean, because it always has. Rather that it comes out is one of my
Wittgenstein, 1956, VI, 33-34. Cf. VI, 21:
it would be nonsense to say: just once in the history of the world 
someone followed a rule (or a signpost, played a game, uttered a 
sentence, or understood one and so on).
1953. section 138. Cf. the story of the "two-minute men" in 1956. VI, 34. 
1956. VI. 39
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foundations. What must come out is a foundation of judgement that I 
do not touch/^
(4) As any principles to which we appeal in justification are themselves of the 
nature of rules, justification also "comes to an end."^ * So the search for absolute 
foundations founders on the same rock as the search for absolute objectivity. This is 
the theme of On Certainty, where we may find such a passage as this:
"I cannot doubt this proposition without giving up all judgement."
But what sort of proposition is that?... It is certainly no empirical 
proposition. It does not belong to psychology. It has rather the 
character of a rule.^^
Especially when (4) is borne in mind, the rule-following considerations force upon 
our attention what might be termed the pervasiveness o f normativity. The 
considerations have brought home the extension to the whole area of meaning of the 
difficulties that might have been thought to confine their havoc to the field of 
metaethics- can the normative realm be objective, can it be captured by reduction to 
some non-normative realm and, if neither, can an anti-realist position be made out with 
respect to it?^  ^(4) has brought it home that normativity goes, as it were, all the way 
down, that rules, that things at least closely of a kind with evaluations, underpin our
Ibid., VI, 46.
Wittgenstein, 1969. section 192. Cf. 1953. section 326.
1953. section 494.
Boghossian, 1989 highlights the emergence of these problems.
53
most basic beliefs about the objective world to which the world of values is so often 
supposed to contrast. Thus Putnam's claim that:
The question: which is the rational conception o f rationality itself 
difficult in exactly the way that the justification of an ethical system is 
diflficult.^ ^
2.3. The latter sort of consideration gives point, for example, to the version of the 
argument fi-om companions in guilt that Putnam himself urges in his efforts to subvert 
the fact/value distinction.^^
Putnam coins the two predicates "justifiedcamap" "J^sti^^^Newman" in 
John Henry) and considers a possible non-cognitivist's contention that:
no value judgement is involved in stating the fact that a given statement 
is justifiedçgjTiap or justified^g^man- But [he goes on] fi-om whose 
standpoint is the word "fact" being used. If there is no conception of 
rationality one ought to have, then the notion of a "fact" is empty.
The non-cognitivist is able, I think, to reply to this in two ways:
(1) Messrs. Carnap and Newman differ about justification and hence about the 
extension of “fact” but there is at least a theoretical limit on how far such disagreement
1981. pl36 I
j
^  See Wiggins, 1980. and Putnam, 1981. chapter 6. Putnam does not here explicitly |
relate his observations about the pervasiveness of normativity to the rule-following |
considerations, but the connection is, nevertheless, there to be made. I
I
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can go without collapsing into a case of cross-purposes.^^ For example, if either or 
both so understands "fact" as to exclude from its extension even the sort of paradigm 
facts adverted to at the close of 1.4 above, the commensurability of their views with 
our own (assuming arguendo that "we" are Johnsonian paragons of common sense), 
never mind each other's, would at least require considerable explanation. But if their 
disagreement does have the limits imposed by commensurability it is not clear that they 
would disagree radically, whatever their other differences, over the extension of their 
respective concepts of justification, "justifiedcarnap" "justified%qg^ Yman" Each 
might plausibly recognize, to a great extent, just what is and is not counted as justified 
by the other's standards as indeed might we. And if this is so, the "fact" appealed to by 
Putnam's non-cognitivist is surely rather better sheltered from the winds of relativism 
than he supposes.
(2) The bedrock of a coherent notion of justification in epistemology may indeed 
be conceded to involve one's values and there may be roughly Wittgensteinian reasons 
precisely for non-cognitivism about that bedrock. '^  ^But, in the first place that is not yet 
a reason for supposing that what we build on those foundations is not so structured as 
to permit the making of a fact-value distinction within it. As noted under (2) above, 
objectivity may be seen as the child of complexity, an insight that seems to leave space 
for combining non-cognitivism about the foundations of the epistemological edifice 
with cognitivism about the higher stories. We may then be well placed to make the 
point Allan Gibbard makes in this connection, that:
Cf. 3.1 below.
See Wright, 1980, chapter 20 and 1986a. And cf. Lenman, 1994a. section III.
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The justification of factual beliefs is a normative matter, but that does 
not turn factual beliefs into normative judgements.^^
Furthermore it may be replied that part of the very attractiveness in understanding 
the bedrock in non-cognitive terms is that this precisely removes the need for 
justification. A non-cognitive attitude like a desire, say "I want to go for a walk", may 
be susceptible of justification but if it has none, if I just do want to go for a walk and 
that's all there is to it, that isn't a problem in the way it is a problem if I have a wholly 
unsupported belief. For there is just not the same conceptual space for talk of a desire's 
being "mistaken" as there is with belief (even on an internal realist's sense of 
"mistaken"). Desire is perhaps answerable to norms of rationality just as belief is; but, 
unlike belief, it is not possible for it to be "wrong" in cases where there is no actual 
conflict with such norms.
2.4. The rule-following considerations have recently been deployed in the context of 
defending moral realism by Hurley^ ,^ arguing against subjectivism, which she defines 
as:
the view that preferences are prior to and independent of specific 
values, and indeed, in some way, determine values.^^
Gibbard, 1990, p34.
^  See her 1989, especially chapters 2-6. Cf. McDowell, 1981, Lovibond 1983. 
Wiggins, 1987. pp126-30.
1989. pl4.
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Note that this characterization of "subjectivism" differs from that given above. I shall 
be using the word in Hurley's sense only for the purposes of the present discussion of 
her work.
Hurley seeks to underpin a complex conception of ethical theory on which
reasons stand to intentional action in general as meanings stand to
linguistic action in particular.^®
She makes the point that Davidson's appeal to radical interpretation and Wittgenstein's 
to the shared practices of a community are comparable^ :^ both, as she reads them, 
addressed the problem of giving a naturalistic account of meaning by seeking to base 
that notion in the particularities of how people behave. Both reject accounts of 
meaning that are, as Putnam has expressed it, "magical"^ ®- words are not intrinsically 
meaningful, thoughts are not self-interpreting: in Hurley's terminology, there are no 
ultra-interpretations. The upshot of this, she has it, is that the very possibility of 
interpretation is based on the existence of substantive constraints on interpretation^^ 
supplied by a context of shared practices and that these constraints include precisely 
values. This extension of this form of constraint to the interpretation of preferences is 
taken to defeat subjectivism.
A desire does not necessarily call for justification. But it certainly calls for 
interpretation. The problem. Hurley stresses, is not merely of interpreting the 
preferences of other persons, but of interpreting one's own. Preferences are taken to be
Ibid., p273.
^  See in particular, ibid., chapter 3, section 3.
Hurley, 1989. p34; Putnam, 1981. pp3-5. 
See in particular her 1989. p36.
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"noraiatively constrained" so that, to some extent, as she quotes Lewis saying, an 
interpretee;
ought to believe what we would believe, or perhaps what we would 
have believed in his place, and he ought to desire what we desire, or 
perhaps would have desired in his place.^^
Of course tliis way of looking at things does not, in practice, seem much of a constraint 
in the case of the interpretation of one's own desires, but presumably we are intended 
here to suppose that one's believing and desiring much as those around one would 
believe and desire constitutes, in virtue of the non-solipsistic character of meaning 
which Hurley champions, that sufficiency of background agreement for foreground 
disagreement to be possible which is a condition of our even possessing a language and 
hence of our belief and desire contents being in any way determinate.^  ^Still the 
supposition here must presumably be not that I ought not to deviate too far (as this 
would be, to say the least, a puzzling supposition) from the desire and beliefs of others 
but that somehow I could not.
The constraints seen by Hurley to confine interpretation operate holistically 
moreover, this being both the most that the background of semantic argument is 
plausibly able to deliver and a condition on the possibility of the sort of moral 
disagreement that we actually encounter.
Quoted in ibid., p24, citing Lewis, 1983. pi 12. Lewis' thought here harmonizes with 
Wittgenstein (see e.g. 1956. VI, 39; 1953.1, 242) and Davidson (see e.g. 1984. p i97).
33 See Davidson, 1987. which Hurley cites (p393, n4).
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The conceptual locus of substantive disagreement is not constant from 
example to example. '^^
Given the resulting possibility of disagreement, there remains the problem of 
diagttosing it- given the available space for competing interpretations of evinced 
preferences there is always the option of interpreting m>ay any appearance of 
divergence. Do we, for example, explain away behaviour that apparently persistently 
violates the axioms of decision theory by imputing to the subject desires and beliefs of 
a perhaps increasingly Goodmanesque character or do we revise the axioms in question 
in the light of such behaviour. The problem is illustrated by discussions of John 
Broome's reluctant but cowardice-avoiding mountaineer, of Howard Raiffa's menu of 
unfair gambles (both apparently transitivity-violating before moral discriminations are 
invoked)^  ^and of Peter Diamond's proposed preference for one of two distribution 
procedures (apparently sure-thing-violating until fairness is invoked).^  ^The proposal of 
Lewis is cited that we interpret the mental content of persons in the light of a 
distinction between "natural" and "unnatural properties" so as to undermine the 
imputation to them of Goodmanesque contents.^  ^ As is Broome's response to the 
difficulty to the effect that, in imputing background beliefs so as to reinstate the 
threatened conformity between theory and data, we distinguish critically between 
beliefs that would serve to justify the observed behaviour and beliefs that would not,^ ® 
The moral drawn from both proposals, alongside the general Davidsonian emphasis on
Ibid., p51.
Ibid., p60.
Ibid., ppl02-105..
Ibid., p87. Citing his 1983. 
®^ Quoted in ibid., p85.
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charity and consensus, being the existence of substantive as well as formal constraints 
on eligible interpretations of preferences. Examples canvassed from the literature are 
taken to suggest that among the eligible background attitudes might be moral attitudes 
differentiating alternative courses of action in ways that make essential reference to 
such values as courage and fairness.
The same requirement of substantive, including moral, constraints on eligibility is 
urged in cases where it is a question of the eligibility of what John Harsanyi calls 
"extended preferences"- effectively preferences between combinations of 
circumstances and characters where in the latter are subsumed all distinguishing 
characteristics including preferences. This is argued in terms of a discussion of an 
example of Amartya Sen's in which both Prude and Lewd, whose names describe their 
inclinations, prefer that Prude, rather than Lewd read a certain risqué book. Prude out 
of an impertinent desire for Lewd's spiritual welfare. Lewd out of an equally 
impertinent desire to outrage Prude's sensibilities.^  ^But that nobody read the book is 
ranked by Lewd below the two other alternatives, by Prude above them. Given a 
hberal principle whereby Lewd should read it rather than nobody and nobody rather 
than Prude plus the Pareto Principle whereby Prude should read it rather than Lewd, 
an apparent intransitivity emerges, which can. Hurley suggests be eliminated by taking 
as eligible an extended preference ordering constrained by some principled recognition 
of the value of autonomy that discounts the more meddlesome aspects of both Prude 
and Lewd's first order preferences.
There are a number of difficulties with Hurley's account of value to which I would 
wish to draw attention here. To begin with, it is unclear how much work the 
Davidsonian and Wittgensteinian considerations invoked by Hurley are actually doing 
in the case of the sort of examples she considers. For from the insight that
39 Ibid., pp 116-8, citing Sen, 1982. pp80-83.
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disagreement is only possible against a background of agreement it follows of course 
that disagreement is possible against a background of agreement. In other words there 
is nothing in this insight that rules out the possibility of local disagreement. The move 
is thus indeed plausibly available of urging that disagreement might in principle quite 
intelligibly be global within the domain o f ethical values (to the extent that is not ruled 
out by straightforward considerations of consistency) given sufficient agreement 
outwith that domain. That is, some might disagree with us (prescinding from the 
question of who we are) on all (or as many as consistency permits) of the questions we 
normally (prescinding from problems about what that amounts to) classify as ethical or 
moral questions. Obviously they could not disagree on all normative questions as, 
given the normativity of meaning and of the canons of justified belief this would be 
tantamount to global disagreement. Nor could we take for granted given the 
hypothesized disagreement that they would demarcate some region of the normative as 
ethical or moral in remotely the way we do, so that the locality within which global 
disagreement is imaginable must be defined on ota system of categories, not theirs.
But this still leaves what Hurley calls the "horizon of intelligibility"'  ^looking rather too 
distant for what constrains interpretation to motivate a claim that value is objective. 
Certainly there may be substantive constraints on the interpretation of those who 
disagree with us. But, so interpreted, they may still disagree with us and such 
constraints do not suffice to motivate any claim that there is a fact of the matter about 
who is "right". Note too that it is one thing to say, plausibly, that, if agreement 
between us is to be possible, then, necessarily, there must be a core of judgements on 
which we agree; another again to say, less plausibly, that there must be a core of 
judgements on which, if agreement between us is to be possible, we necessarily agree.
40 Ibid., p51.
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The needed locus of agreement, as Hurley acknowledges, may be variable as well as 
local
Hurley's argument is, in effect, that we invoke substantive norms of rationality in 
order to make the conceptual disagreement/substantive disagreement distinction in 
cases where formal norms of rationality are apparently violated by agents. However 
when it is a question of which norms of rationality we should invoke in such cases it 
would seem obvious that their norms are prima facie to be preferred to our norms 
where these can be seen to differ, as, in cases where the disagreement is not global 
(and in none of her examples is it global), there is no reason why they should tmt both 
differ and be seen to differ. Thus we may accept Broome's point that justifiers should 
be given salience in matters of interpretation while insisting that when, say, I am 
interpreting you and I am Carnap and you are Newman, it is justifiers^g^j^an not
justifiersQamap which it is proper to invoke. Of course I then have to make out the 
substantial/conceptual distinction with respect to our disagreement about what 
justifiers are. Certainly if I invoke in this way some values or beliefs of yours that differ 
from mine, the substantive/conceptual difficulty may arise again. The problem is met in 
the same way by invoking distinctions that are eligible myour terms. If these too aren't 
eligible in my terms we may have the same problem. And if the disagreement between 
us approaches global disagreement this is how things wiU proceed until I indeed 
despair of making sense of you. But in fact, as I have said, none of Hurley's examples 
concern such global disagreement.
With her treatment of extended preferences this problem is exacerbated. For the 
question becomes one of whose extended preferences are in question. Of course on the 
usual understanding the whole point of extended preferences, as Hurley observes'^  ^is 
that they necessarily coincide, in virtue of the level of universalizability they are taken
41 Ibid.,ppl08-lll.
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to respect. It is precisely in virtue of this that they do the work they do in the theories 
of Harsanyi, Hare and others. Her criticism of this, following Charles Taylor and 
Michael Sandel, that this reduces the bearers of such preferences to "featureless bare 
egos"'^  ^is convincing, but by giving them features the question arises of what features 
they are to be. For writers such as Harsanyi and Hare it makes sense to speak of the 
extended preference ordering for the radical deployment of the third level of 
universalizability or the veil of ignorance leaves nothing for them to be except an 
ordering of outcomes by average utility. As everyone's extended preference orderings 
thus coincide we may cut the whole concept loose from its psychological moorings and 
speak simply of the extended preference ordering conceived simply as a mathematical 
object. But if, like Hurley, we resist this extreme level of abstraction, one surely looses 
this form of objectivity altogether. Extended preferences are then very definitely 
somebody’s higher-order preferences ranking packages of circumstances and lower 
order preferences. And, if our substantive values are needed to determine these, there 
is no reason at all to suppose they might coincide. And here it seems natural that the 
extended preferences imputed to Lewd and Crude, say, should be responsible to their 
values (which are perfectly intelligible and raise no particular problems about 
eligibility), not to ours. But not so. Hurley claims that liberal values provide "eligible 
distinctions" for determining an extended preference ordering even if Prude and Lewd's 
higher order preferences simply endorse their first-order preferences or indeed if they 
lack any (if they are wcmtons in Frankfurt's sense). Of course if we were trying to 
articulate how we think a social preference relation should be defined (which was Sen's 
original concern in constructing the example) our own liberal values might be an 
appropriate, "eligible", input. But it is another matter again when what we are trying to 
do is to interpret the extended preferences of Prude and Lewd. Here it just makes no
42 Ibid., pll2.
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sense to suggest that their extended preference ordering be liberal even "if they are 
both wantons, or...have opposed higher-order preferences"'^ .^ If either of the latter is 
the case then w  ha\^ e already done our interpreting o f them and liberal extended 
preferences are ruled out. Of course, our extended preference ordering may be liberal 
but that is not what we are supposedly trying to interpret. In fact Hurley seems to 
write as if it were still a question of the extended preference ordering but as we are no 
longer going all the way out to the third level of universalizability this just seems to beg 
the question of objectivity. What is now supposed to be determining the ordering? Our 
OM>n extended preferences? And what is special about these? The answer she ÿves is 
that they are "normal and natural" but this is at least in part simply to say that they are 
ours (compare 2.5 below), which cannot be both justificandum and justificans. Of 
course we can simply insistently (indeed perhaps with considerable resources of 
argument) stick to our liberal guns rigidly valuing liberal outcomes, but this is nothing 
to do with the interpretation of Prude and Lewd who, as described, are far from lying 
beyond the "horizon of intelligibility" simply because they dissent from our liberalism.
Hurley is somewhat inexplicit as to what she take "values" to be. She is generally 
scrupulous to define her terms and helpfully adverts to such definitions in her index by 
the use of bold type. Looking up "values" we are directed to p388, n31 where we find 
that they "provide reasons that are substantive rather than formal, and ultimate rather 
than instrumental". But this is presumably intended to supply a necessary, not a 
sufficient criterion for value-hood. For preferences may be both substantive and 
ultimate. That is why subjectivists are so very interested in them. Indeed there seems to 
be nothing in part 1 of her book, which is devoted to the refutation of subjectivism that 
prevents one from conceding the thrust of her argument and taking values as being 
simply higher-order preferences constrained by considerations of eligibility where the
43 Ibid., pi 17.
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latter are indeed (we concede arguendo), value-laden but where the values that load 
them are themselves precisely preferences. But if I am right in supposing such an 
understanding of what values are to evade her argument there remains an obvious 
sense in which lower order preferences are prior to, albeit not independent of, higher, 
in that, if preferences of order (n + 1) are taken to be preferences with respect to the 
preferring subject’s preferences of order n, the latter will be prior to, in the sense of 
presupposed by but not presupposing, the former.
But Hurley does not take values to be higher order preferences. In chapter 14 she 
writes:
There are truths about such things as meanings, beliefs, numbers, 
values, theories and explanations; and one can perceive the meaning, 
the value, the number of something concrete, or grasp its explanation; 
but is the meaning, the value, the number, or the explanation itself 
concrete? It's not clear what could be meant be supposing they might 
be. Such things are abstract entities, which provide a rational, but 
nonetheless natural- as reason is itself natural- framework for natural 
events, including human actions, a framework that needs no pretence to 
supernatural underpinnings; a natural order naturalized.'^ '^
Values exist in virtue of the fact that there are truths about values. And truths about 
values come down to truths about our practices. It is these that bestow meaning upon 
our specific reason-giving concepts and these in turn furnish the data for a practice of 
theorizing that gives meaning to our more general reason-giving concepts. This partly 
reflects the doctrine she calls centralism whereby:
44 Ibid., p277.
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the general [reason-giving] concepts, such as right and ought, are to be 
taken to be conceptually prior to and independent of the specific 
concepts such as just and unkind.
This is a natural doctrine for anyone who is externalist about values, who thinks, that 
is to say, that my assent to some evaluative claim is independent of my being motivated 
to act in accordance with it. The internalist, in particular what in chapter 3 below I call 
below the subjective internalist, holds that my assent to such a claim is at least partly 
constituted by my preferences and other pro-attitudes reflecting it. For such an 
internalist to speak of values is just to speak of preferences. Of course not just any old 
preferences are to count as, moral say, values. There are preferences and preferences 
as I hope later to make clear. But for the internalist the feature of the natural world 
that gives sense to talk of values is our emotive natures, the psychological fact that we 
value things. This doesn’t, in fact, mean that preferences are prior to and independent 
of values. What it means is that values at*e effectively preferences of particular kinds- 
higher-order, impersonal, rigidified (see chapters 4 and 10 below).
For the externalist, on the other hand, it can look rather mysterious what we are 
talking about when we talk of values. This is what seems to drive Philippa Foot's'^  ^
objection to the central claim of utilitarianism that there is such an intelligible concept 
of ours as that of the good conceived impersonally that is not parasitical for its 
meaning upon such specific values as are given in attributive uses of good or in talk of
45 Ibid., p ll.
See Foot, 1985a. 1985h.
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particular virtues. Granting the sort of extemalism Foot espouses this would be a 
plausible claim'^  ^but I will argue in chapter 3 below that we should not grant it.
Hurley's motivation of non-centralism, similar to Foot's in some respects, trades on 
her claim that:
A practice account denies that there could be a residual content to our 
concepts that transcends the use to which we put them.'*®
The trouble is that an account of value that understands claims about it as claims about 
the content of some best theory pursuing coherence among our specific reason-giving 
practices is that this will only be of interest to me if my own attitude to those practices 
is one of wholehearted identification. Such an attitude, a corollary of what in chapter 9 
below I will call stability2 is certainly something that it can (and will) be argued is 
desirable. But it is not plausible to think it a conceptual necessity.
Hurley makes a great deal of an analogy between her non-centralism about values 
and Wittgenstein's non-centralism about colours, suggesting that:
colour has an abstract and theoretical status in relation to specific 
colours'*^
But there are notoriously a number of points of disanalogy between values and 
secondary qualities^  ^ and one in particular is worth averting to here. Both are plausibly
Cf. 5.2 below.
'*® Hurley, 1989, p51.
Ibid., p40.
50 See e.g. the lists given in Blackburn, 1985. and Mark Johnston, 1989.
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supervenient properties, value on the non-evaluative characteristics of what is valued, 
colour on the physical characteristics of the coloured surface. With moral value at any 
rate this supervenience is a strongly conceptual matter. If I don't begin understand to 
supervenient character of value I don't understand the concept at all. But I can (and 
do) discriminate red from blue things without knowing the first thing about just what 
the physical basis of such coloration is. Indeed I could do this without any suspicion 
that supervenience holds at all. But I can't begin to distinguish right from wrong 
actions in ignorance of the characteristics on which these features supervene.
What follows? Well it is plausible that I leam how to use the concept of colour by 
learning the concepts red, blue, etc. And it is immensely plausible that without any 
understanding of specific colour concepts I could not have the concept of colour at all. 
But, certainly at least from an internalist perspective, this is not true of value. In order 
to come by the concept of value I must first certainly come to see certain particular 
types of thing as to be pursued or to be steered clear of. But it is unclear why in 
principle at any rate these discriminations might not all be made at the subvenient level, 
without specific evaluative concepts being invoked at all. Of course our own language 
does not work like this. But it does not seem inconceivable that a hypothetical 
language should. In other words, I am suggesting, a language might contain only 
general evaluative terms and no such specific terms as just and unkind (though I will 
suggest in chapter 8 below that this state of affairs would be unlikely to be stable).
With colour, on the other hand, no such thing seems even imaginable, a contrast that is 
surely telling for the relative plausibility of non-centralism about these two domains.
2.5. I turn now to consider three influential versions of what I called above "critical 
subjectivism". I begin with Brandt's analysis of "rational".^* He takes "rational" to
Brandt, 1979. chapter 1,
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cover "actions, desires or moral systems which survive maximal criticism and 
correction by facts and logic." This process of criticism Brandt calls "cognitive 
psychotherapy". The ideal end product of this process is one who takes account, in 
fully vivid way, of all relevant available information.
A problem for such this view, recently stressed by Gibbard, is that it misses the 
sense in which one may rationally prefer not to possess vivid awareness of all relevant 
information. Gibbard offers the examples of a squeamish neurotic who, given a vivid 
appreciation of the nature of the human interior, would become unable to eat in the 
society of others, thus crippling himself socially; and of an official who fears that, given 
a vivid appreciation of the beneficial effects of corruption upon his standard of living, 
he would crumble before the temptation to accept bribes. In both cases
the protagonist endorses a system of ends he thinks would not survive a 
vivid, repeated confi-ontation with the facts.^^
Is this objection fatal to Brandt's theory? Perhaps so, as it stands, but I am not 
convinced that Brandt's position cannot be adapted to meet it by generalizing his 
account of "rational" to cover questions of what it is rational to know (or seek to 
know). Reference would then be made in the characterization of "rational" not to all 
relevant available information but rather to all relevant available information saving 
only such information as the subject would rationally prefer not to know. For it is 
possible that someone might, possessing all available information regret possessing 
certain items of that information on the grounds that he regretted the manner in which 
that particular knowledge influenced his desires and actions. Information that one
52 Gibbard, 1990. p22.
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would in such circumstances so regret might then be excluded from the information 
with which one is properly to be confronted in the course of cognitive psychotherapy.
But there are, it seems to me, other problems with Brandt's theory. I suggested 
above that it is a moral of the rule-following considerations that "rational" is an 
evaluative term. But this is not quite Brandt's view. His definition of "rational" is 
characterized as being a reforming definition and does not, he claims,
import any substantive value judgements into the concept of 
"rational".
And this claim has plausibility. Take the craziest, silliest, most fickle, wickedest action, 
course of action or progress of life you like and, as far as Brandt's theory goes, that is a 
rational action or way of life for someone only provided that it is the action or way of 
life they would choose as the end of cognitive psychotherapy. This would indeed seem 
to evacuate his conception of rationality of any substantive evaluative content, but at 
the cost of making it uninteresting.
So that when Brandt lists various "mistakes" that can be made in action and 
desire^ '* thereby in effect rendering his account of rational more and more substantive 
in practice, it is plausible to doubt his right to characterize them as mistakes in virtue of 
his own definition of rationality except in such cases as "the mistake of overlooked 
options"^  ^where the failure does seem straightforwardly cognitive.
And it should fiirther be stressed that even this exception holds only before we 
make the sort of modification of the ideal information condition I proposed is
Brandt, 1979. pl3.
*'* Ibid., chapters 4 and 6.
5S Ibid,, pp71-73,
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necessitated by criticism such as Gibbard's. For, given this modification, it may become 
quite rational for me to overlook any number of options provided that, had I known 
about them I would have preferred not to- and this preference must be rational only in 
Brandt's sense; I don't need a good reason for preferring such ignorance. I need only 
prefer it.
Consider further Brandt's theory in comparison with a broadly Aristotelian view of 
moral and ethical education such as that which sees it as concerned to educate the 
passions of the moral agent so that he desires the good and shuns the bad.^ ® What is 
rational on such a view might plausibly be taken as what is desired by a person at the 
end of such a process whereby their desires are educated in the light of some guiding 
standard of reason. On Brandt's view, however, what such a person wants at the end of 
this process is indeed rational. But, as this process involves far more than mere 
exposure to logic and the facts, so too is what they would, given merely the latter 
exposure, want at the beginning of this process. The only proviso is that their desires 
must survive the correction of any false beliefs they might have come to hold. And this 
seems unconvincingly weak.
2.6 Another sophisticated critical subjectivist account, this time of "value", has been 
offered by Lewis who offers the claim that:
Something o f the appropriate category is a value i f  and only i f  we
would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it.^ ^
He explicitly rejects the inclusion of a full-informedness condition on the grounds that:
See my discussion of Aristotle and Confiicius at 10.3 below. 
Lewis, 1989. pi 13 (italics in original).
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An ideal balancer of values needs thorough knowledge of the terms of 
trade. An ideal valuer may be better off without it.^ ®
Lewis' ideal conditions are nonetheless characterized epistemically. Ideal conditions are 
defined as "conditions of the fullest possible imaginative acquaintance". Of course, 
were this to be taken as the fullest possible imaginative acquaintance with all relevant 
objects of acquaintance, then the possibility arises again that the advantages of theft or 
the horridness of the working digestive tract are among such objects.
What might seem however to remove Lewis fi-om the line of fire of Gibbard's 
criticism of Brandt is the former's understanding of the concept of "valuing" as 
applicable to first-order desires only for a fully wholehearted agent, one who desires 
only what he desires to desire. For less abnormal agents he equates values with 
second-order desires, what we value is what we desire to desire.^ ** So Gibbard-type 
examples tend to lose force.
Lewis' theory is couched in terms of what he calls an "ideal responder" and such a 
dispositional theory is clearly related to the sort of ideal observer theory whose most 
prominent modem protagonist has been Roderick Firth.^* There are two related 
difficulties for both sorts of theory that are perhaps best initially characterized in 
relation to the latter.
®^ Lewis, 1989. pl24.
Johnston, 1989. ppl51-5 deploys arguments of this type against Lewis.
The materials for this are of course taken fi-om H. Frankfurt, 1971 and 1987. 
See his 1952. Lewis explicitly distances himself from ideal observer theories for
reasons that do not concern me here.
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Firstly there is the problem that the term "ideal" appears to import into the analysis 
an dimension of value that vitiates its purpose as an analysis o f value. As Gibbard's 
examples showed for Brandt, such things as vivid imaginative acquaintance or full 
possession of relevant information fail as a route to what we value if we desire not to, 
or desire to desire not to, act as we believe we would in the event of achieving such 
states. Such a desire would be coherent and cannot, without circularity, be denied 
some such status as putatively rational or value-conferring other desires may be held to 
possess.
Secondly the ideal observer theory invites a Euthyphro-type dilemma. In virtue of 
what is what the ideal observer values to be valued? If it is to be valued because it is 
valuable, the analysis issues in a regress. If its value just consists in the observer's 
valuing it, the theory is implausible. Is this all it takes to endow value? Would what the 
observer values be valuable whatever it wasl Of course we could rule certain things 
out but when we try to do this the first problem seems inescapable.
Are things any better for the ideal responder? The problem with "ideal" remains as 
before. But the second problem seems less of a threat when, as on Lewis' theory the 
person in question is taken to be oneself or "one sufficiently like oneself in his or her 
dispositions", thus respecting intemalism. But in fact the indexicality on its own does 
not guarantee the respecting of intemalism. Suppose the ideal conditions were 
conditions of having been successfully brainwashed by the ideal observer for whom the 
second problem arose. This would of course be deemed an unsuitable specification of 
ideal conditions. But what, if not our values, do we appeal to in judging such a 
specification unsuitable? Appeal to conditions of full imaginative acquaintance has little 
to recommend it if we in fact desire to desire not to act on the values such conditions 
would invoke in us.
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2.7. A little more might be said here about the much discussed analogy between values 
and secondary qualities. This analogy has been siezed upon by McDowell as casting 
light on how we might suppose at once that values are
there to be experienced, as opposed to being a mere figment of the 
subjective state that purports to be an experience of it^ ^
there independently of any particular apparent 
experience of them
while at the same time they
stand in an internal relation to some exercize of human sensibility^^
The aspect of secondary qualities that on which the analogy bears is described as 
follows;
An object's being such as to look red is
independent of its actually looking red to anyone on any 
particular occasion; so, notwithstanding the conceptual 
connection between being red being experienced as red, 
an experience of sometliing as red can count as a case of
MacDowell, 1985. pi 14.
This and the preceding both ibid., p i20.
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being presented with a property that is there anyway- 
there independently of the experience itself.®"^
The analogy being presented involves a dispositional analysis of secondary qualities 
roughly to the effect that something has some secondary quality S if and only if it is 
such as to appear S to a normal observer and a similar analysis of value roughly to the 
effect that something has some evaluative quality V if and only if it is such as to appear 
to have V to a normal observer. The natural parallel suggests that values, while being 
"subjective" in the way secondary qualities are, i.e., by being dependent on some 
distinctively human sensibility are at the same time "objective" in the same way, i.e., in 
so far as it is possible for a particular person at a particular time to be mistaken about 
them.
The most serious problem faced by this analysis, noted by Wright,®^  is a result of 
an equivocation involved in "normal". This is open to a difficulty similar to that Lewis 
was seen to face over "ideal". In one sense "normal" is a more or less straightforwardly 
statistical concept, roughly equivalent to "typical" or "standard" and this sense is 
adequate for the analysis of secondary qualities in a way that it is not for that of values. 
In the case of values, the analysis requires us to take "normal" in a sense which is itself 
directly evaluative. The statistical sense is inadequate in so far as the extension yielded 
for evaluative concepts will vary enormously depending upon the population over 
which it is defined and the only prospect for selecting an appropriate population is by 
the critical application of evaluative criteria, by moving fi-om a crude to a critical 
conventionalism and incurring difficulties already noted. A critical conventionialism
"ibid., pi 12,
"  See his 1988. The same general line of counter-argument is found in Gibbard, 1990. 
p i83-8 and Johnston, 1989.
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faces exactly the same problems as critical subjectivism in providing a non-question- 
begging account of what is supposed to drive the criticism. So that an analysis of value 
that invokes "normality" in this way in the artalysans is as ultimately unhelpfiil as one 
that invokes an ideal observer or responder.
The adequacy of the statistic sense of "normal" in the case of colour concepts is a 
consequence primarily of the far greater co?isemus that obtains about the extension of 
secondary quality concepts, itself perhaps to be related to what Wright terms the 
rmmess of such concepts.^  ^There is no reason to doubt that ancient Egyptians, infants 
and the Ik are, in principle, on a level vis à vis the capacity to distinguish, say, colours. 
Obviously there are some who have defective vision, etc. but on the whole they 
recognize themselves as so defective and in the few cases where they fail we would 
incline to suppose them further defective in some additional respect. There is no 
analogue for secondary qualities of Mackie's "argument from relativity". Of course 
there might in principle be such divergence but in that case we would plausibly simply 
relativize our colour concepts with a nonchalance hard to imagine where values are 
concerned.
With values relativity seems to pose a more serious problem for such secondary- 
quality-type realism.^  ^Subjectivism is rejected as failing to explain the apparent 
possibility of a particular person being in error, only to espouse what amounts to a 
form of conventionalism that fails to explain the apparent possibility of a society being 
in error. David Wiggins has noted this problem and sugested it might be sidestepped by 
an indexicalizing move whereby what is valuable is identified with our actual values. 
This is an attractive device and in chapter 101 will exploit it myself to the same end. It 
is however best viewed as motivated by a second-order evaluative commitment to the
“ Ibid.,ppll-13.
"  See e.g. Blackburn, 1985. p i4.
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values in question and hence is rather harder to motivate for the positive subjectivist 
who is offering a fonn of reductive naturalism about values.
Another recent move that seems to fail is Michael Smith's suggestion that instead of 
normality, we invoke rationality^^ For this is itself an evaluative concept (Smith's 
analysandum is Brandt's and Gibbard's analysons) as we have already extensively 
observed.^  ^We return to the Wittgensteinian point about the pervasiveness o f 
normativity made at the outset of this chapter. As Smith and Lewis's coseminarist 
Mark Johnston puts it:
The concepts of value and of substantive practical reasoning take in
each other's washing.^^
Johnston's own account seeks to avoid this problem by explicitly not claiming to be 
seeking a reductive account of values, an objective which, like myself and for related 
reasons, he thinks chimerical. Once this claim is dropped then the project of examining 
the conceptual connections between the two concepts in question indeed takes on a 
more promising aspect. But the project of purchasing some kind of objectivity for 
values with the currency of practical reason is likely to remain forlorn at least until the 
independent objectivity of the latter has also been paid for.
2.8. The form of objectivity espoused by reductive naturalism seems untenable. 
Statements about values do not reduce to naturalistic statements about things of other
"  See his 1993.
® Cf. Gibbard, 1990. Putnam, 1981.
70 Johnston, 1989. pi 62.
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kinds, a conclusion which will be seen to cohere with my arguments of chapters 1, 7 
and 8 especially.
A related form of objectivism contrasts with a subjectivism whereby, as Galen 
Strawson puts it:
while the true account of why we believe that moral judgements are or 
can be true or false leads back to all sorts of things, both to feelings and 
attitudes and other, non-mental tilings in the world, its does not lead 
back to moral facts (nor to non-moral facts that are held to amount to 
moral facts, given some variety of naturalism). So that z/there is any 
sense in which morality generally considered is a real phenomenon in 
the everyday world, this is essentially partly because we believe that this
71IS SO.
In chapter 3 especially, I shall argue that an objectivism that denies this is also 
mistaken. There and elsewhere, I will concerned to criticize the view that value is 
mind-independent. This is false and seeing that it is is again part of what is involved in 
taking the point about immanence noted above.
There is however a. yet further sense to talk of objectivity where it is a matter of 
the sort of considerations marshalled by Wiggins and Dummett in their respective 
characterizations of the marks of truth and quasi-assertion cited in chapter 1. Such 
objectivity involves the availability and applicability of notions of correctness and 
defeasibility and of the varied apparatus of logical discipline. In later chapters. I'll be 
concerned to show how such objectivity is enjoyed by evaluative discourse but also 
how that is no comfort to the realist who seeks to make no distinction between such
Galen Strawson, 1986, p i5.
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quasi-assertions and assertions in a stronger sense, a distinction whose availability I 
shall seek to demonstrate.
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Chapter 3: Platonism and Internalism
3.1. To reflect about values is, effectively, to inquire after the good. And to inquire 
after the good is to face a problem first raised by the author (be he Plato or Socrates) 
of a classic argument found in Plato's
An inquiry into what goodness or anything else is would have little interest unless 
it were something we did not already know about. But if we do not know what 
goodness is, then how can we inquire into the matter, for in that case, it would seem 
the object of our inquiry remains completely undetermined?
There are obvious things to which we can appeal in dealing with this, the Paradox 
of Inquiry, in its general form. In some cases, for a start, we can appeal to what 
Putnam calls the division of linguistic labour.^ If I have no very clear conception what 
an elm is, I can still make sense of an inquiry into the matter simply because language 
is a public thing and because I have reason to suppose that there are people somewhere 
who do.
But it is only inquiries motivated by purely personal ignorance that are accounted 
for in this way. Where no such supposition is warranted, we might give a different 
account. The question "What is X?" might be asking any one of various things- what is 
it for, what is it made of, what is it called, what that is more familiar can it be described 
in terms of, what is its causal role, where is it located? We can ask for some such 
information about something so long as we already know something else about it that 
enables us to individuate it. If, for example, we ask "What is the thing in the box?", we 
already know the last of these things about the object of our question, which thus 
satisfactorily individuates that object and gives our inquiry the necessary cognitive
 ^ See Plato, Meno, 80, D-E.
 ^See pp227-9 of Putnam, 1975.
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purchase. The object of an inquiry then can be identified by one or more of many 
possible identifying descriptions of it and the inquiry is then directed at firrther, as yet 
unfamiliar, aspects of that object. What the Paradox of Inquiry teaches us is that a 
question of the form "What is x?" is always a request for further information.
In the present case the object of our inquiry is goodness. And what do we know 
about goodness that might give us a conceptual toehold on this inquiry? If we are 
platonists about goodness the question might indeed baffle us. There seems to be little 
that we could claim precisely to know about goodness realistically conceived, little that 
we cannot plausibly greet with scepticism. Some have claimed that it is what we 
approve and commend to the approval of others, some that it is a simple and 
unanalysable non-natural property, others that it is whatever conduces to happiness.
But what stable conception of the analysandum links these competing analyses 
effectively enough that they may be said genuinely to compete?
Consider an analogy. Suppose we want very much to know what burgles are. 
Because "burgles" is a nonsense word the question is foolish. We do not know what 
we are asking. No one does. Suppose this confusion persists. We remain baffled. As a 
solution to our bafflement the Walrus offers the theory that burgles are simply 
cabbages, that talk of burgles is reducible to talk of cabbages. The Carpenter, on the 
other hand, claims that, far from being cabbages, burgles are in fact kings. The 
disagreement between them is obviously quite empty, for all we know is that the one 
claims of things he takes to be cabbages that they are cabbages, the other of things he 
takes to be kings that they are kings. We may sometimes feel baffled by our inquiry 
into goodness, but it is important not to set the problem up in such a way as to be too 
baffling or nothing will remain to be baffled by.
If things were this bad, inquiry would be futile. Some forms of relativism might 
seem to leave things this bad in virtue of involving us in problems of 
incommensurability. But it also seems to be a problem for realism. Platonistic forms of
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realism seem to leave things this bad in virtue of what amounts to a problem of 
vacuity.
3.2. Another way of pointing up this threat to the platonist is analogous to the 
Benaceraff Problem, a well-known problem in the philosophy of mathematics.^ The 
problem is simply that if platonism about numbers were true, how is our knowledge of 
them to be explained! What possible epistemic connection, causal or otherwise, could 
there be between the abstract entities numbers are held to be by platonists and our own 
thoughts and beliefs about them? The problem is clearly formulable in terms of 
reference as well as knowledge in so far as we suppose the former to demand causal 
interaction with its object and the profession of such an accomplishment to demand 
explanation of how that interaction is secured.
This sort of difficulty is applicable to realism in general. Wright has expressed the 
difficulty by drawing a distinction between "gloomy" and "optimistic" forms of 
realism'*, the gloomy realist being one who
denies that there is any cause to believe that the pursuit of "best 
method" enhances the likelihood of truth.^
The result, he points out, is "a realism that has no bearing on scientific practice". 
Indeed it has no bearing on any kind of practice.
 ^The name alludes to Benacerraf, 1973. For a more recent deployment see Field, 
1990.
"See his 1986b.
' Ibid., p257.
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Such realism is indeed "a bankrupt philosophy". But Wright goes on to suggest that 
even the optimistic realist's position leaves absolute truth and falsity with "no 
regulative role to play."
our practice is rationalized by the "absolute" objectives only in so far as, 
and for precisely the same reason as, it is rationalized by the objective 
of avoiding empirical inadequacy.®
After all, if, as the absolute (or "external") realist and the radical sceptic tend to 
agree, reality is characterized in terms of some noumenal realm with no essential link 
to our experience it is unclear not only how we would succeed in knowing about it but 
also how we could succeed in speaking or thinking about it at all.
In the specifically moral realm, such difficulties for the realist are familiar. Thus 
Mackie writes:
When we ask the awkward question, how we can be aware of this 
authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical 
premises or of the cogency of this distinctively ethical pattern of 
reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception or 
introspection or the fi'aming of explanatory hypotheses or inference or 
logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination of these 
will provide a satisfactory answer.^
And Smith, discussing intuitionism, writes that:
® Ibid., p258.
" Mackie, 1977. pp38-39.
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we have independent reasons to believe the intuitionist's epistemology 
only if he can explain how the alleged faculty of moral intuition is 
supposed to work. But, unsurprisingly, since all we know about the 
faculty is that it is apt for detecting self-evident moral truths, the 
intuitionist is unable to provide such an explanation.®
This epistemological line of attack on moral platonism points up the vacuity I 
suggested threatened it in the previous section. For the epistemological argument does 
semantic as well as epistemological work. If we say of values that they are possible 
objects of knowledge but have no story to tell about how such knowledge is possible, 
then not only the truth but the intelligibility of our moral theory is called into question. 
A theory about a realm we can only know about in a mysterious and unspecified way 
leaves it mysterious and unspecified what realm that is. The platonist might of course 
suppose that we are related to the realm in question in virtue of our everyday 
engagement in evaluative feeling and response but then the question is acutely felt, 
what on earth provides a basis for any such supposition? And should the platonist wax 
gloomy about our being appropriately related to such a realm at all, then he risks losing 
the cognitive purchase on the notion of value discussion of the Paradox of Inquiry 
showed us to require.
3.3. The Paradox of Inquiry invites comparison with the line of argument used by 
Moore in advancing his view that good is indefinable and attacking what he calls 
"naturalism". He developed it by formulating what has come to be known as the "open 
question argument". This has it that any reductive definition of the form, goodness is F,
® Smith, 1986. p205.
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is Open to the criticism that, given that some A if F, it is always an open question 
whether that A is also good.®
It has been emphasized that this is, in a rather specific form, basically the same 
thought as is involved in the Paradox of Analysis.*® This paradox may be stated in 
terms of a dilemma whereby any analytical equivalence between expressions would 
either be a trivial and uninteresting identity-statement or be false**.
It is worth giving a brief account of how this paradox may be resolved in terms of 
the project of philosophical analysis that has preoccupied philosophers since Moore's 
day. This is the project of providing "analyses" of concepts and propositions that 
would exhibit their logical structures and smooth out philosophical difficulties which 
seem to come in the their wake. Classic examples of analysis would be such analytic 
projects as: reducing all statements about material objects to statements about sense 
data; reducing all statements about "theoretical" entities in science to statements about 
observable entities; reducing all statements about psychological states to statements 
about observable behaviour. Such analyses of familiar concepts doubtless came as a 
surprise to many people who were perhaps reluctant to accept them as accounts of 
what they had meant all along.
But of course these do not need to be taken as accounts of what the concepts 
involved mean. They are far more satisfactorily taken as accounts of what these had 
better mean. All the cases just cited were proposed by philosophers with a strong 
commitment to empiricism, for whom reference to the likes of material objects, 
theoretical entities, mental states was for familiar empiricist reasons, highly 
problematic. The analyses of such concepts could stand or fall on two tests-
® See Moore, 1903. chapter 1, esp sections 10-13. 
*® See Smith, 1986. p295.
11 See Langford, 1942. pp322-3 and Moore's reply in the same volume.
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1/ Did they avoid the philosophical problematicity of the original sentences?
2/ Did they do justice to the original sentences? That is, could they be expected 
to do service for all the legitimate uses to which the original sentences could be 
put?*^
Question 2 is not on the face of it at all the same as the question: did the analysantes 
mean the same as the analysandal This is simply not the issue. The issue is: could we 
dispense with the analysanda in favour of the analysantes without losing out on such 
ability to make sensible, intelligible assertions as the former conferred. This much 
could convincingly be claimed for analysantes whose fidelity to their analysanda was 
far from trivial and obvious.*®
If this account of the matter is along the right lines, then Moore's open question 
argument looks less impressive.*" Nothing it says rules out the possibility of someone 
claiming that goodness is F on the grounds that whatever else we may suppose it to
*" Cf. Lewis, 1989, pl31:
If the dispositional theory is only unobviously and equivocally analytic, 
why think that it's analytic at all? Because that hypothesis fits our 
practice.
*® Cf. the last three paragraphs of ibid.
*" Cf. Harman (1977. Chapter 2, section 4) who argues that the argument is a) 
question-begging (certainly the question is open if ethical naturalism is false) and b) 
invalid (That it is an open question whether water is H^O is beside the point in 
determining whether it is).
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mean, F is all that it can mean. Early emotivist accounts of value, such as Ayer's can be 
read in this way. Clearly they were driven by the same empiricist convictions as the 
other paradigms of philosophical analysis alluded to above.
Moore's argument however is close to a much sounder kind of point which serves 
perhaps to explain such plausibility as it may possess. This is the kind of point, 
classically stated by R. M. Hare*®, that no reductive analysis of good that is merely 
descriptive is adequate, that such analyses fail to pass the second of the two tests cited 
for analytic projects above. So that if it is claimed that goodness is F where "F" is a 
purely descriptive term and some A is F, then it will indeed be a finther question 
whether A is good given that good is not a descriptive term,*® Such open question 
arguments are best read as suggesting that some proposed analysis fails test 2 above.
*® Hare, 1952. chapter 5. Hare's reconstruction stresses commendation while in 4.5 
below I stress motivation, but of course, for Hare, the connection between the two 
latter is an intimate one- see especially his 1963. chapter 5.
*® The relatedness of this sounder point to the open question argument may perhaps go 
some way to explain why, although Stevenson in "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical 
Terms" gives an account of the difficulties with the question "What is goodness" that is 
close to my own (1963. pplO-11) he then goes on to employ the open question 
argument against naturalistic reductionism (pi5) where we might expect him to know 
better.
The historical significance of the open question argument for twentieth century 
moral anti-realism is considerable. For it was not simply positivism that motivated 
philosophers like Ayer (1971) in holding an emotivist position but the conjunction of 
positivism, which rules out Moorean non-naturalist intuitionism, with an acceptance of 
Moore's argument, which was taken to rule out naturalistic accounts of value of the 
kind some positivists, such as Schlick (19391. in fact adopted.
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3.4 We can begin to see why this is so by returning to our consideration of the 
Paradox of Inquiry. This led to the conclusion that some cognitive purchase on the 
object of inquiry is needed in order for any inquiry to get off the ground. There remains 
the issue of where, in the case of goodness, this is to be found.
There is a natural place for us to begin. "Good" is a word in our language. It is in 
all the dictionaries. This is the most salient thing about goodness that distinguishes it 
from burglehood. Surely we can learn what it is by examining the occasions of its use.
The result of this examination is of central importance to understanding the 
difficulties of moral theory. For anyone observing the employment of "good" by 
English speakers will be able to make two observations about it.
First he will notice that:
01 : certain things are and others are not in fact deemed to be good by his 
peers. He will learn to make the sort of observations that always so 
infuriated Socrates:
In the first place if what you're interested in is the virtue of a man, then 
that's a simple matter, such virtue being just this: to be competent to 
manage the affairs of a polis and, treating one's fiiends well and one's 
enemies ill, to be circumspect over not receiving the latter treatment 
oneself. And then if you want a woman's virtue, that's not difficult to 
deal with: it's that she manage her household well, looking after what it 
contains and obeying her husband. And a child's virtue is different again
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(depending on the sex of the child) and an old man's, free or slave, as 
you will.*^
In addition to this kind of rather piecemeal information about the extension of the 
word he will secondly notice something rather more general about its use;
02: that the word "goodness" is used to commend things, to
express approval, to back up wishes and commands, in general, to guide action.
These two basic kinds of data from which all examinations of goodness must begin 
are in tension, and the tension between them is of central significance.
The first kind of data gives us a picture of how for a particular given culture the 
goodness of a thing, situation, person or whatever consists in a variety of specific 
features of that thing, situation, person or whatever- that it is usefiil, just, trustworthy 
or whatever. These specific features appear to be perfectly objective, to be proper 
objects of belief and knowledge. The concepts by which we attempt to capture them 
may then be taken as determining the application of more general concepts such as 
good, thereby leading to an account of value that will be non-centralist and 
cognitivist.*®
The second observation does not allude to our specific evaluative concepts but 
rather to the use to which evaluative concepts in general are put, that is in 
commendation, prescription, expression of approval and the grounding of imperatives.
Plato, Meno 71E-72A. My translation.
*® See Murdoch, "The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts" in her 1970: Foot, 
"Moral Arguments" in her 1978 and her 1985a and 1985b: McDowell, 1978. 1979. 
1981: Hurley, 1989. especially chapters 1-6.
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The usual course provoked by this is an underlining of the contrast between such 
activity and non-evaluative assertion, description of how things are taken actually to be 
rather than of how they should be. The position taken as an outcome of such 
underlining has tended to be centralist and frequently non-cognitivist.*®
The most immediate objection^ ® to the first approach is to note the problem with 
the phrase "for a particular given culture". For it is a commonplace that there are many 
cultures (and subcultures) and the specific values prevalent in them vary widely,®* So 
that the meaning of "good"®® seems to be different at this specific level for different 
cultures. But if it were different there would, it might seem, be no disagreement 
between them for the reasons rehearsed at 3.1 above. What we needed was a common 
conception of goodness. What we get from the first observation is very precisely not 
that.
The existence of such divergent cultures is not in fact necessary for such a problem 
to arise, merely their possibility. So that the problem could still be formulated if we 
lived in a world where nobody differed on any questions of values. In such a world
*® Prominent examples of such positions are found in Hare, 1952 and 1963 and 
Gibbard, 1990.
®° This objection is well put by Hare who sees in it a "Reductio AdAbsurdum of 
Descriptivism". See his 1989. Essay Eight.
®* For documentation of these variations presented as evidence for egocentric 
relativism, see Westermarck, 1932. chapter VII.
®® Not to mention the meaning of terms such as agathos conventionally translated by 
English evaluative terms such as "good". But it is simpler for the sake of argument to 
ignore these for now as there is quite enough variation in values in the anglophone 
world to carry the points in question.
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moral dissidents would be like solipsists, objects of philosophical fantasy of interest 
only to philosophers. But they would nonetheless interest us.
This sort of consideration can encourage the claim that the more fundamental of 
the two observations is the second, which might be seen to pinpoint the common 
denominator of what is understood by "good" in all cultures, this being the action- 
guiding force of evaluative language.®®
This again is very much the position of Hare in The Language ofMorals^"  ^who 
distinguished the descriptive and evaluative meaning of the word "good", these being 
just those aspects of its meaning identified by the first and second observations above 
and then claims that the latter is primary for two reasons:
1/ It is common to every class of objects for which the word is used.
2/ We use the evaluative force to change the descriptive force.
He notes however that, while for general words like "good" the evaluative meaning 
is primary, for specific words like "tidy" and "industrious" the descriptive meaning is 
primary. This latter fact he explains as "a sign that the standard to which the word 
applies has become conventional."®®
®® See e.g. Hare, 1952. pi; Mackie, 1977. pp40-41; Blackburn, 1984. p i80; Smith, I
1986. pp295ff.
®" 1952. 7.4 and 7.5. |
®® But of course this takes us to part of the reason for saying above that the tension j
between the two observations was central. For it has become a familiar claim among I
moral realists precisely that the specific evaluative concepts we use are conceptually |
prior to the more general ones. As Hare contemptuously put it, j
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3.5. It was suggested above that there is a better argument that Moore's open question 
argument gains much of its plausibility from resembling. This kind of argument is 
directed against naturalism by Moore and descriptivism by Hare. My own objections 
to descriptivism will come mainly in chapter 8 below. But my more immediate target is 
rather extemalism, an understanding of values that does not relate it essentially to what 
motivates us, to what we care about. It has already become clear at 2.4 above that the 
position we take on extemalism is crucial to the plausibility of the sort of non­
centralism that sees 01 as more basic than 02.
The trouble with extemalism is that it readily secures the objectivity of value but 
leaves its prescriptivity unaccountable. For the externalist, as Richard Gamer writes:
Learning that something is wrong would be like learning what time it is- 
its relevance would depend on other commitments.®®
It is precisely the presence or absence of such other commitments that extemalism 
leaves "open" and in so doing it deprives imputations of rightness or wrongness of any 
force or interest to us. So the question that is left open by extemalist theories of value
26
The object of this common descriptivist ploy is to suck the greatest 
possible advantage from the fact that the descriptive meaning of the first 
sort of words [the specific evaluative words] is entrenched. (1989, 
pll6)
Gamer 1990. pl39.
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is not so much Moore's "But is it good?" as it is simply "So what?" which may follow 
even an affirmative answer to the former question.®^
Philippa Foot's progress as a moral philosopher is perhaps illustrative of the 
present point. In her earlier work, most notably the papers "Moral Arguments" and 
"Moral Beliefs"®® she adopted a descriptivist strategy along conventionalist lines 
concentrating on the more specific moral concepts and insisting that their meaning is as 
determinate and as involving of descriptive content as any more typically "factual" 
concepts are. In the later "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" she is 
brought to an intense moral scepticism by virtue of the lack of authority this view 
seems to confer on morality. Morality, understood externally, in the sense of whatever 
moral norms enjoy recognition in a given culture, is something about which we can 
make claims that are true, factual and objective as well as naturalistic in content. But 
morality so understood is something we can coherently choose to disregard. Told not 
to tell lies because it is immoral I retain the option of replying that, while being moral is 
not what interests or motivates me, telling lies is. The problem is only overcome when 
I myself am a participant in the recognition of the norms in question, when "morality" 
is taken in its internal sense®® in which it refers to whatever norms enjoy recognition or 
endorsement from myself (or whoever it is whose morality is in question).®® Value,
®'* Cf. Mark Johnston, 1989. pp 157-8. 
®® Both in her 1978.
®® My terminology here follows H. L, A, Hart, 1961. pp55ff and Neil Cooper, 1981. 
pp51ff, q.v. Cf. the distinction between embracing a norm and recognizing it made by 
Railton, 1986. section U and Smith 1989. p97.
®® It is the failure of such coincidence that is perhaps at the heart of Aristotle's 
understanding of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics, VII. See Bumyeat, 1980 on the links 
between this and Aristotle's account of moral education.
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understood externally, is dead when we merely know its content without additional 
emotional commitment.
The problem is made vivid when we consider extemalist theories that take a 
conventionalist form. These may perhaps be made more plausible when their 
extemalism is weakened in some way. But if this is not done, it would seem to follow, 
as already noted in chapter 2 above, that the proper understanding of the project of 
determining what, in a particular instance, is good or right or rational or ought to be 
done is simply as a research project in sociology. But this naturally invites both the 
phenomenological objection that this is not even remotely what we do when 
confronted with ground for perplexity about such matters and the logical objection that 
someone faced with such perplexity and furnished by some sympathetic and expert 
friend with the results of just the appropriate such research project might properly be 
puzzled as to just how this information succeeded in being, vis à vis their difficulties, 
either here or there. Of course, it will be relevant if the person in question embraces a 
norm of deference to the values of their community and, in chapter 10,1 will make out 
a case for such a norm. But, cmcially, conventionalism of this sort has ceased to be 
externalist.
Given these points the extemalist seems to face a dilemma. Either he adopts a 
positive conventionalist theory of value, thus making the kind of observation 
instantiated by 01 fundamental, and must then confront the difficulties just raised. Or 
he adopts a form of extemalism which takes value to be something prior to and 
independent of the conventions of particular societies, in which case he has to explain 
how he avoids the difficulties raised for the platonist above, given that, neither having 
adopted such a conventionalist theory nor conceded the intemalisf s case, he seems to 
have blocked for himself the pathways to a cognitive purchase on what values are 
taken to be offered by 01 and 02.
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A related merit of internalism is the very straightforward way in which it evades a 
form of scepticism about the significance of evaluative claims that we have seem to 
threaten the platonistically inclined extemalist. This is felicitously dramatized by the 
story Hare tells us in his well-known paper "Nothing Matters".®* In this Hare describes 
a young man who had been persuaded to adopt an extreme form of value nihilism, 
summed up in the paper's title, by a reading (perhaps a misreading) of certain modem 
European writers. Hare goes on to claim that he helped the young man in question 
back to sanity by bringing him to realize that, prescinding from the existence of large 
metaphysical tmths about what he ought to care about, there were a great many (very 
normal and human) things that he did care about. That many things did in fact matter 
to him and that in virtue of just such facts sense could be made of claims about things 
mattering tout court- claims that are simply mysterious when supposed to be 
independent of the cares and concems that we in fact have. Intemalism then secures a 
link between values and what we care about in virtue of which we can the better make 
sense of the former.
"Intemalism" has a number of senses nowadays. We should here distinguish:
1/ What I'll call subjective intemalism - the broadly subjectivist variety 
whereby things that are said to have value for us matter to us (where mattering 
involves, but is perhaps not exhausted by, motivating) because so mattering is 
constitutive of what we mean by value.
from
In his 1972.
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2/ The broadly realist kind {objective internalism, to give it a name) whereby 
things that have value matter for us, or motivate us, because such mattering, or 
motivating, is a necessary concommitant of our perceiving (or otherwise 
coming to know) objective values themselves prior to such mattering.
This latter form of intemalism, which, stressing as it does the intrinsic prescriptivity of 
objective values, is the target of Mackie's argument from queemess.®® This may be 
read as stressing the action-guidingness of moral judgements, thereby at once 
dramatizing the untenability of extemalism and underscoring the peculiarity of 
objective intemalism. This approach is certainly, I think, fatal to the objective 
intemalist if he is a platonist for then once again he is implicated in the epistemic 
difficulties noted above. His position vis à vis the extemalist platonist is really rather 
analogous to that of the optimistic vis à vis the gloomy realist as Wright characterizes 
these. For it is surely only in virtue o f mattering to us that the objective values in 
question have any role to play in the ordering and regulation of our moral (and 
pmdential, aesthetic, etc.) practice. The platonistic objective intemalist must then 
characterize what it is that gives content to his notion of value in addition to this very 
mattering and hence what distinguishes his position from the subjective intemalist. 
Insofar as his platonism is incompatible with conventionalism, 01 is unavailable to him 
as a resource for such characterization. While if the objective intemalist is, rather than 
a platonist, some kind of positive conventionalist we revert to the kind of 
phenomenological objection to that position already levelled against the extemalist- it 
is surely simply false that knowledge of the evaluative norms prevailing in the society I 
live in is necessarily motivating, necessarily guarantees that these norms will matter to
®® See Mackie, 1977. pp38-42 and Gamer 1990.
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me. Reflection about what values to endorse is not, once again, a research project into 
the moral sociology of one's own, or any, society.
3.6. There is a yet further ambiguity in the term "intemalism."®® It is not universally 
accepted that whenever somebody os (intentionally, that is- their oing must be an 
action) then there is present a desire on their part to 0 . It can also be alleged that 
certain sorts of belief, perceptual experience or other cognitive state can suffice for 
motivation without the participation of desires, an allegation whose denial constitutes 
Humean in tem alism .Such Humean intemalism undermines objective intemalism 
insofar as difficulties are thereby raised for the very idea that perceiving or otherwise 
coming to know objective values, qua purely cognitive state, could ever have 
motivating force.
The most influential contemporary argument for Humean intemalism is what Jay 
Wallace has dubbed the "teleological argument".®® This may be reconstmcted as 
follows. Intentional action is goal-directed- seeks the realization of some state of the 
world conceived not as actual but as sought after. In this respect to act intentionally, or 
indeed to hold an intention with or without acting on it, is to be in a state of mind
®® "Intemalism" is also ambiguous insofar as it is sometimes used to indicate a claim 
about reasons (for action) and at other times of values. That this distinction is 
comparatively unimportant for my purposes will be unsurprising when chapter 2 is 
recalled in which rationalistic approaches to objectivity were criticized on the grounds 
that reason and value are insufficiently categorially distinct for the explication of the 
latter in terms of the former to be much help to us.
®" Note that "Humean" in what remains of this chapter refers to the position here 
characterized prescinding fi-om controversy about the interpretation of Hume.
®® Wallace, 1990, p359ff.
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having world-word direction offif^, where a state of mind has such a direction of fit if 
the onus o f match between the content of the thought involved and the world lies on 
the world and not the thought. So that if I find a thought of mine with word-world 
direction of fit (a belief) failing to match the world, the thought is subject to revision. 
But if a thought with world-word direction of fit fails to match the world, it is, as it 
were, the world that is subject to revision. So if I wish to be driving towards 
Cambridge (Dummett's example®^ ) but find I am not, I change not my attitude but my 
direction of travel and match is attained, à la Marx, by improving the world and not 
my understanding of it. As (roughly) Humberstone has it, in the most detailed attempt 
known to me to cash out the distinction, the intention constitutively involved in a 
thought with word-world direction of fit is that the thought not be had in the event that 
its content be false; while that so involved in a thought with world-word direction of fit 
is that the world become such as to match the content.®® Because intentional action and 
desire have a common direction of fit (world-word) that beliefs do not share, it follows 
that not all the psychological antecedents of action are strictly cognitive states. And if, 
as is plausible®®, world-word direction of fit is taken as characteristic of the broad class
®® The notion of direction of fit has its source in Austin' "How to Talk" (in his 1970) 
and Anscombe's 1957. p52. Searle, 1983. gives it a prominent role in his philosophy of 
mind and language. Its most influential invocation in the cause of Humean intemalism 
is by Smith (1987 and 1988) but note his anticipation by Cooper (1981. chapter 3).
®"* Dummett, 1973. p299.
®® See Humberstone, 1992.
39 Cf. the passage from Wallace quoted below.
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of thoughts made up by desires or wants, it follows that anyone who intentionally os 
necessarily wants or desires to 0  (under some description)/®
There are now two moves that the Humean's opponent may make'’^  the first"^  ^is to 
suggest that it is possible for a single thought to be at once both a belief and a desire, 
in John Altham’s terminology a "besire"^ ,^ having thereby both world-word and word- 
world direction of fit. The immediate objection is that this is incoherent given that 
beliefs and desires, word-world and world-word thoughts, are by definition responsive 
in different ways to additional cognitive (or affective) input/'^ But the response to this 
is to suppose that the content of the belief qua belief might differ from its content qua 
desire. However, perhaps the coherence of this supposition might be called in doubt by 
asking in what sense the belief and desire in this instance are held to be the same- to
Cf Davidson's "Intending" in his 1980 and Audi, 1986. pp20-27. Note that Audi 
makes a distinction between wanting and desiring in which I do not follow him. We 
may here note the sort of objection to Humean intemalism (which Audi's distinction 
seems partly intended to deflect), made e.g. by Staude (1986) which stresses cases 
where through duress or kindnessor simple lack of choice we act in ways we do not 
want to. This seems to me to focus with misleading exclusivity on one's pro tanto 
initial wants as opposed to what one prefers (most wants) from the (perceived) 
available alternatives all things considered. For a more extensive response to this sort 
of objection see Marks, 1986a. See also Smith, 1987. pp45-50.
Cf. Pettit 1987. p531.
See McNaughton, 1988. ppl08-110.
See Altham 1986.
'"See Smith 1987. p56.
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what principle for the individuation of thoughts appeal is to be made that does not 
invoke precisely their content in a way fatal to such a move/^
Here the anti-Humean might bring in some piece of philosophical psychology 
designed to supply a suitable such principle. But for now let us rather concentrate on 
his other possible course which is to retreat to the second of the two main anti- 
Humean tactics alluded to above. This is the tactic, most influentially practised by 
NageF®, of conceding that desire plays a part in all motivation but of suggesting that 
the motivation of that desire in turn (where it is motivated at all) may be purely 
cognitive.'*’'
It is worth pointing out that my own mixed evaluations of chapters 1 and 8 are not 
besires in the appropriate sense as they decompose into distinct descriptive and 
evaluative ingredients 
In his 1970. chapter V. Cf. Bond, 1983. pp67-68.
Here we might note the position discussed by Lewis 0988. p326) whereby in some 
cases an agent
desires things just to the extent that he believes that they would be 
good.
the upshot of which in formal terms is to assign the same value to the agents credence 
(i.e. subjective probability) fonction for the said belief as to his value (utility) fonction 
for the said desire, a result that might be associated either, in terms of the first tactic, 
with an identification of the belief and the desire, however justified, or, in terms of the 
second, with the rational adequacy of the said belief in motivating the said desire. 
Lewis takes this to lead to incoherence but see Huw Price, 1989 for criticism of his 
argument.
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This second tactic is made vivid in an example I draw from Stephen Darwall/® A 
certain young woman, Roberta, watches a documentary film about the plight of certain 
exploited workers and as a result is motivated to perform a certain class of political 
actions of which 0 , say, is one. It is conceded that her motivation for oing includes at 
least one desire- the desire to 0 . The question then is whether the motivation o f that 
desire is similarly inclusive of at least some non-cognitive element. Darwall's claim is 
that:
Roberta may have no desire prior to viewing the film that explains her 
decision to join the boycott. And whatever desire she does have after 
the film seems itself to be the result of her becoming aware, in a 
particularly vivid way, of considerations that motivate her desire and 
that she takes as reasons for her decision: the unjustifiable suffering of 
the workers.
The explanation might invoke some prior "abstract desire to relieve suffering" but need 
not do so.
For her to come to a general desire to relieve suffering she would have 
to become actively concerned about the fact of suffering itself, 
conceived independently of who suffers, and she may never have done 
that.'*^
48 See his 1983. pp39ff.
These quotations from ibid., p40.
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What considerations might the Humean invoke to suggest that pure cognitivism is as 
implausible in an account of the motivation of desire as it is in the motivation of 
action?
An initial thought is that the same considerations that led to the conclusion that 
some desire is involved in the motivation of any action can simply be redeployed 
further down the chain of motivation. But there is a problem here. Consider the 
following passage in which the teleological argument is elegantly deployed by Wallace 
(not a Humean) against Richard Warner:
Warner describes a thought-experiment in which we are to imagine a 
creature which takes thoughts as inputs and produces behaviour as 
output; the coherence of the description is then taken to show that a 
rationalist account is at least possible. But the description is coherent 
only if we interpret the creatures behaviour as mere bodily movement 
rather than as intentional action. The point of the teleological argument 
is that it is not coherent to suppose that intentional action could take 
place in the absence of a state of desire.^ ®
Why argument of this sort cannot simply be reproduced against the second tactic is 
fairly clear- we do not speak of arriving at desires as a result of intentions so to arrive 
in the same way as we speak of performing actions as a result of intentions so to 
perform.
What the Humean needs to do to produce an analogue of the original argument to 
work at this level is appeal to the notion of rational (as opposed to wo«-rational) desire 
formation. If it is inappropriate to speak of forming desires intentionally, it is not
Wallace, 1990. p361, note 14.
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always so to speak of forming them deliberately, that is, as a result of rational 
deliberation. And a plausible supposition is that this is not what happens in the 
Darwall's example. For Roberta, we may suggest, is, in spite of the noted disanalogy, 
like the creature described by Warner- beliefs about working conditions are the inputs 
and a desire to alleviate them the output. Nothing, it is true, prevents there being just 
such a causal linkage between them but the difficulty is with supposing the former to 
constitute reasons for the latter. For my coming to believe that P is the case only 
begins to provide a rational explanation of my wishing that it cease to be the case on 
the fiirther assumption that I don't like what I learn. In Darwall's example, this 
assumption is slipped over partly because such a response would be almost universal 
(nobody is pleased by brown lungs, low wages and the other things Darwall mentions). 
So consider an example where this is not so. I leam that there is no parsley on the 
moon and so come to desire that some be taken there.The "so" here may well 
indicate a supposition about causality, but it seems to make little sense as insinuating 
that an explanation in terms o f reasons has been given.
To bring the point out further, it may help to consider a simpler example than 
Darwall's. Someone visiting a gallery comes face to face with a painting and forms a 
desire to buy it. Suppose the person is not a collector and did not have any such prior 
desire as that he should buy some painting. Suppose moreover that he has no 
antecedent interest in art- he's simply escaping from a downpour. The reason for the 
desire, the anti-Humean will urge, is just that the painting has, as he perceives it to 
have, just the aesthetic properties it does. The anti-Humean's representation of the 
persons thought-process might go as follows:
a) This painting has the properties it does. So I want to buy it.
Cf. Nagel, 1970. p45; Parfit, 1984. pl23.
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Against this the Humean would be foolish, surely, to oppose this with the suggestion 
that the person actually thinks anything like:
(b) I want to buy a painting with such and such properties. Here is one. So I
want to buy it.
No such antecedent desire is needed, nor in this case is it at all plausible. Wliat the 
Humean propose is simply, dropping the "so" from (a), giving:
(c) This painting has the properties it does. I want to buy it.
Now if the painting is by, say, Leonardo, then the desire to buy it“ will make enough 
sense in terms of what are likely to be our own tastes for the "so" to have a 
justificatory force it would lack were it by, say, myself. But as far as explanatory force 
is concerned, the cases are much the same. For this person, unlike ourselves, has no 
antecedent views about aesthetic merit that inform the formation of his desire.
But though he brings no such antecedent views with him to the encounter with the 
painting, he may well take them a)\>ay from it. For it is, at least sometimes, by 
discovering what we are disposed to value in particular cases that we arrive at more 
general views about the sorts of things we value. And this is very much the process of 
which both Roberta and our artistic neophyte finds themselves at the beginning. Were 
they further from that beginning, then the Humean could indeed invoke general and 
antecedent wants to explain the genesis of the particular wants in question, but as they 
are at the beginning, it can simply be said that they are such as to respond to certain
52 It is beside the point that the desire may be unrealistic- "wants" does not imply "can".
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experiences by discovering in themselves certain desires. These particular responses 
may indeed come to occupy a place in a wider pattern, come to be seen as particular 
manifestations of more general impulses. And when this happens, there may be another 
way in which the "so" is restored, as it were, retrospectively. Suppose Roberta, 
subsequently to her initial politicization by the film, is disposed to respond similarly to 
other comparable instances of exploitation. It then does start to make sense to say of 
her in these cases that she dislikes exploitation. So that when she encountered this 
instance of it, she opposed it. The understanding of her character and dispositions thus 
deployed can also be deployed retrospectively to the initial case when those 
dispositions first made themselves known, this aspect of her character being taken to 
antedate its first clear manifestations, just as glass is brittle before it ever breaks. But 
this is only true in virtue of later developments. If Roberta's response to the film is a 
one-off, if there is no consistent pattern of response into which it is subsequently seen 
to fit, then it does seem no more or less inappropriate to say- she saw the film so she 
joined the boycott, than it is to introduce a similar "so" into an account of an 
eventuality she might describe in the words "Watching that documentary gave me a 
craving for cherry trifle", an eventuality which, while it may be a genuine instance of 
causal engagement between experiences, does not, at least prima facie instantiate the 
formation of want on the basis of a reason.
An insight to which I am appealing here is that to acting, or to deciding to act, or 
to coming to have a desire, on the basis of a reason, the same strictures seem to apply 
as Wittgenstein applied to rule-following in a remark already quoted in chapter 2:
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it would be nonsense to say: just once in the history of the world 
someone followed a rule (or a signpost, played a game, uttered a 
sentence, or understood one and so on).”
Of course in discussing Humean intemalism, the reasons that interest us are those 
invoked in the explanation rather than the justification of actioff^ and reasons that 
explain may fail to justify. As when we say:
Pierre dislikes his Jewish landlord so he supports Le Pen.
But though the forgoing does not justify Pierre's support, it resembles a justification in 
that it at least makes sense of it. It makes sense of it in a way that saying:
Pierre dislikes cherry trifle so he supports Le Pen.
fails to make sense of it and hence fails to get of the ground as a reason-invoking 
explanation of Pierre's support. Were it the case that our language or our culture 
recognized some connection between cherry trifle and the Front National sense would 
emerge just as it does when Roberta sees poor working conditions as a reason for 
political activism. But for that sense to have explanatory value, we would have to 
suppose that connection internal to Pierre's deliberative processes and this can only 
come about when, again as we saw with Roberta's political commitments, those 
processes come to exhibit a larger pattern which that sense fits. Explanation that 
proceeds by the invocation of reasons is, like rationality itself, the child of structure 
(and we shall see in later chapters how the same is true of morality).
” 1956. VI, 21.
” On this distinction see e.g. Bond 1983 , chapter 2, Darwall, 1983. chapter 2.
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3.7. Cases like Roberta and my aesthetic neophyte recall the discussion of these 
matters by McDowell in his paper "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical 
Imperatives?"” , written in response to Foot's claim that the answer to that question is 
effectively, "Yes." To accept that one should do something, McDowell claims, is ipso 
facto to accept that one has reason to do it, a reason that may be constituted by one's 
conception of one circumstances, a conception that does not weigh with one only 
conditionally on possession of appropriate desires. McDowell follows Nagel in 
suggesting that the ascription of a desire to someone acting for such a reason is 
"simply consequential on our taking him to act as he does for the reasons we cite."” 
The possibility that someone might share one's conception of one's circumstances but 
see no reason is, he claims, imaginary:
It is not clear that we can really make sense of the idea of someone who 
is otherwise rational but cannot see how facts about his future can, by 
themselves, constitute reasons for him to act in various ways.”
Thus we say such things as "You don't know what it means that someone is shy and 
sensitive" and, he asserts:
Conveying what a circumstance means, in this loaded sense, is getting 
someone to see it in the special way in which a virtuous person would 
see it.^ ®
” McDowell, 1978 
”  Ibid., pl5.
” Ibid., pl7.
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The question "Why should I conform to the dictates of morality?" is, we are told:
most naturally understood as asking for an extra-moral motivation 
which will be gratified by virtuous behaviour/^
and it is this which makes the question improper and redundant- for the virtuous 
person requires no such extra motivation.
Now suppose a virtuous person is presented with a set of circumstances, forms a 
conception of what those circumstances are and then acts in the way dictated by virtue. 
McDowell is conceding that the antecedents of the action incorporate a desire so to act 
but takes it that this desire is simply consequential on "the fact that the reasons weigh 
as they do" where the reasons are construed along cognitivist lines. McDowell's then 
seeks to improve upon what he takes to be a simplistic view of the antecedents of 
virtuous action, whereby they comprise:
1/ an understanding of the situation,
2/ an understanding of the requirements of morality with respect to the 
situation and
3/ a desire to act on those requirements 
with a view which sets them out as follows 
1/ an understanding of the situation,
” Ibid., p21.
”  Ibid., p22.
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2/ a desire to act as that understanding determines one to act.
The insight here is that a virtuous person's understanding of his circumstances may 
differ widely from that of a person of a different kind precisely because he is virtuous 
and the associated claim is that that difference in his understanding suffices to explain 
the difference in his behaviour without having to invoke a different set of desires which 
the virtuous person brings with him to the situation (as opposed to forming in response 
to it). My worry here is that we might also reasonably demand some explanation of 
why the virtuous person's understanding of his situation differs as it does. To say it 
does so in virtue of his being virtuous is to invoke a virtns dormitiva unless we can 
give a characterization of virtue other than as a disposition to understand 
circumstances in a particular way. And the natural point to make about a virtuous 
person is that he is someone who values virtuous actions and desires to perform them. 
Indeed this is just how Aristotle (whom McDowell claims as an ally) characterizes the 
temperate man, who is distinguished from the merely enkratic precisely by the 
conformity of his desires with the requirements of virtue.®® Such a consideration 
invites the non-cognitivist to characterize the antecedents of virtuous action rather as 
follows:
1/ an understanding of the situation and
2/ a desire to act as a virtuous person would in that situation which is 
determined both by 1/ and by
3/ an antecedent set of more general desires to act in the ways in which a 
virtuous person does- these desires not only collaborating with 1/ to produces 
2/ but themselves colouring 1/.
®® Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 9.
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Here we accept the sort of explanation we rejected for Roberta and the aesthetic 
neophyte that appeals to antecedent desires. And this simply because such explanation 
failed for them precisely because they were at the beginning of the educative process 
of character-formation vis-à-vis respectively political and aesthetic deliberation and 
reflection, whereas the virtuous person, again following Aristotle®*, is naturally taken 
to be the outcome of such an educative process. And it is often indeed to such 
antecedent feelings that we may look for the explanation of the behaviour and attitudes 
of those whose opinions are more settled that Roberta's are. Thus George Eliot's 
Dorothea is attracted to Casaubon because of what she (falsely) understands him to be- 
a brilliant and accomplished man of letters. But this only provides a reason for her 
attraction given the way in which all her desires and aspirations were, antecedent to 
meeting him, so very determinedly highbrow and intellectual. Or again the man who 
was "Thursday", in Chesterton's story, fears and has an aversion to "Monday" and the 
others because he (again falsely) takes them to be insane and murderous political and 
moral fanatics but this only explains his attitudes given our understanding that, as a 
good policemen, he has an antecedent aversion to people of that kind.
We also accommodate McDowell's insight that the way a virtuous person sees and 
understands his circumstances may be decisively different from the perception and 
understanding of a different kind of person. But we accomodate it by simply remarking 
that the way we see and understand the world is itself coloured and structured not only 
by our theoretical beliefs but also by our desires:
Ibid., II.
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Murphy, all life is figure and ground: the face or system of faces against 
the big blooming buzzing confusion. I think of Miss Dwyer.
The insight is real, but, as far as the Humean is concerned the threat is illusory.
3.8. I hope two things at least have emerged from this chapter. The first is at least a 
prima facie motivation for subjective intemalism, given the extent to which the 
plausibility of the alternative offered by extemalism and objective intemalism have been 
undermined by the foregoing argument. This should further set the stage for the 
arguments marshalled more generally against descriptivism in chapter 8 below.
The second thing I hope has emerged is the untenability of platonism in the sphere 
of value. Value is immanent or it is nothing.®^  It is a moral that is perhaps helpfully
®^ The words are Neary's from Beckett, 1973. p6.
”  The rather Hegelian choice of diction does not seem wholly infelicitous for Hegel 
indeed stresses just such immanence:
The identity of the good with the subjective will, an identity which 
therefore is concrete and the tmth of them both, is Ethical Life. [1942. 
para. 141.]
And cf. Knox's note to para 142 :
Hegel...is denying that the ethical order is purely transcendent;...it is a 
substance which has risen to self-consciousness in those very individuals 
and has become actualized only for that reason, [ibid, p346]
Ill
pointed via consideration of the interesting metaethical argument of Michael Walzer's 
Tanner Lectures.®'* Echoing the subtitle of Mackie's influential book, Walzer considers 
what he calls "the path of invention" and "the path of discovery". About the discovery 
he is sceptical because, he notes, the moral principles presented to us by objectivists 
who follow such a path have a habit of proving to be:
already in our possession, incorporated, as it were, long ago, familiar 
and well-thumbed by now...They are, so to speak, there, waiting to be 
enforced. But they are only there because they are really here, features 
of ordinary life.®®
Where the results fail to show such familiarity, something is taken to be wrong:
Bentham obviously believed that he had discovered objective truth, and 
the applications of this truth are, very often, not recognizable at all as 
features of ordinary life. Frightened by the strangeness of their own 
arguments, most utilitarian philosophers fiddle with the felicific calculus 
so that it yields results closer to what we all think. So they pull the 
exception back to the rule without confidence in revelation, we can only 
discover what we know.®®
Invention, on the other hand, can proceed in two ways. It can proceed de novo, 
along constructive lines, but that raises a problem. For, should the results have that
®'* Walzer, 1988.
®® Ibid., pp6-7.
66 Ibid., p8.
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unfamiliarity so unwelcome in the outcome of what purports to be discovery, on what 
basis are the inventors to impute to those same results the authority over us without 
which they would fail to be interesting. The principles that emerge from considering, à 
la Rawls, what rational beings would agree to when
[djeprived of all knowledge of their standing in the social world, of 
their interests, virtues, talents and relationships.®^
might prove to be such as we, knowing ourselves so situated, would repudiate. To 
meet this difficulty, Walzer suggests, all that the path of invention can hope to offer is 
some degree of codification of the principles we hold as we are, in all our messy 
particularity.
He concludes this stage of his argument by suggesting that the claims made by the 
followers of both paths are illusory:
Philosophical discovery and invention (I leave aside divine revelation) 
are disguised interpretations: there is really only one path in moral 
philosophy.®^
We don't have to discover the moral world because we have always 
lived there. We don't have to invent it because it has already been 
invented- though not in accordance with any philosophical method.®^
®'Ibid., pi 1. 
®' Ibid., p20. 
®^Ibid.,pl9.
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Notice here the aptness of Walzer's use of the first person plural- the value of 
intemalism and the stress it leads us to place on 02 is that vis à vis the conventionalist 
it keeps us mindful of the question- what is the authority foi^ me of the values prevalent 
in my social milieu. Walzer’s discussion, among other things, points up a similar 
significance for 01 by offering to our consideration the way we as a society might 
question the authority of extemal and alien norms. Just as I  cannot begin to deliberate 
without beginning from the evaluative attitudes I already hold, so we cannot begin to 
reflect together without beginning fi*om the values we hold in common. Insofar as both 
sorts of reflection concem us, our acceptance of intemalism had better not result in the 
dismissal as irrelevant of the kind of considerations provided by 01 and I shall later 
seek to show how it does not.
Suffice it to say at present that if we had no shared norms, we could not fimction 
as social creatures. And if we had no passions in our soul we could scarcely function as 
agents. And if we did not have both there could be no question of there being any such 
thing as morality. To stress, as the champions of emotivism did when non-cognitivism 
enjoyed what we might think of as its age of innocence, the first-person approbational 
aspect of moral evaluation at the expense of the wider interpersonal normative context 
is to caricature it by disregarding its essentially social location. To stress the norms and 
mles of cultures at the expense of the emotive engagement therein of particular 
persons, as cognitivists have tended to do, is equally to caricature it by leaving it with 
little to differentiate it in status from a moribund set of mles of etiquette’® which, 
however anthropologically interesting as a cultural artefact, is not something that you 
or I need have much reason to concem ourselves with.
’® See Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in her 1978. But see 
also chapter 10 below.
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In these remarks, I am looking, to some extent, ahead. Looking back however, it 
must be recognized that, whatever the pitfalls of focusing too exclusively of the desires 
and pro-attitudes of the individual subject or on the shared and established norms of a 
wider culture, it is on just these things that we must focus. Independently of talk of my 
values and our values no sense attaches simply to talk of values as such. Platonism is a 
non-starter. The Way is not distant.
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Chapter 4: Principled Desires
4.1. Alastair MacIntyre, in After Virtue, presents a sustained critique of what he rather 
loosely calls emotivist theories of value which he believes should be rejected on moral 
as well as on metaethical grounds. He includes within emotivism all theories that 
regard evaluative judgements as ultimately expressive of preferences and desires, an 
understanding that he takes to include not just such unquestioned exemplars of 
emotivism as Charles Stevenson but also such diverse figures as Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Jean Paul Sartre and R. M. Hare, this understanding of "emotivism" being based on his 
view that these positions are effectively united by just such a shared assumption, viz 
that:
The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of 
the preferences of an individual will.
In this chapter, which has MacIntyre as its point of departure, but only in this chapter, 
my use of "emotivism" follows the somewhat extended sense he gives it.*
* See MacIntyre, 1981. chapter 1 (The quoted passage is from p20). His synechdocal 
use of "emotivism" recalls Murdoch's (1970, title essay) "existentialism" and 
Anscombe's (1958) "utilitarianism" (in the mouths of these respective writers these 
three terms are virtually synonymous), just as his desire to reject something he takes to 
be common to all post Kantian, and perhaps especially post-Nietzschean, moral 
pWlosophy can be seen as a development of Murdoch and Anscombe's earlier essays. 
More recent comparably generalized criticisms of modem moral thinking on similar 
grounds to MacIntyre's are given by Stephen Clark, 1989. chapters 1 and 2.
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At the centre of MacIntyre's objection to emotivism is not so much its logical 
inadequacies as its moral poverty. Emotivism, he writes:
entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative 
and non-manipulative social relations/
And if it is true:
evaluative utterance can in the end have no point or use but the 
expression of my own feelings or attitudes and the transformation of the 
feelings or attitudes of others. I cannot genuinely appeal to impersonal 
criteria, for there are no impersonal criteria. I may think that I so appeal 
and others may think that I so appeal, but these thoughts will always be 
mistaken. The sole reality of distinctively moral discourse is the attempt 
of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences and choices of 
another with its own. Others are always means, never ends.^
It will be a central pre-occupation of the remaining chapters of this thesis to show that 
this kind of characterization does not describe the poverty of emotivism but merely the 
poverty of an unnecessarily impoverished emotivism, to show how an account of value 
can be emotivist in its treatment of the fundamentals of the subject and at the same 
time capture all the complexity and richness of the sort of moral life and moral 
conception of life MacIntyre feels it betrays. To this end I will elaborate in coming 
chapters on what the invocation of "attitudes, feelings, preferences and choices"
' Ibid., p22.
' Ibid., p23.
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amounts to. In this chapter, however, I want to develop a preliminary response more 
particularly directed to MacIntyre's objections.
4.2. Emotivism, as a theory of the meaning of evaluative utterance, fails, MacIntyre 
argues, primarily for the reason that it is unable to make out the distinction between 
moral expressions of pro-attitudes and other sorts. Emotivism:
is dedicated to characterizing as equivalent in meaning two kinds of 
expression which...derive their distinctive fimction in our language in 
key part fi’om the contrast and difference between them. I have already 
suggested that there are good reasons for distinguishing between what I 
called expressions of personal preference and evaluative (including 
moral) expressions, citing the way in which utterances of the first kind 
depend upon who utters them to whom for any reason-giving force that 
they may have, while utterances of the second kind are not similarly 
dependent for their reason-giving force on the context of utterance.'*
The problem then is to describe how moral desires, pro-attitudes or whatever are 
distinguished from non-moral desires. In contemporary moral theory there are of 
course standard responses to this problem, notably those that invoke the notions of 
universalizahility and of higher-order desired, but at present I want to consider a 
rather different way of drawing the distinction that differs from these and draws on the 
notion invoked by MacIntyre of impersonality.
"Ibid., ppl2-13.
® On the former see Hare 1952. 1963. On the latter see Frankfiirt, 1971. 1987 (and 
compare Charles Taylor's (1985. 1989) "strong evaluations" on which see below).
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When it is a question of distinguishing specifically moral jftom non-moral attitudes, 
an important caveat is necessary. For the distinction we are making is not an 
unambiguous one. There is, in the first place, the distinction we want to make in 
demarcating those considerations on wliich I ought always, all things considered, to act 
from those that are not so overriding. An understanding of "morality" informed by this 
distinction would lead us to suppose that, if I believe that, while moral considerations 
favour doing over 0 2 , 1 ought to do 0 2  rather than 0 j, I must be using either 
"moral" or "ought" in what Hare calls an inverted commas sense^ or else do not 
understand one or other of these two terms. Thus, if we consider an advocate of first- 
person dictatorship who believes that everyone should serve that same person's own 
interests’, the considerations this person views as overriding may be said to lack 
impersonality and vice versa. Someone presenting such a view as a moral theory will 
not then be stressing overridingness in their demarcation of the moral. Considerations 
such as overridingness demarcate the moral in a formal sense in virtue of the sort of 
questions (How to live? What to do?) to which moral thinking purports to supply 
answers. Hence Hare's truism that:
the function of moral principles is to guide conduct.®
And hence the moral theorist’s interest precisely in which principles can be properly 
described as overriding. This is the sense in which "moral" is taken as what Neil 
Cooper calls a universe o f discourse word, the sort of word
®Hare, 19S2,pl24.
’ My terminology here follows Rawls, 1972. p i24. Q.v.
Hare. 1952. pi.
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used to classify statements according to their topic or subject-matter/
But which principles are overriding depends on which substantive moral positions we 
adopt- on the answers we give to the moral thinker’s questions. Interestingly specific 
criteria for demarcating the moral realm become available as and only as we become 
committed to substantive moral positions such as are involved in Hare's 
universalization-based utilitarianism or Thomas Nagel's impartial rationalism.
"Moral" may then come to signal a second sort of distinction understood in what 
by Cooper terms a restrictivist manner which confines its sense in just such substantive 
ways.*® Thus Bernard Williams, for example, takes a restrictivist line in writing:
I take altruism... to be a necessary feature of a morality. It follows that 
a principle to the effect that everyone ought exclusively to pursue his 
own interests... would not constitute a morality or be a moral 
principle.**
® Cooper, 1981, p26.
*® Ibid., pp27ff.
** Williams, 1973. p250. Note however, MacIntyre's historical claim (1981. pp212- 
213) that the terms in which Williams here (and elsewhere) conceives "morality" are 
essentially modem ones, that it was only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
that (p212):
morality came generally to be understood as offering a solution to the 
problems posed by human egoism and that the content of morality came 
to be largely equated with altruism.
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I am not primarily concerned in this chapter to explicate the sense of "moral" as a 
universe of discourse word. Nor yet to exemplify;
the attempt of restrictivists to foist on the world of thought a restricted
concept of a morality to the exclusion of all others.*^
But rather simply to show how the distinction between considerations that are, in a 
sense, impersonal and those that are not may be given importance without retreating 
from the sort of position MacIntyre calls "emotivist". This is related indeed to the job 
that Hare seeks to do by distinguishing desires that are universalizable from those that 
are not*® and Nagel seeks to do by singling out those considerations that lack what he 
calls a "free-agent variable"*", but it is a job that may, in principle, be carried out 
without our having to endorse desires of the more impersonal kind. So that it need not 
be restrictivist in character, though of course much of the interest will be conditional 
on an assumption that desires characterized as impersonal, in the manner to be filled in, 
are of particular moral significance. The immediate concern of this chapter is to show 
that how such a distinction is available to a moral theory without insisting on whether 
or how it be deployed.
4.3. Such availability is nonetheless important. For the phenomenological difficulties 
raised for the kind of position described as "emotivist" by MacIntyre would seem to 
demand it. Thus when Milton Friedman characterizes the racist as simply possessing a
*^ Cooper, 1981. p31.
*® Hare, 1952. ppl58-9.
Nagel, 1970. p90.
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"taste...that one does not share"*® the claim strikes us as grotesque. Moral claims, we 
wish to say, are very different from expression of taste. And so they are. In this chapter 
we will begin the process of seeing how.*®
I dislike liquorice- a clear instance of an expression of taste. Faced with some, I 
would prefer not to eat it. If anything is a purely personal desire, this is. For the 
consumption, or not, of liquorice by anyone else is a matter of no interest to me. I also 
dislike torture and this is a pretty clear cut case of a paradigmatically evaluative, and 
specifically, moral desire: not only would I rather not be subjected to torture myself 
but I object to anybody's being tortured. I object indeed (however impotently) to the 
torture of those who (it is depressingly certain) will be subject to torture in the distant 
firture when I am dead and forgotten.
Although the latter desire is personal in the sense of being my desire it is 
completely impersonal with respect to its content. Desire is of course construable as an 
intentional state involving both a proposition and an attitude to it. Or, in John Searle's 
formulation, a representative content and a psychological mode.*’ In a case like that of 
my aversion to liquorice, the state of affairs intended in the representational content is 
simply a state of the desiring subject- myself. While, in the case of my desire that 
nobody be tortured in the distant future, the content of my preference is as free from 
egocentricity as it could be.
*® Friedman, 1962. pllO.
*® Gibbard, 1990. pp 164-6 likewise takes it as crucial to his expressivistic account of 
reason to distinguish rational requirements from mere matters of taste. He focuses here 
on the independence of validity and acceptance and on the question of normative 
authority (on both of which see finther chapter 10 below).
*’ Searle, 1983. p6.
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The point I want to press against MacIntyre, then, lies in the distinction Williams 
makes in Ms paper "Egoism and Altruism" that:
the trouble for the egoist is not that it is desires that he expresses, nor 
that they are his desires- the trouble is that all Ms desires are for tMngs 
for him}^
Williams goes on to distinguish between what he calls I-desires and non-I desires, 
the two being distinguished by the fact that the specification of I-desires
requires "I" or related expressions ("my" etc.)
wMle in non-I desires it does not. But because both sorts of desire are always 
somebody’s desire there is nothing in the distinction that leaves it unavailable to the 
emotivist in MacIntyre's sense. The impersonality is in the content of the preference, 
not in its location, or lack of location, at a person.*^
It must be admitted that Williams' characterization of I-desires is rather imprecise 
given the difficulties raised by "or related expressions". For there may well be an 
embarrassingly large number of these, given such claims as that of Steven Schiffer that 
all ostensibly de re thoughts are implicitly indexical, to say notMng of related views 
such as Tylor Burge's understanding of the semantics of proper names as having an
*® Williams, 1973. p260. Compare Gibbard's distinction (1988. p63) between umversal 
and self-pertinent preferences, Nagel's contrast betwen the personal and the impersonal 
standpoints (1970. pplOOff) and Dworkin’s notion of extemal preferences (p234 of 
"Reverse Discrimination" in Ms 1977).
*" Cf., Darwall, 1983. ppl35-136.
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indexical element necessary for determination of reference; David Lewis's ingenious, 
but I tliink implausible, view that "actual" is an indexical expression and hence all 
reference to the actual world, as opposed to non-actual but merely possible worlds, 
involves an implicit reference to the speaker; or Roderick Chisholm's claim that all 
reference is effected by way of self-reference.^® Even on the less extreme views there is 
a danger that the definition of "I-desires" as those whose content involves reference to 
oneself (specified by the first-person) is going to cast its net debilitatingly widely.
What we must do is seek to distinguish between desires of mine (say) the contents 
of which are about me and those whose contents are about things other than me which 
can only be individuated with respect to their relation to myself. Thus my desire that 1 
win the foot-race is about me whereas my desire that the best man win is not, although 
it may well be that I must be alluded to in any specification of the contextual 
circumstances sufiSciently rich to determine, in both cases, exactly which foot-race it is 
that I am thinking about.
Suppose a full specification of the contents of two desires were:
(1) that the foot-race I intend to enter tomorrow be won by me.
and
(2) that the foot-race I intend to enter tomorrow be won by the best man.
Both of these count as I-desires in Williams' sense but we want to make the distinction 
in such a way that only (1) is so counted. And this seems possible. For the contents of
See Schiffer, 1978. Burge, 1977. Lewis, "Attitudes De Se and De Dicto"' in his 1983. 
Chisholm, 1981.
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both desires are about who wins the footrace- the desires are satisfied if the person 
referred to wins, frustrated if he loses. What happens to me is however, in the case of 
(2), neither here nor there and makes no difference to whether the desire is satisfied or 
not. My only role is in the contribution I make to fixing the satisfaction conditions of 
the desire, not in any respect in which I might contribute constitutively to fulfilling 
them.
Where would this leave a desire such as this:
(3) that my brother win the footrace?
For, after all, I  do not feature in the content of my desire. The person who does so 
feature is singled out by reference to me but the preference is still, in Dworkin's sense, 
an external one.^  ^Yet in this case we might wish, intuitively to count the desire as an I- 
desire for the first-person does seem to indicate a sense in which such a desire- the sort 
that characterizes what Mackie calls first-person altruism^^- is egoistic- less egoistic 
perhaps than (1) but more so than (2).
The difference between (2) and (3) is a significantly hard one to make precise. For 
it is a matter of what sort of relations between myself and other things are most salient 
in my evaluative thought. To see this, we can imagine a situation in which this 
difference would be extinguished. Suppose that it were a point of the greatest 
importance to me that the foot-races I  entered (or even merely intended to enter) were 
won by the best man, that I was disposed to regard it as a great dishonour if anyone 
implied that I might consider entering a foot-race whose outcome was not assured of 
absolute fairness. Then in (2) the reference to myself would not simply serve to fix  the
For reference see note 18 above. 
See Mackie, 1977. pp84-5.
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reference of my thought about the footrace but to indicate the motive for my concern 
about, in particular, this foot-race- as if, were it some foot-race I was not to enter, I 
might be quite indifferent to the fairness of its outcome. Or I might desire the victory 
of the best man and hence, believing him that, of my brother. That he is my brother 
might be neither here nor there, only of importance as a handy means of determining 
who it is I am thinking about.
So that the relevant difference between (2) and (3) is an extrinsic difference- both 
are equally 'T"-involving in the way their conditions of satisfaction are fixed, equally 
non-I-involving in the way their conditions of satisfaction are fulfilled. In practice 
whether the imputation of egoism to the desirer makes sense to us depends on other 
things he or she may value. Provisionally then let us classify desires such as (3) as non- 
I-desires though we will see shortly how they may be otherwise differentiated.
4.4. Let us, calling this non-"I"-involving characteristic of non-I-desires their 
impersonality, note that impersonality, so understood is quite distinct jfrom other kinds 
of impartiality that might be admired. Thus we would not be disposed to characterize 
as impartial a desire that people with auburn hair be given special privileges unless they 
live in Portugal or Anstruther or that people above 5T0" tall be flogged daily unless 
they were bom in 1950. Yet, of course, in a sense such desires are impartial- they are 
desires that people so characterized be so treated whatever else they are. Their 
supposed partiality is not in the fact that they discriminate (for the most Solomonic of 
wisdom discriminates) but in the fact that the lines along which they discriminate are 
so strange.
That is, they are better described as arbitrary rather then partial, and their 
arbitrariness consists, I would suggest, in their failure to relate to a whole background 
of the sort of discriminations we regard as, to echo Susan Hurley's terminology, 
normal and natural. Giving prizes to the fastest mnner is a form of discrimination that
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fits in rather nicely with a whole complex of widespread and shared conceptions of 
what justice is and what athletics is in the light of which it is a straightforward matter 
for us to, as Alan Gibbard likes to say, "make sense" of such a policy.^  ^Whereas 
desires of the kind described in the last paragraph are comparable to G. E. M. 
Anscombe's now proverbial example of a desire for a saucer of mud or MacIntyre's 
example of a stranger at a bus stop remarking that the common wild duck is called 
histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus.^ ^ Desires and actions of this kind are not literally 
unintelligible, nor necessarily ineligible at the level of interpretation (see chapter 2 
above). Nor are they necessarily irrational (as opposed to non-rational)- they simply 
fa il to fit together with the rest of what a normal person would desire.
Though not, of course, necessarily with the rest of what an abnormal person might 
desire, so long as the abnormality was not too nearly global in which case, firstly, the 
constraints on interpretation discussed in chapter 2 might well start to limit our ability 
to make much sense of such a person and, secondly and relatedly, we would become 
unable to apply a notion offitting together commensurable with our own to the way in 
which that person him or herself organized his or her desires, beliefs etc.^ ^
The point to grasp in considering examples like MacIntyre's is close to what was 
said above vis à vis Hurley. MacIntyre is concerned here to identify a sense of 
"intelligible" that is appropriate to semantics with a sense indicative of the availability 
of psychological or social explanation of the kind associated with Max Weber. Such an 
identification can be defended^  ^by appealing firstly to the difficulties in principle of
See Gibbard, 1990. pp36ffi 
2"" See Anscombe, 1957. p70, MacIntyre, 1981. pp 195-6.
23 Cf. 3.6 above.
2® See e.g. Winch, 1958. MacIntyre, 1981. chapter 8, Taylor, 1985, esp. chapter 1, and 
Hurley's (19891 treatment of meanings as a special case of reasons.
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framing explanations in the human sciences in terms of strict and extensionalistic 
covering laws and secondly to the Wittgensteinian point that it is only because 
linguistic expressions are used to organize the psychological and social world that 
imputations of meaning to them makes much sense- meaning is not intrinsic to them 
and demands a background in human action. But these considerations do not seem to 
suffice for, say, MacIntyre's example to work as he intends- for there is a background 
in human action for the linguistic behaviour of our friend at the bus-stop that makes 
what he says intelligible. He says that the name of the common wild duck is 
histrionicus histrionicus histtionicus thus asserting an English sentence that is true if 
and only if the Latin name for the common wild duck is histrionicus histrionicus 
histrionicus. We don't need to know what on earth he is playing at in saying this to 
understand the semantics of his utterance. Which is not to deny the point, applicable at 
a far more global level, that we need to understand what speakers of English on the 
whole are up to in order to have any semantic grasp of that language. But when we do 
understand this, we can then find no particular difficulty in understanding, at least in a 
semantic sense, the behaviour of eccentric young ornithologists at bus stops.
Such arbitrariness falling short of unintelligibility might seem to characterize a 
possible kind of desire superficially very similar to more strictly personal I-desires. 
Such would be, for example, a desire of mine
(4) that persons called "James Lenman" be given large government pensions
and other useful privileges.^^
22 There is also of course the possibility of desires relating to persons who are not just 
called "James Lenman" but are James Lenman (cf. Williams, 1973. p254). Perhaps 
supporters of Kripkean views on reference might find the contrast significant. Those, 
like myself, who are persuaded by the arguments of descriptivists (e.g. Dummett,
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Such a desire, although, if I held it, it would doubtless be egocentric in its motivation, 
is not egocentric in its content. A person otherwise named might conceivably hold it 
for some highly eccentric but nonetheless principled reason- say that the name in 
question is thought to be that of a deity and that those who share it are thereby set 
apart. And so indeed might /- though my avowals of such motivation would ordinarily 
be less than convincing. Desires like (4), when held by me, do not then fail to qualify as 
impersonal for their content makes no reference to me-as-sucfr®, involves no first- 
person indexical element of the sort that is irreducible to any such purely descriptive 
characterization as reference to persons by means of what they are called.^ ^
4.5. As Williams notes in his discussion of I and non-I desires:
1973, chapter 5, appendix; Searle, 1983. chapter 9; Bach, 1987. chapters 7 and 8);
Katz, 1990. will not. ;
2' Cf. Nagel, 1970, p91. j
2^ The irreducibility of the first person is the subject of a large literature- e.g., |
Anscombe, 1975: Perry, 1977 and 1979: Schiffer, 1978. section 5; Chisholm, 1981: j
Lewis, 1983: Nagel, 1986: Mellor, "I and Now" in his 1991. 1 symapthize with much j
of Mellor’s impatience with the attempts of some of these writers (notably Nagel) to j
make metaphysical heavy weather of the matter and with the line taken by Mellor and i
Perry that the central significance of irreducibly "I" and "now"-involving thoughts is of j
the pragmatic kind dramatized famously by Perry's messy shopper example. It is, at I
any rate, given my present subject matter, their pragmatic signifiance that most jI
interests me here. !
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Just as there are non-I desires which depend on I desires, so there are 
non-I desires which depend on I desires^ ®
This adds a significant dimension to the distinction as so far characterized allowing us 
to introduce a fiirther distinction between desires according to whether the direction o f 
motivation is personal-impersonal or impersonal-personal. In so doing we acquire the 
ability to make within emotivism a distinction that may be deployed in an attempt to 
condemn it. Thus we have the following from a former Bishop of Birmingham:
Here in Britain we have privatized religion, and we choose our moral 
and spiritual values like brands in a over-stocked super-market. "Facts'* 
are public, and either true or false, but values are neither true nor false, 
merely a personal choice.^ ^
One element in the anxiety expressed here is that we are perceived as lacking the 
resources to speak of there being a place in our thought about values for an idea of an 
authority outwith our personal attitudes. This sort of anxiety, shared by Maclntyre^ ,^ 
will be addressed in chapter 10 below. But there is also present the idea that moral 
attitudes are selected fi*om the "available range" on the basis of their potential for 
personal gratification, that when we lose the belief that values have objective, 
descriptive meaning, we become committed to an outlook that is tainted with what one 
might call moral consumerism whereby there is nothing for it but to "shop" for the 
values that best accomodate our desire for such gratification..
3® Williams. 1973.0261.
32 Hugh Montefiore in the Guardian, 2nd June, 1988. 
321981. pl77.
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Suppose nonetheless that values are taken to be a form of desire. There remains 
the question of how we determine what values to hold which will be a special case of 
the question of how we determine generally what we are to desire. Here there is firstly 
a broad distinction to be made between desires that are grounding and desires that are 
grounded in them. To borrow fi’om Hume, one desires exercise because one desires 
health because one desires a long life with a little pain as possible.^  ^Desires like the 
latter are grounding, like the former grounded.
Talk of choosing ultimately grounding desires can easily sound odd, like talk of 
what Charles Taylor describes as a "pure leap into the void". '^’ And in fact our desires 
do not generally spring into being ex nihiio. As noted above they relate to a whole 
background of other beliefs and desires. We generally come to deliberation, not as 
"featureless bare egos"^ ,^ but with too many prior desires for those we newly form to 
be wholly free fi*om their influence. Which is not to deny that some desires are formed 
unrefiectively, without anything it is meaningful to call "deliberation". A man who 
walks past a restaurant kitchen with an empty stomach, encounters an attractive 
woman or comes face to face with a large, aggressive and unchained dog will quite 
unrefiectively form desires which are not obviously grounded in any prior desires, the 
sort of desires in describing whose genesis the word "onslaught" comes naturally to 
mind.3® But in cases like this, it seems inappropriate to speak of choice. Where talk of 
choice is appropriate the background of prior desire is bound to play its part.
33 Cf. Hume, 1975. p293. 
3^ Taylor, 1985. p35.
35 Hurley, 1989. pl03.
33 Of course such desires are related to our biological natures and generally indeed 
conform to enduring dispositions. But that is not to say that they are motivated by 
reasoning from prior desires- although they may well fit into a pattern of prior desires
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The grounding/grounded distinction still bites in at least two ways, the more 
important of which I will consider in 4.6 below. But for now it is enough to note that 
when we look at related groups of our desires some can be seen as grounded, some as 
grounding, with respect to others. I want to go to the shops because I want to buy 
some food and not vice versa. The former desire is not of course ultimate in the sense 
of arising arbitrarily from nowhere but is grounding with respect to the latter desire. 
This of course means that a given desire may be both grounding and grounded but only 
with respect to different other desires. Thus the desire for health grounds that for 
exercise but is grounded by that for long and painless life.^ ^
We may call consumerist a structuring of desire whereby impersonal desires are 
grounded by their personal desires. We might recall Mr Bulstrode who:
was not a hypocrite- he was simply a man whose desires were stronger 
than his theoretic beliefs and who always rationalized the latter into 
theoretic agreement with the form er.
that is not our reason for acquiring them. Compare Nagel's category of "unmotivated 
desires" as he explains it in his 1970. p29.
32 Note that the grounding/grounded distinction incorporates but is wider than the 
ultimate/instrumental. If I desire the happiness of all mankind, that grounds a desire for 
the happiness of various remote persons in the far east; if I regret all my follies (wish 
they had never occurred) that may ground a regret for my follies of 1975. The 
relationship is logical not instrumental and because the desires are remote from my 
future actions the invocation of means involved in talk of instrumentality is simply 
inappropriate.
3^ George Eliot, 1965. p667 (the language is cognitivist of course but the illustration, 
for my purposes, none the worse)
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Consumerist patterns of desire would be exemplified by one who based a repudiation 
of vegetarianism on their love for meat or of temperance principles on their passion for 
drink, by one whose pacificism was a rationalization of personal cowardice or by one 
whose adherence to a political movement was the product of fashion (talk in the 
seventies of "trendy lefties"), greed or envious sour grapes. The examples almost 
inevitably illustrate how almost any impersonal desire can be denigrated by imputing 
consumerist motivation patterns to its bearer. Such denigration is akin to what 
MacIntyre characterizes as "unmasking" but it is not a fair characterization of 
emotivism to see it as a global unmasking.^®
The opposite pattern of motivation might be called principled. It is exemplified 
whenever anyone with an impersonal desire puts it into action as if I were to vote for 
party X because the principles they espouse appear to me just.'*® Indeed the issuing in
3" 1981. p69
'*® The effect of adopting a principled outlook is comparable to the effect of adopting 
what Rawls calls (1972. pi 8) the "standpoint of justice":
if a man knew he was wealthy, he might find it usefijl to advance the 
principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if 
he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary 
principle.(ibid, ppl8-19).
But note that the choices made from this standpoint are not, or not necessarily, 
expressions of impersonal preferences. I choose certain principles because I would 
rather be a member a society where they are adopted than of one where they are not.
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action of impersonal desires requires just such mediation by personal desires to act 
grounded upon them just insofar as a personal first-person desire is an ingredient in any 
intention.So even our most high-minded actions are the immediate upshot of 
personal desire, albeit personal desire with a complex motivation in desire of a different 
kind.
Given what has already been said, it comes as no surprise that the patterns are not 
mutually exclusive: I may want to vote for party X because I want them to win 
(principled) and want them to win because I want to be better off, believing this a 
likely consequence (consumerist).
In the light of this distinction it will prove interesting to recall again desires (2), (3) 
and (4) above. (3) was classed as impersonal because nothing could be seen to 
intrinsically differentiate it fi-om (2) with respect to the proposed test. But the 
distinction now available can differentiate self-referentially altruistic desires from those 
in which the self-reference is of that different kind that merely fixes reference, (2) 
might, we noted, be motivated, by a desire that I only enter fair foot-races, (3) by a 
desire that I be the brother of the victor. In such a case, we may now say, they are 
indeed impersonal desires, but their motivation is consumeristic so our feeling that the 
presence of egoism has been glossed is avoided by distinguishing such consumeristic 
desires from the same desires when otherwise motivated- where the self-reference 
simply fixes reference to another. Likewise the apparent egoism of (4) is more fully 
characterized by saying that either it is arbitrary and fails to fit in with anything but an 
abnormal background of desire or it is consumerist- the only convincing, non­
granting that I do not know which such member I would be. I'm still thinking 
egocentrically, albeit in ignorance of where the centre is.
*^2 See Castaneda, 1975. p i50; Davidson, "Intending" in his 1980; Audi, 1986.
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eccentric, explanation for it would be that an explicitly personal desire served it as a 
ground.
4.6. Given this possible diversity of direction of motivation and what was said above 
about the oddity of imputing any particular ultimately grounding desires, it may be 
wondered what sense attaches to the representing of a person's character as 
consumerist (as George Eliot implicitly does of Bulstrode) or to so characterizing a 
culture (as Hugh Montefiore implicitly does of Britain).
The answer, I suggest, is to look at the matter in terms of what gives way first 
when desires conflict. This is, I think, the most important place at which the distinction 
between principled and consumerist patterns of desire takes effect. I might desire, 
impersonally, the welfare of animals and, personally, a tasty bit of steak; impersonally, 
the fiirthering of social justice and personally, the election of a government fi'om 
whose corruption I will benefit; impersonally, the defeat of an aggressive power in a 
distant region and, personally, my own safety. Clearly there are principled and 
consumeristic ways in which such conflicts can be resolved and it might also be a 
settled trait of someone's character or a settled norm of a culture that they should be 
resolved in one way or the other. And this quite independently of any consideration of 
the complex genesis of the conflicting desires against a dense background of prior 
inclination.
4.7. It is one thing of course to draw these distinctions, another thing, as noted above, 
to put them to work in moral thinking. My concern at tliis point is been simply to note 
that they are there to be drawm and to stress that the emotivist can draw them. 7/“ the 
priority of impersonal criteria is the essence of morality, then the emotivist can 
recognize it. If consumerism as a cultural norm should be condemned then the 
emotivist can condemn it. The emotivist is not committed to obliterating the distinction
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between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations and viewing other persons 
as means to his or her own ends- to suggest this is to make the confusion adverted to 
above between desires that are personal with respect to their content and those that are 
personal simply in virtue of being somebody's desires. All emotivism is guilty of is 
failing to incorporate the demand for impersonal and/or principled thought in its 
recommended metaethics. The principled person does not seek to gratify his taste and 
personal desires in the selection of a moral outlook but reverses this process in a way 
that makes such talk of gratification (notice its deployment by McDowell as quoted at 
3.7 above) simply misleading and rhetorical.
4.8. Just as focusing on the role of I-desires seems to illuminate the sort of 
impersonality that may be thought to characterize principled moral thinking, it may be 
usefiil to note a parallel point about temporally indexical thoughts. Thus there are 
many desires (and other kinds of pro-attitudes) whose prepositional content requires 
"now" or related expressions just as that of personal desires requires "I" or related 
expressions- we might call these immediate desires. I may want a cool drink ncm>- an 
immediate desire. Or I may be reluctant to live a life from which the pleasure derived 
from cool drinks is wholly absent- a non-immediate desire.
It is worth noting that the sort of "onslaught" desires characterized above are 
typically immediate desires, as, more generally are physical appetites- notably those for 
food, drink, sleep and rest, sex, cigarettes, alcohol and other drugs- the sort of desires 
in fact to which the akrates typically yields and which the continent person typically 
resists. Non-immediate desires, on the other hand, typically include the sort of desires 
that concern the sort of lives we would wish to lead and the things we wish to do with 
them- the sort of desires the weak and imprudent typically fail to fulfil while moralists 
and educators typically aim to instil them. Divergent directions of motivation between
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such desires set up a temporal analogue of the principled/consumerist distinction drawn 
above.
Consider the character of the procrastinator as exemplified in the Augustinian 
prayer for reform- da mihi castitatem et continentiam sed noli modo- or by Dr 
Johnson who wrote, fairly characteristically, in his diary one birthday;
I have now spent fifty-five years in resolving; having, from the earliest 
time I can remember, been forming schemes of a better life. I have done 
nothing.'*^
Such an agent may have a non-immediate, and in fact undated desire, to 0  (or not 
0 ) at the same time as an immediate desire now to not-0  (or now to 0 ). What operates 
is the immediate desire. A desire to 0  at some time or other does not of itself issue in 
action. I have wanted for years to read The Magic Mountain "some time", "when I get 
round to it". But, as I have never wanted (all things considered) to embark upon it now 
(i.e. at the time of wanting indexically conceived), I never have and, until I do so want, 
never will This isn't hy itself b, problem or a defect of character. Life is notoriously too 
short for most of us to satisfy all such vague and dateless desires. But it is a problem 
when the non-immediate desire in question is an urgent and important one. Another 
form of procrastination occurs when the desire in question is dated in the future but 
when that date is revised forward when, or before, it arrives. Again there might be no 
problem- there are plenty of occasions when such procrastination makes every sense. 
Plans that lack urgency or importance are naturally put off when relatively more 
pressing considerations intervene.
42 Augustine, Confessions, VIII, vii; Boswell, 1960. p341.
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Importance cannot here be straightforwardly correlated to strength understood as a 
disposition to issue directly in action. For it is precisely immediate (all things 
considered) desires that so issue and only these. Dateless desires do not so issue except 
when they ground immediate desires, just as the impersonal desires of the principled 
agent so issue by grounding his personal ones. Nor, directly, do dated but non- 
immediate desires. My present desire to send a gift to some friend on their (now quite 
distant) birthday doesn't even begin to motivate an immediate move to the shops. For 
this to come about it is necessary that the date be now, that it be known so to be and 
that the knowledge issue in an appropriate (all things considered) immediate desire.
The ascetic's desire to take a cold shower at 6 a.m. on the morning of January 1st,
2000 A.D., must, at that time, if he realizes that that is the time, issue in a desire to 
take a cold shower now.
Another way of reading "importance" is in terms of the role a desire plays in the 
wider economy of one's projects and life-hopes (to say nothing of one's impersonal 
desires). The fate of the large-scale procrastinator is to be systematically thwarted in 
such global, non-immediate desires by the strength of his more immediate inclinations. 
The consequence, a thoroughgoing lack of whole-heartedness in his or her actions and 
a life ending in disappointment, is where to look for what we might wish to call the 
"irrationality" involved- Johnson and St Augustine being cases in point. So that much 
(though not all) of the group of phenomena we are considering when we speak of 
moral weakness may be characterized as doing what we immediately prefer, all things 
considered, though, non-immediately we would prefer something else. Preferences 
relating to the sort of life we wish to lead or the sort of person we wish to be are of 
just this non-immediate kind- and it is preferences such as these that are at stake in
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what MacIntyre characterizes as the "narrative order" of a human life taken as a
whole/3
Acknowledging this it remains to note that an emotivist, as MacIntyre 
characterizes that position most broadly, is not left with nothing to be but a 
Kierkegaardian aesthete or an existentialist à la Sartre/Roquentin.'*'* He need not 
conceive human life as
dissolved into a series of separate present moments, in which the unity 
of a human life disappears from view/*^
and need not be conceptually alienated from some such thought as that:
a completed and fulfilled life is an achievement and death is the point at 
which someone can be judged happy or unhappy.
or from a
conception of a whole human life as the primary subject of objective 
and impersonal evaluation, of a type of evaluation which provides the 
content for judgement upon the particular actions or projects of a 
particular individual.
*^3 See his 1981. chapter 15.
See MacIntyre's discussions of Enten-Eller in ibid., pp38-42 and p225 and of La
Nausée in ibid., ppl99-200.
Ibid., p225.
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When, as "emotivism" suggests, values are understood as grounded in the pro-attitudes 
, typically the desires'*®, of valuing subjects, such a conception does not become, as 
MacIntyre puts it, "something that ceases to be generally available"'*^ . Rather there are 
pro-attitudes and pro-attitudes. The emotivist moral subject may inhabit a richer or 
poorer evaluative landscape depending on the depth and complexity of attitude his 
valuations express.
4.9. The point might still be urged that, while a principled approach to life is mmlable 
to the emotivist, it is entirely arbitrary, from his perspective, whether it is adopted or 
not. Thus my way of distinguishing between the principled and unprincipled character 
recalls the Kierkegaardian opposition between the ethical and the aesthetic way of life 
as it is presented in the course of MacIntyre's argument, whereby, prior to one's 
choosing between such ways of life, there can be no rational leverage whatever to 
sway that choice in one way or another. The trouble, for MacIntyre, with this 
Kierkegaardian outlook lies in the fact that;
The ethical is presented as that realm in which principles have authority
over us, independently of our attitudes, preferences and feelings.48 jI
*^31 will question this emphasis on desire in chapter 7 below, but such questioning is not 
yet relevant to my argument which at this point is more conveniently focused on this 
traditionally paradigmatic type of pro-attitude.
'*2 This and the preceding two quotes, ibid., p32. Cf. Taylor, 1989. pp49-52.
'*® Ibid., p40. Emphasis mine. I stress that my discussion here is of Kierkegaard as 
MacIntyre represents him and prescinds from questions (acknowledged by MacIntyre 
on p40) about the adequacy of that representation.
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This leads to trouble because
the doctrine of Enten-EUer is plainly to the effect that the principles 
which depict the ethical way of life are to be adopted for no reason, but 
for a choice that lies beyond reasons, just because it is the choice of 
what is to count for us as a reason, yet the ethical is to have authority 
over us. But how can that which we adopt for no reason have authority 
over us?'*^
A possible short answer is that what we so adopt has authority in virtue simply of the 
fact that we have in fact sincerely adopted it. But to this it might be replied, following 
MacIntyre himself, that this is a poor sort of authority. For the decision so to adopt a 
way of life remains arbitrary, a choice between values made by a consumer in 
Montefiore's supermarket.
Another answer might be that consumerist pattern of motivation undermines 
happiness, most obviously in the temporal case, as it undermined Johnson's. But 
Johnson was not at all like a Kierkegaardian aesthete. In particular his yielding to his 
immediate desires was never a wholehearted affair but always involved departure from 
non-immediate desires which the pure Kierkegaardian aesthete simply lacks. It is 
precisely because Johnson had ethical standards of which he fell short and not because 
he lacked them that his happiness was so compromised.
A more promising line is to simply to reject the Kierkegaardian notion that the 
issue between aestheticism and ethics or, for the purposes of my argument, between 
principled or consumerist patterns of motivation is something that gets settled by an
49 Ibid., p41.
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act of ultimate and radical choice, for, as I noted above, this is a pretty doubtful model 
of how we actually operate. As Walzer puts it:
We have to start from where we are.^ ®
and that, wherever it is, is unlikely to be a point altogether prior to any such choice. So 
that, while for a "featureless bare ego" nothing would count as a reason to adopt an 
ethical rather than an aethetic way of living, we are certainly not featureless bare egos 
but creatures of a particular kind with particular histories.
Such an insistence is helpful, but it leaves open the question of whether a 
principled, or, returning to the larger question, a moral approach to life has any claim 
on our allegiance other than that which follows trivially from our possible pre­
disposition thereto. The process of choice may not in fact be an arbitrary affair, but the 
issue it addresses may be in a way that leaves our final commitments, if not altogether 
a matter of undirected willing, nonetheless subject to a perhaps disquieting 
contingency. In short the question urged by MacIntyre, of the authority of our 
principles remains with us.
I think it is possible from a broadly emotivist perspective (in MacIntyre's enlarged 
sense of the word) for this question to be addressed, as in chapter 10 it will be. First it 
will be necessary however to make more precise the sort of meta-ethics I am defending 
and just how it takes the desires (or rather, as will be seen, the broader category of 
pro-attitudes) of valuing subjects as fundamental to the theory of value and then to 
show how such a theory can be enriched both to address such issues as that of the
3® 1988. pl6. Cf. Clark, 1975. pl4; Taylor, "What is Human Agency?" in his 1985: 
Sandel, 1982. esp. pp179-183; Hurley. 1989, chapter 15, section 1.
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authority of certain values and to enable us to live with such contingency as remains. 
But this too is the work of later chapters than this.
4.10. It may be recalled that Hurley characterizes subjectivism as the view that
preferences are prior to and independent of specific values and, indeed, 
in some way, determine values.^ *
It will be recalled that I criticized her above for failing to make adequately clear just 
what, on her view values were. And what I am more generally concerned to argue here 
is that values are indeed constitutively related to pro-attitudes which are at least of a 
kind with preferences. It has been my aim in this chapter to show how the sort of 
impersonal flavour we associate with values rather than with desires can in fact be 
accounted for as a feature of what is in effect a species o f desire.
MacIntyre's view of the relationship between values and desires recalls Hurley's 
rejection of subjectivism. Thus he writes in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?^^ that:
Wants, satisfactions and preferences never appear in human life as 
merely psychological, premoral items to which we can appeal as 
providing data that are neutral between rival moral claims.
The reason he here gives for this claim is simply that:
32 1989. p273.
32 MacIntyre, 1988.. p76
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to exhibit a particular pattern of emotions and desires, to treat them as 
appropriate or inappropriate in one type of situation rather than 
another, is always to reveal a commitment to one set of justifying norms 
rather than another, but such a commitment is always to one distinctive 
evaluative and moral position rather than another.
The possibility this point fails to address is simply that to make the latter commitment 
is precisely "to exhibit a particular pattern of emotions and desires" in which case what 
is at issue is not the precise relation between emotions and desires on the one hand and 
something quite distinct from these called "values" on the other but rather the way in 
which those same emotions and desires are so structured as to give point to our talk of 
"values" in the first place. Thus, when MacIntyre makes the point that "emotions and 
desires are norm governed" then it is open to the exponent of the sort of 
subjectivism/emotivism I am defending to see this fact as simply an special instance of 
the often remarked upon fact that we have second-order emotions and desires.
It cannot be stressed too much that the subjectivist position I am seeking to arrive 
at is not properly characterized by saying that we have certain quite innocent emotions 
and desires that have nothing to do with our values and which serve to determine 
them. Like MacIntyre, Taylor and Hurley I take this to be false. While I see much of 
our talk of values as referring to emotions and desires of particular kinds, I in no way 
wish it to be supposed that between emotions and desires of these special kinds and 
other emotions and desires, there is any uniquely privileged order of priority. The 
traffic on this street can go both ways.
4.11.1 have focused in this chapter on MacIntyre's objections to emotivism arguing 
that they are at best objections to an impoverished kind of emotivism very far from 
what I would wish to defend. Another writer about whom similar points might be
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made is Charles Taylor who argues in his recent Sources o f the 6'e|/'that the character 
of our evaluative experience undermines such non-realist positions as those of Mackie, 
Williams and Blackburn. Our evaluative thought, Taylor argues, is structured by 
frameworks of what he calls strong evaluations, which provide standards independent 
of out tastes and desires in terms of which the latter stand to be judged . Such strong 
evaluations and the hypergoods they commit us to, goods which we take as of a higher 
order than others and invoke in their appraisaf'*, are inextricably involved in the very 
manner in which we define ourselves. Who we take ourselves to be is determined to a 
great extent by how we orient ourselves, to where we "take a stand" with respect to a 
"moral space" constituted by inescapable questions about the good.^  ^This inability of 
ours to do without strong evaluation constitutes the first phase of Taylor's argument 
against the non-realist. The second phase goes like this:
Wfiiat is real is what you have to deal with, what won't go away just 
because it doesn't fit your prejudices. By this token, what you can't help 
having recourse to in life is real, or as near to reality as you can get a 
grasp of at present.^^
But, granting the first phase, the second is surely just too quick. Given Taylor's 
strategy we could presumably secure realism about the external world, theoretical 
entities in science, numbers, intentional states, meaning, the past, counterfactuals, 
possibilia and so forth in a manner that would be similarly rapid and leave the sceptic
33 Taylor, 1989. chapter 1. On strong evaluation see also his 1985. chapter 1. 
3'* Ibid., pp63ff.
33 Ibid., chapter 2.
33 Ibid., p59.
145
with a similar sense that a point had somewhere been missed. We need to ask: what is 
the precise sense of "real" here. Taylor isn't all that clear about this though he's clear 
that it isn’t simply a matter of reducibility to the ontological categories of physical 
science. If Taylor is claiming that what we have to deal with is, in some non- 
tautologous sense, real, then that sense hasn't been made out. If, on the other hand, 
Taylor simply means by real "what you have to deal with" then the second phase of the 
argument doesn't take us any further than we were left by the first. And this isn't all 
that far. For the expressions of attitude the typical non-realist takes evaluative 
utterances to be may well be complex, rich and highly structured, may well be inclusive 
of higher-order attitudes that set a standard for others, may well perform a role of 
orienting us in a space of moral questions and yet fail to describe a moral domain 
independent of those attitudes and that structure. There may be a sense in which that 
structure confers a sort of objectivity upon evaluation but it will do this simply because 
it is a structure and not because it mirrors some independent realm.
It is worth noting that when Taylor describes the firameworks we think by as 
"inescapable" he is himself engaged in strong evaluation. It's not that it would be 
impossible to do without such frameworks. One could perfectly conceivably become 
what Frankfurt has called a wanton^\ Taylor a simple w e ig h e r It is not that this 
would be impossible. Rather it would be dreadful (or contemptible to anticipate my 
own argument of chapter 10 below). One who had dispensed with strong evaluation 
would appear "pathological", would have "gone beyond the fringes of what we think of 
simply as shallowness. "3® We can't help making strong evaluations because the strong 
evaluations we do make demand that we go on making them.
32 See his 1971
33 1985. pp23ff.
59 Taylor, 1989, p31.
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To say all this is to summarize Taylor's argument. It is also to anticipate my own. 
So where is the disagreement? Arguably there isn't much. As with MacIntyre, I think 
Taylor has refuted a non-realist position of a crude and impoverished kind and inferred 
that something called "realism" is true. If I don't altogether agree it's not because I 
think his refutation fails. Michael Rosen has expressed a similar scepticism:
Many non-realists may indeed, as Taylor alleges, be reductive about the 
nature of the good, concentrate excessively on questions of obligation 
and ignore the issue of how far our choices can be integrated into a life 
which is seen to be valuable as a whole. But this is certainly not true of 
all non-realists, so why should we regard these characteristics as 
essentially connected to non-realism?®®
Taylor's published response to Rosen's paper fiirther serves to weaken the sense that 
there is much disagreement here. As he conceives it:
ethics tries to define the shape of the human moral predicament. But 
there could be no such thing unless human beings existed.®'
I don't have any quarrel with either of these claims.
®® Rosen, 1991. pl88,
®2 Taylor, 1991. p245. cf., his 1989, p68.
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Chapter 5: Finding Beauty
5.1. The kinds of values that interest the moralist, those that concerned us in the 
previous chapter, are not of course the only values we recognize. In the present 
chapter I wish to shift the focus of attention to the central value of aesthetics^, namely 
beauty. My larger purpose in the discussion that follows will be to foreshadow points I 
will be making at later stages about goodness by advancing parallel points about 
beauty. For, with beauty, the same points, for reasons that will become apparent, are 
somewhat clearer to view.
It should be stressed that in discussing beauty I am not at all exclusively concerned 
with aesthetic merit in art but rather with beauty quite generally, a concept we perhaps 
apply at least as often to the products of nature as to those of art and most often of all 
perhaps to those peculiar collusions between the two, our fellow human beings. I want 
to begin by pointing to certain broad contrasts between beauty and goodness and then 
make some suggestions as to how these contrasts may be explained. It will emerge 
subsequently that, to a large extent, the contrasts drawn depend not so much on radical 
differences between the way the concepts work as on the greater complexity involved 
in applying a similar model to goodness as is here applied to beauty. The details of this 
extension will be, in large part, the concern of the chapters that remain.
We may note, for a start, that both beauty and goodness have both a high degree 
0Î generality. Just about anything can be described as "good". And just about anything 
can be described as "beautiftil".  ^By "can be described as" I mean of course that such a
2 This centrality has been recently defended by Mothersill in her 1984. 
2 Cf. Mothersill, 1984. pp265ff, 411.
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description would make sense, would be coherent, not that most of us could plausibly 
be supposed as making or assenting to it.
Given this common generality, this "thinness"  ^shared by the two concepts, the 
simple question, "How do they fail to be synonymous?" invites a no less simple 
response: although both are indeed thin evaluative concepts, there are situatiohs where 
the use of one rather than the other is sanctioned by convention, if not exclusively, then 
to a greater degree. Things are typically and centrally (but by no means always) 
beautifiil in virtue of the responses they elicit from us in virtue of what they look or 
sound like or some other sensory quality. A fact, that such and such is the case, can be 
characterized as beautiful- as when we say "a beautifiil coincidence". But this is rather 
a peripheral application of the concept. On the other hand, things are typically and 
centrally (but by no means always) good in virtue of responses elicited from us in 
virtue of how they function or behave. And these specific paradigm uses and contexts 
of use, it might reasonably be claimed, suflSce to distinguish the meanings of the two 
concepts.
This explains how it is that many applications of the concepts are somewhat distant 
from the more paradigmatic applications without being in any obvious sense 
metaphorical. But it also explains the non-synonymy of the concepts- the fact that 
there are some applications of them that would jar on the ears. It is good that someone 
is beautiful and we may find someone the more beautiful in virtue of their goodness but 
there are still two evaluative concepts here that may indeed conflict in certain 
situations.
 ^Williams, 1985. In fact Williams speaks only of "thick" evaluative concepts (for 
references see his index) but both this and its natural antonym have entered a wider 
philosophical usage from this source.
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5.2. That said, the contrast between goodness and beauty has further dimensions, 
consideration of some of which will sei*ve to bring them both into sharper focus.
We may begin with a difference likely to be urged by the sympathetic reader of 
Kant, recalling his claim that:
To deem something good, I must always know what sort of thing the 
object is intended to be, i.e. I must have a concept of it. That is not 
necessary to enable me to see beauty in a thing."^
The reader of more recent material  ^will be tempted to reformulate this as a claim 
that "good" is attributive, "beautifiil" predicative. But this formulation can be 
misleading unless we elaborate somewhat on what is correct about it.
It is wrong to say that "good" is attributive if by that it is meant that it always is, 
but right if we merely mean that it sometimes is. We see that it sometimes is by 
considering a sentence like:
(1) The use of mobile gas chambers is a good means of mass execution.
This is not equivalent to:
(2) The use of mobile gas chambers is (a) a means of mass 
execution and (b) good.
" Kant, 1911. p46.
 ^Notably Geach, 1956..
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That it is not is obvious because, whether or not we assent to (1), most of us are 
quite unwilling to assent to (2). Granting (1) arguendo as a comment on how to solve 
the logistical and engineering problems of mass extermination, we consistently insist 
upon:
(3) The use of mobile gas chambers is not good.
In (3) however, as in (2), "good" is used predicatively. So that in the very course of 
illustrating how "good" can sometimes be attributive we rely on our ability to 
understand its predicative uses.
That "beautiful" is predicative is surely true. Certainly no counter-example to this 
claim along the lines of (1) seems possible. To see something as a beautiful X is to see 
it as beautiful. Simpliciter.
But to assent to the latter paragraph is not to agree with Kant. For it does not 
follow that one need not have a concept of an X to find it beautiful. One’s appreciation 
of a work of architecture as beautiful may, and should, be bound up with some 
understanding of its purpose as a home, a workplace or whatever:
the conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a 
horse, the capacity, security and swift sailing of a vessel, form the 
principle beauty of these several objects.®
And one could hardly begin to see the beauty of a mathematical proof, say, without 
having some conception of what a mathematical proof is and what it is for. One needs, 
in other words to know what a good proof or a good pudding would be like, the
Hume, 1978. p576. Cf. p299.
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"good" being attributive, in order to know what a heautiful proof, pudding or 
whatever would be like, "beautiful" being understood predicatively.
To call something a good X, using "good" attributively is to evaluate it with 
respect to some (often very) specific and (implicitly) specified interest or purpose 
which one may or not share. To call it good simpliciter^ using "good" predicatively is 
not but is rather to evaluate it with respect to unspecified interests and purposes, 
interests and purposes which, if "good" is used in a internal sense (see chapter 3 above) 
such that to call something good is to identify with the values thus invoked, will be 
purposes and values of one’s own. And this will leave it unclear how there could be 
any difference between the senses of good in (1) and (3) beyond a certain, regrettably 
vague, generality in the latter. This is not to conflate being good qua something and 
being good from some point o f view but relies on the fact that in both cases the 
evaluation goes on with respect to something. And, just because it is unclear how an 
evaluation that was both predicative and external could be with respect to anything 
very much, it is unclear how such an evaluation could have very much in the way of 
content? And it is because we could hardly hope to make sense of such an evaluation 
that to use "good" predicatively is not to evaluate something relative to no specific 
interest or purpose whatsoever.
To call something a beautiful X is to call it beautiful simpliciter. To call something 
a good X need not be to call it good simpliciter. The approbative force of "beautiful" 
is thus, in a way, more direct, so that it is not possible to use "beautiful" in the same 
way as the attributive "good" where the force is primarily descriptive? For, in 
attributive uses of "good", something is evaluated relative to a given end which is not
 ^Cf. Foot’s 1985a and 1985b and 2.4 above.
® Though there are other ways for "beauty" to have descriptive force. See, in 
particular, 5.6 below.
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itself evaluated- so that, unlike "beauty", "good" can be used in this way with no 
evaluative force (remember that a civilized person could quite well agree with (1) 
above).
What seems to explain this difference is that "beauty" is never so straightforwardly 
instt'umental in import as "goodness" sometimes is. The distinction we draw between 
intrinsic and instrumental goodness lacks a parallel in the case of the beautiful. If art 
colleges promote the production of good painting then they are {pro tanto) a good 
thing. But that they promote the production of beautiful painting would not in any way 
license the supposition that they are (pro tanto) beautiful. As noted above, a feeling 
that an X is a beautifiil X may properly be informed by an understanding of what an X 
is for and how well that function is executed by this X. But while such instrumental 
value may contribute to the beauty of a beautiful X it is never exhaustively constitutive 
of it. A beautiful X may owe some of its beauty to its effectiveness as a means to 
beautifiil Ys but we only impute beauty to it if we take it to be beautiful in its own 
right and not merely derivatively. We do not use "beautiful" not only of things we find, 
or think we would find, beautifiil, but also of things that promote, more or less 
indirectly, such responses on our part.®
We are here, as elsewhere, close to the view of Santayana (1936. p22):
...whereas, in the perception of beauty, our judgement is necessarily 
intrinsic and based on the character of the immediate experience, and 
never consciously on the idea of an eventual utility in the object, 
judgements about moral worth, on the contrary are always based, when 
they are positive, upon the consciousness of benefits probably involved.
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5.3. That the furthering of beauty elsewhere does not, of itself, make a thing pro tanto 
beautiful should come as no surprise, given another salient point of contrast between 
goodness and beauty, namely that it is never, I would suggest, appropriate to talk of 
anything's being pro tanto beautiful.’^
This claim is easily misunderstood. Aesthetic theorists commonly discuss ways in 
which various general features of works of art may contribute to their aesthetic merit, 
and thus to their beauty, without necessarily being all such merit amounts to. This 
might easily be misread as suggesting that, in virtue of being characterized by some 
such feature, such a work may be pro tanto beautiful.
Taking something to be beautiful, in this respect, resembles taking it to be 
pleasurable. There are certain features a kind of experience may possess that often 
make for pleasure. Thus what is sexually arousing is typically pleasurable. But not 
always." We do not thereby say that what is sexually arousing is pro tanto pleasurable. 
On the contrary, either it is pleasurable or it is not. Being sexually arousing, we might 
say, makes for pleasure, but that is quite different jfrom being pro tanto pleasurable. 
Being brilliantly articulate, after all, makes for success in interviews but that is not to 
say that a brilliantly articulate candidate is thereby pro tanto successful. Nothing can be 
pleasurable in some respects but not in others. And the same applies to beauty.
And cf. Kant, 1911. Pt. I, Bk. 1 ,1st Moment. Note how, for Kant, the 
disinterestedness of an aesthetic response is conflated (I think unhelpfully) with its lack 
of (mind-independent) ontological commitment (on which see 5.5 below), for what he 
takes us to be disinterested in is precisely the "real existence" of the object.
Cf. Mothersill, 1984. ch. IV.
" By "sexually arousing" I do not of course mean contributing to sexual pleasure but 
simply contributing to the usual physiological corollaries of sexual pleasure.
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One should not be misled by the common expression "beautiful in parts". To be 
such is quite different from being beautiful in some respects in the sense under 
consideration. What is beautiful in parts is such that parts of it are beautiful.
Simpliciter.
We might plausibly relate the points of contrast brought out in this and the 
preceding section. Pleasurahleness, we may note, also resembles beauty in terms of its 
more consistent predicative status. Something pleasurable, say a swim, is not simply 
pleasurable qua swim. Either it is pleasurable simpliciter or it is not. Likewise pleasure 
is never merely instrumental. Maybe I enjoy training for the footrace in virtue of my 
anticipation of the pleasures of victory that may be the fruit of such training. But 
maybe not. The goodness of the end transmits pro tanto goodness to the means 
automatically, but only pro tanto goodness. Pro tanto beauty or pleasure is not 
similarly transmitted because there is really no such thing.^ ^
The explanation that most immediately offers itself is that to impute beauty to a 
thing is typically to respond to it, to recognize it as directly affecting one in a particular 
fashion. To take something to be beautiful or pleasurable is typically to find  it beautiful 
or pleasurable through direct exposure to it, through experiencing it. We can talk of 
/zWmg things good in a similar fashion but in fact what finding something good seems 
usually to involve is just something like finding it pleasurable or beautiful and it is the
12 Cf. Kant, 1911. pp46-7:
with the good the question always is whether it is mediately or 
immediately good, i.e. useful or good in itself; whereas with the 
agreeable this point can never arise, since the word always means what 
pleases immediately- and it is just the same with what I call beautifiil.
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case neither that what is so found is necessarily deemed good simpliciter nor that there 
are not many circumstances in which something may be deemed good that we do not, 
and would never expect to, find good.
5.4. Pleasure will be discussed at greater length in chapter 6 below, but one question 
invites more immediate attention. Something has been said about the relative 
differentia of goodness and beauty and in saying it I have drawn parallels between 
beauty and pleasure- but this is to invite examination of what differentiates these. That 
there are connections between pleasure and beauty is a commonplace in aesthetics. 
But, in view of this and the parallels just noted, how, if at all do these two differ?
A number of observations might seem to drive a wedge between the concepts. In 
the first place I may find pleasure in something without it making much sense to say I 
find it beautiful. Thus I enjoy a game of backgammon over a pint of beer but would 
hardly describe my appreciation of this activity as aesthetic. Secondly, the converse of 
this is true; Edward Bullough’s example of a jealous husband at a performance of 
Othello '^’ is a usefiil one- such a person may well have a thoroughly miserable time as 
the play scratches the raw nerve of his anxiety but may nevertheless recognize the 
beauty of the play.
Thirdly if I am imagined standing in a room full of Vermeers listening to a 
recording of Queen's "We are the Champions" I might plausibly be supposed to 
recognize at one and the same time the beauty of the former and the crassness of the 
latter. But to say that I experience both pleasure and displeasure seems forced. The 
paintings may make for pleasure for me and the music have the reverse effect, but it
"  See e.g. Hume, 1978. 2.1.8, Kant, 1911. Pt I, Bk I., passim. 
"'Bullough, 1913.
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will usually seem unnatural to say, in an unqualified sense that I am, at one and the 
same time, experiencing both pleasure and its opposite.
Fourthly and relatedly, the experiences we most typically describe as beautiful are 
experiences of things. This observation is explanatory with regard to the backgammon 
example for it leaves it unsurprising that beauty is not normally imputed to pleasurable 
activities. Of course some activities, such as gymnastics, may be beautiful qua things 
to which we may be spectators. But to enjoy engaging in them is not typically to find 
them beautiful (recall section 5.1 however, for locutions which impute beauty to 
activities ate at times to be heard- "typically" above is emphasized advisedly).
Fifi:hly, Kanf s claim will be recalled that;
Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged 
with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of 
taste.’®
as will the manner in which Kant contrasts the judgement of taste in this respect with 
"delight in the agreeable" which, he take it, is "coupled with interest" in a way aesthetic 
pleasure is not;
that a judgement on an object by which its agreeableness is affirmed, 
expresses an interest in it, is evident from the fact that through 
sensation it provokes a desire for similar objects, consequently the 
delight presupposes, not the simple judgement about it, but the bearing
15 1911 .  p4 3 .
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its real existence has upon my state so far as affected by such an 
object.’®
Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged 
with the slightest interest is very partial and not a pure judgement of 
taste."
This seems an unsatisfactory way of understanding the point. It is not, for example, 
always and obviously true that my enjoyment of this chocolate bar provokes a desire 
for similar chocolate bars.’^  It would be natural if it did but it would be equally natural 
if my enjoyment of a good poem provoked a desire to read other good poems.
Note too the tension between what Kant says here and the concession in 5.2 above 
that a things aptness for its purpose is indeed of relevance to the appraisal of its 
beauty. Note further the enormous tension between the frankly utilitarian view of 
Hume there cited and this Kantian emphasis on disinterestedness. Noticing this 
difference, it is not unnatural to see it as simply a reflection of a wider change in 
aesthetic attitudes associated with the rise of the Romantic movement which differs 
from the preceding period, inter alia, precisely by such a distancing of aesthetic from 
utilitarian concerns- as witness the sea change in prevailing attitudes to such 
paradigmatically useless objects as ruined buildings and mountains.
It remains true that we would tend to disqualify from the category of the aesthetic 
interest or pleasure which is too directly personal. To reverse Bullough's example, if
Ibid.,, 1911, p45. Cf. Bullough, 1913. Urmson, 1957. A number of writers on this 
point are summarized and criticized in Mothersill, chapter 2, section 6.
" Ibid., p43.
See further chapter 6 below.
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someone normally unresponsive to Shakespeare enjoys an indifferent performance of 
Othello because the hero's anxiety gives him a certain smug delight by its contrast to 
his own complacency on the same score, we would not say his enjoyment was 
aesthetic. It would not be beauty he was recognizing in the play.
Here we may notice the connection between this point about disinterestedness and 
a sixth, also Kantian, point about the prescriptivity of aesthetic response:
where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him 
independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object 
as one containing a ground of delight for all men.’®
So that if anyone:
puts a thing on a pedestal and calls it beautiful, he demands the same 
delight from others.^ ®
So that if my pleasure is an outcome of my idiosyncratic concerns as in the Othello 
example, it fails to count as aesthetic. If, however, I enjoy the play for reasons others 
may be expected to share, I may be said to find it beautiful.
Note of course that I enjoy chocolate for reasons others may be expected to share 
but this is not what we would normally call an aesthetic response. Of course the 
difference here, for Kant, lies in the prescriptive nature of my expectation in the 
aesthetic case. If you don't share my taste for chocolate, then I recognize that you 
differ fi'om me and don't see a problem in that. But if you do not and cannot be
’®Kant 1911. p50.
"®Ibid.,p52.
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brought to share my taste for Bach then I might want to say you are not merely 
different but somehow deficient f
Perhaps this can be brought out as a form of wholeheartedness to which we are apt 
in aesthetic response. If I learn that tomorrow I will lose my taste for chocolate I will 
react with some indifference. I like chocolate, but that I like it is of no importance to 
me. With Bach this indifference would be absent. I not only enjoy Bach but I value my 
enjoyment of it-1 value, one might say, being the sort of creature that can find beauty 
in this music.^ ^
Another, final source of difference, also helps to make sense of the intuitions to 
which talk of "disinterestedness" appeals- this is seen when we contrast the 
defeasibility of our attitudes when we find things beautiful or pleasurable. I may find 
pleasure in the experience of listening to a piece of music which I also find beautiful 
only, later on, when my taste has matured, to find it laboured and unbeautiful and draw 
no pleasure fi’om it. That it was pleasurable on the earlier occasions I continue to 
grant, but, although I then found what I heard beautiful, it was, I now incline to say, 
nothing of the kind.
In this last observation, we seem to be bringing out a phenomenological point that 
would seem to invite a cognitivist treatment of what we are up to in finding something 
beautifial. To find an experience pleasurable, we might be inclined to say, is just to like 
it. Whereas when we find it beautifiil we indeed like the experience we have of it but 
that liking is bound up in the making of a judgement about its worth, a judgement we
Cf 4.11,5.8, 10.2.
Of course I value being the sort of creature that enjoys food- hence my formulation 
of my fourth point of difference- what is found beautiful is a particular object (in the 
attributive sense of that term- a poem is not, in the metaphysical sense, a particular', 
but it is a particular poem).
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revise in withdrawing an imputation of beauty we have previously made. This line of 
argument fails to convince me. A better explanation of what we are about in such 
retrospective withdrawals of imputations of beauty is by reference to the 
wholeheartedness such imputations were noticed to enjoy in the preceding paragraph. 
When I express my enjoyment of some chocolate, I do just that and no more. But 
when I say "I find this music beautiful" I not only express my pleasure in the hearing of 
it but strongly evaluate that pleasure- and it is the latter, strong evaluation that I am 
withdrawing when, the next day, I withdraw my imputation of beauty. This sort of 
second-order evaluation implicated in the imputation of beauty will concern me again 
at the close of 5.8 below.
5.5. It was suggested in 5.3 above that something is beautiful or pleasurable in virtue 
of having a tendency to elicit from us responses of certain kinds. And we might 
likewise say that an action, for example, was good in virtue of its tendency to elicit 
from us a particular kind of response.
But in fact we think things good when they elicit nothing from us. When they are 
in no position to elicit anything or to have any other kind of causal efficacy in virtue 
simply of not existing. Thus to desire something is, in some respect, to think it good 
{nihil appetimm, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, nisi sub ratione malP). But 
the object of desire may be a non-actual state of affairs or a non-existent object. Of 
course when the desire is one that will be satisfied the object/state of affairs will be, 
from a timeless perspective, existent/actual, but not all desires are realized and even 
when this happens the thought of the object of desire is often de dicto rather than de 
re. Similarly, moral evaluations need not be responses to anything actual- think of our
"Old formula of the schools", apud Kant, 1956. p61. 
Cf. Piû&tQt\Q,Nicomacheœi Ethics, 1094^1-3.
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moral responses to works of fiction or the science fiction thought-experiments that 
riddle recent philosophical literature. No one is prevented from feeling the wrongness 
of O'Brien's scaring of Winston Smith with rats by the fact that no such person ever did 
any such thing.
This does not seem to be the case where beauty is concerned. It would be an odd 
supposition that we could think of things de dicto and find them beautiful. Mothersill 
makes the same observation:
Nothing exists that may not prove beautiful; nothing that exists (or 
might exist) is such that, on the basis of mere description, we can infer 
that it is beautiful or not beautiful. There are, in contrast, situations 
which on the basis of description we recognize as bad and actions or 
action-types which on the basis of description we recognize as wrong.
It is possible for me to take a moral view of the actions of Dorian Gray, say, in the 
light of Oscar Wilde's account of them. But the picture of Dorian Gray is not 
something to which I can respond as beautiful or ugly. Nor would anything count as 
my so responding, given the painting's status as a fictitious object. I could have a moral 
response to Gray's actions without knowing very much about them, perhaps by simply 
reading a review of the novel that gave a gist of the plot- of course such a response 
would not be worth much, but that is beside the present point. Whereas, even if Wilde 
devoted the whole space of the work to describing the painting in meticulous detail, I 
would still not be a position to find it beautiful. So we may be tempted to draw a 
further contrast here between aesthetic and moral evaluation: the imputation of beauty, 
unlike that of goodness, is always referential, always de re.
Mothersill, 1984. p4Il. Cf. ibid., ppl71-2.
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We will see below how this is not quite the right diagnosis, but we should first note 
a more immediate difficulty. This is the problem of referentialfailure. If someone 
takes Â to be beautiful and we insist that that is a de re thought, what, we may be 
asked, of the cases where "Â" fails to refer?
The claim that imputations of beauty are de re is, however, plausibly held to be 
more supported than undermined by this problem precisely because such imputations 
seem to lack vulnerability to it in a peculiar way and because that lack of vulnerability 
can be explained.
Suppose in my dreams I sometimes visit a strange range of mountains, the Mei 
Shan, which I find intensely beautifiil. The Mei Shan, I then have it, are beautifiil. But 
the Mei Shan have no existence outwith my dream. They are not, in this (mind- 
independence-invoking) sense, real mountains.
But this is not to say that the question of their beauty does not arise. "Reality", in 
the sense just deployed, is not a necessary condition for the imputation of aesthetic 
quality.^ ® Beauty can be imputed to quite imaginary landscapes or to people found in 
paintings not from life. And the beauty of, say, a person in a painting is a quite separate 
issue from the beauty of the painting itself.
Explanation is approached when we ask: in virtue of what is something beautiful?
A mountain say. The answer that may be proposed is that it is beautiful in virtue 
precisely of features shared by real and illusory mountain: in virtue of those states of 
mind that constitute one's experience of it. These will often (as with mountains or 
paintings) be sensory experiences but need not be (as with poetry). In short, the answer 
to the problem of referential failure in the case of imputations of beauty is that the res, 
de which imputations of beauty may be characterized as being, is an experienced res, a 
mental res, a res that we are, in a Russellian sense, acquainted with. And as such it is
25 Cf. Kant, 1911. pp42-3.
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necessarily a real res, inseparable from the experiences in virtue of which such 
imputations are sincere. So that our account of the objects of aesthetic response will be 
an idealist one.
5.6. I put this boldly but it must be qualified. First there is a sense in which 
imputations of beauty can suffer from referential failure. This happens when, for 
instance, I think that Helen of Troy was beautiful, not because I have seen her but 
simply because that is what I have heard others say.
By way of analogy, consider imputations offunniness. When I find  a joke funny, 
my thought that it is fiinny is generally de re in the sense I am concerned with and 
cannot fail to refer.^ ® That the voice telling me the joke was dreamt or hallucinated is 
neither here nor there. But I may think 2i]6k.Q funny in a way that is not thus de re, if, 
for instance, I so describe it on the grounds that it is widely reported to be funny 
although I myself have not heard it.
Here one of two interpretations may be put on what I think. First that I think the 
joke is funny in what Hare would call an "inverted commas sense'Y  ^simply believing 
the sociological claim that the joke is or would be found funny by others. Secondly I
"® Note that \f anything has the same referent in all possible worlds, that is, anything 
is a rigid designator, then "Why did the Kerryman win the Nobel Prize? Because he 
was out standing in his field." is. "The joke Rachael told Jimmy" is not. It is misleading 
to express the difference by saying that the former refers necessarily to itself. The 
words in question do not refer to a joke but are constitutive of it. To find a joke funny 
is only possible if it is thought of (or read or heard) in this transparent mode of 
description. Similarly we find works of literature beautifijl only when they are 
presented to the mind, in thought or sensation, in this transparent way.
See Hare, 1952, II. 7. 5.
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may be said to have a conditional belief that, were I  to hear the joke, I  would find  it 
funny. In both cases the content of my current de dicto imputation is unpacked by 
reference to other imputations which are de re (and not vice versa), the latter kind of 
imputation thus enjoying conceptual priority over the former. If there were no such 
thing as finding something funny there could be no such thing as thinking something 
funny.
The distinction to be stressed is that between thinking funny and finding fiinny. It 
is a necessary condition for our finding something funny that it dispose us to some 
such expression of amusement as laughter.^ ® If a joke makes us laugh because we find  
it funny, then our attitude is de re. If we think it fiinny but do not find  it funny in the 
sense we are concerned with, it is de dicto.
And likewise for imputations of beauty. We should not say that we may not think 
of things de dicto and think them beautiful, merely that we may not think of things de 
dicto and find  them beautiful. Thinking things beautifiil is generally to have beliefs 
about what we would beautifiil if we had appropriate experiences. Fïwcfmgthem 
beautiful is not to have beliefs at all but attitudes.
An understanding of what it is to find  something beautiful is clearly presupposed 
by any adequate understanding of what it is to think something beautiful. To someone 
who found nothing beautifiil the concept of beauty would make no sense. A blurring of 
this finding/thinking distinction may be a crucial step in making the case for 
cognitivism about aesthetic value look stronger than it actually is.
We thus concede that some imputations of beauty are not de re and can suffer fi'om 
referential failure. But, noting the conceptual priority of de re imputations of beauty, of 
finding beautifiil, the idealistic conclusion of 5.5 above is left undamaged by this
^ Not a sufficient one however. We do not find nitrous oxide fiinny.
165
qualification, for all imputations of beauty that are not themselves de re are effectively 
characterizations of other such imputations (actual and possible) that are.
5.7. What is damaged is the contrast there suggested between beauty and goodness. 
For I suspect that the finding/thinking distinction may be applied equally to the case of 
goodness in such a way that the cash value of the beliefs we have in thinking things 
good is to be sought in the attitudes we, or others, have in finding them good. Where 
there is a contrast in this respect, a contrast which the Dorian Gray example above 
dramatized, is in the greater complexity, in the case of goodness, of the relationship 
between these two kinds of thought. This complexity will a central concern of 
following chapters.
5.8. I have tried here to make a case for a form of idealism about the objects of 
aesthetic response. The claim is that, in finding, say, a painting beautiful, what is found 
beautiful is something^z/W in experience', we might say an experienced aspect o f the 
painting rather than something altogether distinct fi'om the experience such as the 
painting itself (at least as a representative realist would understand that phrase). To 
speak of what is found beautiful is, strictly understood, to speak of our experience.
Some care is in order here. What happens, in the first place, when 1 find Leonardo's 
Adoration o f the Magi beautiful is that I respond with aesthetic pleasure to a particular 
token-experience of it and that token-experience of The Adoration o f the Magi is not 
identical to The Adoration o f the Magi, the painting itself. The question thus presents 
itself- what is the object of my response- the painting itself or the token-experience.
The answer I want to give is that the primary object as I shall call it of my 
response is the token-experience. It is in virtue of this that I cannot be mistaken about 
the existence of the object of my response, that my imputation of beauty to it is de re.
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Rather counter-intuitive conclusions may seem to follow for the ontology of works 
of art. Thus in the words of the idealistically inclined film-maker Andrei Tarkovsky:
A book read by a thousand different people is a thousand different 
books.^ ®
And so, mutatis mutandis, for paintings, sculptures, works of music, etc. Indeed it is 
worse than that. A book read by one person a thousand times is also a thousand 
different books.
We might here stress, following Collingwood, the extent to which the business of 
art is communication^ and the extent also to which communication presupposes 
community o f language^  ^which in turn does not so much presuppose as it is 
constituted by community of feeling and understanding?'^  And we might, through an 
appreciation of these points, come to see to the extent to which the work of art (or 
anything else) qua something found beautiful retains its unity as a "public" object.
It is just in virtue of our community of feeling and understanding, aesthetic and 
otherwise, of and about the world, that we may speak of the painting (or whatever)
29 Tarkovsky, 1989. pp 177-8. The problem is also recognized by Collingwood, 1938. 
chapter XIV, section 4.
Cf. Tarkovsky, 1989. pp39-40 and Collingwood, 1938. chapters XI (esp. section 5) 
and XII.
Collingwood, 1938. pp249ff.
®'Ibid.
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itself as the secondary object of our aesthetic response.®® It is in virtue of this same 
community of understanding that we may speak of such token-experience-transcendent 
objects.®'* And it is virtue of our community of feeling and the concomitant stability of 
aesthetic response that we may describe them, not just as being found beautifiil on this, 
that or the other occasion but as beautiful where by calling something "beautifiil" we 
impute to it a disposition to invoke aesthetic appreciation to those who experience it, 
to be the cause of token-experiences that are the primary objects of such appreciation. 
To say of an object that it is beautiful is to impute such a disposition, to say of a 
token-experience that it is found beautifid is not. And it is only in virtue of a degree of 
such stability o f response that we have any right to speak of such a disposition at all. 
Recall the stress placed by Hume on "uniformity of sentiment among men"®® and by 
Kant on "subjective universal validity".®® It was not misplaced. When I look at The 
Adoration o f the Magi and say of it that it is beautiful I refer to the primary object 
insofar as the existence of "it", of what I find beautiful, is guaranteed. If there is no 
such painting and what I take for one is merely, say, a fragment of underdone potato 
(as Scrooge characterized Marley's ghost) it is nonetheless not the case that I respond 
to nothing, that I find nothing beautiful (even less that I find a fragment of underdone 
potato beautifiil). But, in virtue both of the intra-subjective stability of my responses 
across time and their inter-subjective normality, I am able to refer to the secondary 
object, the painting, as beautifiil and this reference becomes central as it is what makes
®® Exactly what the secondary object of our appreciation of poem of piece of music is is 
a matter of some controversy that need not concern me here. All that matters is that it 
is taken to be something both public and durable.
®'* I mean they transcend any given token-experience. Not every such experience.
®® P272 of "On the Standard of Taste" in his 1907. Vol I.
®® 1911. p55.
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it possible, for example, that when you and I talk together about our responses we are 
both speaking of the same object.
Recalling the distinction developed in 5.6 above, we can, in virtue of this stability 
of response, think something beautiful because we find  it beautifiil Our finding it 
beautiful can furnish grounds for thinking we might find it beautiful on other occasions 
or for thinking others would so find it. And we may well suppose that it is in virtue of 
features it (uniquely) has both that we find it beautiful on this occasion and that we, 
and others, would on others. So to the extent that there is consistency of taste across 
times and/or across persons there is indeed sense in saying, as we do say, "because it's 
beautiful" in accounting for a given aesthetic response of ours.®^
If we confine our attention to the primary object of response, we are forced to 
accept that, in a sense, a play, say, read or seen by a single person many times is many 
different plays. In practice, usually, it is not- it is, in many if not all ways, the same play 
each time one sees or reads it. I find i4s You Like It beautiful in virtue of a diversity of 
episodes of finding beauty in certain particular experiences of it. Because of this 
stability, because the^bwW beauty of the play runs through my several token- 
experiences of it, I impute beauty to the play itself rather than to those experiences.®^  
But conceivably I might fail to find any such stability- such a failure, such fickleness of 
response would be unfortunate (finding things beautiful is a more conveniently 
accessible experience if I know in advance where I am likely to find beautiful things). It 
might be foolish not to seek, if possible, to prevent such a misfortune, but, at least 
insofar as this was not possible, such fickleness would not make me irrational but 
simply, as it were, subject to variation.
®® Cf. Mothersill, 1984. p i51 and ch. VI generally.
®^ Cf. Santayana on "objectification", 1936. pp37-40.
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It is just that community of thought and feeling between you and me as is 
presupposed by any sort of communication between us that makes the similarity 
between the book or painting j/oz/ find beautiful and the book or painting I  find 
beautiful more or less close. A fruitfiil theory of critical communication on this view 
would then be that it is the business of building on and extending this similarity by the 
various means at our disposal. So that he similarity that unites my experiences of 
You Like It serves as a model for a similarity between my experiences of it and yours 
that in critical conversation or writing I might seek to bring about. If the play leaves 
you indifferent, I could, by articulating vividly the character and the background of my 
experience of it, bring you to see what is missing, or unhelpfully present, in your own, 
a process likely to involve much appeal to imagination as to reason and to demand 
eloquence as much as any more logical skills.®®
The stability of response to objects in a public world of which we have a shared 
understanding thus, when all goes smoothly, anchors aesthetic discussion to a common 
object whose effects on us may then be articulated, compared, disputed about and, not 
infrequently, modified. In this complex interaction may be seen adumbrated a 
resolution to the so-called antinomy of taste- Kant's problem of reconcihng the
®® A similar point to this is well made, à propos of morality, by Williams in his "Egoism 
and Altmism" (in his 1973 and see also chapter 4 above) where he remarks of the 
egoist (p259):
...considerations designed to make him wake up to what he is missing... 
will be more like arousing him or turning him round to a new idea of 
what might be worthwhile...and are not likely to be much like 
arguments.
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irresponsibility of aesthetic responses to general principles with the fact that 
disputation de gustibus in fact can, and does, go on."°
In calling something beautiful, we express an attitude, a response, and not a 
judgement, so that there can be no question here of falsity. But in thinking something 
beautiful in the sense of 5.6 we make not a response but a judgement about responses. 
And in virtue of the stability of response I have been stressing, aesthetic thought is 
rarely purely of one of these kinds. In finding something beautiful, as has been noted, I 
am also inclined to make the sort of judgement involved in thinking it beautifiil. But 
such judgements, in a pure form, about one's own and other people's dispositions to 
respond to something in certain ways are, in Harean terminology, entirely descriptive. 
Purely to think something beautiful is not to make any kind of valuation of it but 
merely to hold beliefs about valuations that would be made. But stability of response 
undermines just this purity of such merely cognitive attitudes and imports an evaluative 
element into them insofar as, in making them, I identify with the other persons (or 
temporal parts of myselQ concerned in my judgements. So that I may express, in 
making them, a favourable attitude to the object of response also so concerned. 
Blurring the distinction in principle between thinking and finding is, I noted in 5.6, 
liable to mislead us into cognitivism. But I want to stress that, in practice, it is blurred. 
Thinking and finding are not the same but because I am a person with a stable 
character and a member of what may be called a community of taste they are not 
rigidly compartmentalized activities but rather constitute deeply inter-woven aspects of 
our aesthetic thought.
This stability also contributes to understanding the normative aspect of aesthetic 
judgement, stressed by Kant and commented on above.'*’ For such uniformity is not
40 See Kant, 1911. p205-6.
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merely something that happens to obtain- it is a desideratum. It matters to most of us 
that we show some stability and constancy in our aesthetic responses to the world as in 
Other things/^ And it also matters that we live in a community of shared values and 
that that be inclusive of aesthetic values, that we inhabit, that is, a community of taste. 
It is helpful, to say the least, that the management of the National Gallery has ways of 
deciding what to hang there that are neither entirely random or hopelessly 
idiosyncratic. More significantly, if I have a passion for Mozart and a few close friends 
then it is likely that, by bringing them to share my enthusiasm I will get rather more 
than I otherwise would both from their friendship and from Mozart. This is to some 
extent what we may take to motivate much of that pursuit of agreement that I have 
recognized in critical communication. Though again it must be stressed that we are not 
necessarily irrational if such agreement is lacking but merely unfortunate.
I called the example that connected music with friendship more significant because 
it shows up the way in which our capacity to find things beautiful is something we 
value. As I noted in 5.1 we commonly take beauty to be a good thing and as I noted in 
5.4 our imputations of beauty are distinguished from the likes of my pleasure in 
chocolate-eating in part by a certain wholeheartedness. And we may connect these 
observations- saying, in Charles Taylor’s terminology, that, to some degree, our
Kant, 1911. pp50ff. Notice how Kant explicitly relates this prescriptivity to "the 
universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in the given 
representation" (p57). But, in taking the latter to be "fiindamental, with the pleasure in 
the object as its consequent", he surely puts the cart before the horse. Though perhaps 
he compares favourably here with Santayana (1936) who rather fails to notice that the 
horse has a cart behind it at all.
Cf MacIntyre, 1981. esp chapter 15 and pp 225f and sections 4.8 above and 9,1 
below.
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imputations of beauty are strong evaluations. This strongly evaluative character of 
aesthetic response, again as noted in 5.4, connects with their prescriptivity. To say that 
something, some possible secondary object of an imputation of beauty, is beautiful is 
not merely to impute to it a disposition to invoke aesthetic appreciation. It is to say 
that it ought to invoke it. To say this is partly to express a certain wholeheartedness in 
our finding certain things beautiful: the pleasures are so rich that we would not be 
without them; it is a good thing that there be such experiences. And partly it is to 
express our desire for integration both as temporal parts of people within a unified life 
and character and as people within a unified culture- it is good for persons and things 
to have a certain overall coherence and unity. To say this is to locate this prescriptivity 
of aesthetic valuation within a wider realm of valuation- it is because we value beauty 
that we think and feel this way. And to say this is to disarm the question that lurks on 
the realist's tongue: isn't it a fact about aesthetic value that a beautiful object ought to 
invoke an appreciative response? It is his last card. For in (purely) finding something 
good we exhibit an attitude and not a belief. And in (purely) thinking something good 
we are engaged in a purely descriptive enterprise. And, we can now suggest, in 
thinking of people that they ought to find certain things beautiful we indeed make an 
evaluative claim, but it is not, strictly, an aesthetic claim. Recall Wittgenstein's claim 
that:
Appreciating music is a manifestation of the life of mankind'*®
We are claiming that if certain things were found beautiful then that would be a good 
in a way that is more than aesthetic. But, although it is a claim that may indeed be 
implicated in calling the things in question beautiful, we are not claiming that what we
43 Wittgenstein, 1980. p70.
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are favouring, their being found beautiful, would itself he beautiful. It is a claim 
consideration of which invites us to leave the particular domain of aesthetics and look 
at value at a more general level. It invites us to return to the consideration of goodness 
and in the following chapters this is what we shall do.
5.9. By way of an afterthought to the present chapter, recall a famous thought- 
experiment of G. E. Moore's'*'* in which we are invited to consider a beautiful but 
lifeless world. Moore holds that such a world would be preferable to a world equally 
lifeless but profoundly ugly. But, we may note, if a world were lifeless, nothing would 
count as finding it beautiful and, if I am right in the claim defended above that to think 
something beautiful is in effect to think of it s being^wW beautiful, then the view that 
value is mind-dependent (as stated by Sidgwick), which it was Moore's concern to 
attack, is not vulnerable to such considerations. For it now becomes hard to see how 
we could imagine a world both lifeless and beautiful just insofar as, in thinking it 
beautifiil, we people it in thought.'*^
44
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See his 1903. pp83-5.
A slightly different version of the material in this chapter is Lenman, 1994b.
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Chapter 6: Finding Good
6 .1. It was proposed in the preceding chapter that my account of beauty might serve 
to adumbrate a more general account of value, finding and thinking good being related 
in a way not dissimilar to, though more complex than, finding and thinking beautiful.
The sort of position to which this might most naturally be thought to lead is to be 
found very clearly expressed in the final part of C. 1. Lewis's of
Knowledge and Valuation. Lewis distinguishes between "direct findings of value- 
quality in experience" on the one hand and both "predictions of goodness or badness 
which will be disclosed in experience" and "evaluations of things; appraisals of their 
potentialities for good or ill" on the other. The latter two have the status of 
judgements, subject to verification, and take as their subject matter the former which 
lack this status.* The parallel with the finding/thinking distinction of chapter 5 is 
obvious and striking.
Lewis distinguishes between things that are intiinsically valuable: the values of 
which
are realized, or realizable, in experience tlirough presentation of the 
thing to which they are attributed
and those whose values
are realized through presentation of something else.
Values ascribable to objects are always, he contends, extrinsic insofar as
Lewis, 1946. p365.
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the ruling test of goodness in an object is some goodness findable in
experience.^
Lewis theory then is idealist roughly in the way the view of beauty set out in 
chapter 5 is. Value is such that:
Its esse is percepi. There can be no illusion of present enjoyment or 
present pain, for example, though the supposition that an enjoyable or a 
painful state of affairs environs us may be, in any instance, illusory.^
And, to this extent we may say that value-judgements are in a sense subjective. But it 
is not a sense for which Lewis has much use. For, in this sense, all judgements are 
subjective- Lewis is a verificationist. He prefers a conception of objectivity and 
subjectivity whereby these are contrasted in terms of the possibility o f error And this 
is true of v2X\x&-judgements though not true of the diixQcX findings of value he 
distinguishes from these.
With the characterization of the immediately valuable, what is found, as opposed to 
judged valuable, Lewis rather flounders, settling in the end for the vague and less than 
lucid characterization:
" Ibid., pp386, 389.
 ^Ibid., p407. Note that this doesn't quite match up with the idealist view of beauty 
given in chapter 5 and, to that extent, isn't quite right. We can plausibly be mistaken 
about the existence of our hedonic states (see Smith, 1987. pp45fi) but not about the 
existence of the experiences that are their objects.
" Ibid, pplSO, 410-412. Compare D1 at 1.4 above
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that value-disvalue is a general mode of presentation; that it is subject to 
degree in the sense that for any specific modality- the value- 
characteristic of a given content- there will be other such modalities 
related to it as better or worse/
Identification of the immediately valuable with pleasure is discouraged by Lewis on the 
grounds that the latter term's meaning in ordinary speech is too narrow to express the 
full range of what is immediately valued, preferring to say that:
the variety of our adjectives of prizing is better taken as indicative than 
would be any one of them; which might well be too narrow/
The immediately good is what you like and what you want in the way of 
experience: the immediately bad is what you dislike and do not want/
But what unites such adjectives (and verbs) of prizing still demands elucidation. For, 
after all, surely one need neither like what one wants nor want what one likes. Greater 
clarity about how these attitudes of wanting and liking, desiring and enjoying are best 
characterized and related would seem to be needed.
6 .2. As a preliminary move in characterizing the key notions of pleasure and desire we 
may recall chapter 3 where, in discussing intemalism, desires were distinguished from
' Ibid., p403.
®Ibid., p405.
Ibid., p404.
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beliefs in terms of their direction o f fit's  being world-word rather than vice versa. But 
the category of thoughts whose direction of fit is thus world-word is rather wider than 
the extension of the English word "desire" as normally understood and it will be helpful 
to have a term at our disposal covering the former category as a whole. For this 
purpose we might adopt the term "pro-attitudes" first brought into currency by 
Nowell-Smith/
As noted, "pro-attitudes" is a rather wider term than desires. We do not normally 
speak of desiring what we already possess. What we desire is typically what we lack: 
what we want, in the normal modem sense, is something which, in an older sense, we 
want. This restriction was noticed and stressed by Plato:
Consider then, said Socrates, if it be no mere possibility but a necessity 
that someone who desires desires what he lacks and where
he is not lacking does not desire. At least, Agathon, it's wonderfully 
clear to me that this is necessarily the case.^
The object desired is, we might say, an object not possessed, the state of affairs 
desired not an actual one. But this is too quick. When Edmund Hillary was young he 
wanted to climb Everest. And so he did. The state of affairs he desired is, and (pace 
Aristotle) was, actual and none the less so for its then fiiturity. Indeed we can have 
desires about the past- the examination candidate awaiting his results, the wife of the
 ^See his 1954. esp. chapter 8. My usage shall differ from Nowell-Smith's insofar as I 
shall not distinguish within this category between pro-attitudes (paradigmatically 
desires) and anti-attitudes (paradigmatically aversions) but shall use "pro-attitude" to 
cover both of these, distinguishing "positive" and "negative" where appropriate.
® Symposium, 200a8-b2 (my translation).
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missing soldier, the general waiting for news of a battle all have desires about what has 
already occurred. If these desires are satisfied, the desired states of affairs are not only 
actual but obtain at the time of the desires' being held. The object of desire is not so 
much what we lack as what we do not know ourselves do ha\>e, a point well made by 
Kenny:
One can want to meet Professor X when Professor X is in fact the bore 
from whom one is trying at this moment to escape.***
When our desires our satisfied, when we get what we want, we are normally 
pleased. A tempting thought is then that pleasure is of a kind with desire, differing only 
in the fact that the state of affairs valued is typically one known to obtain.** This 
thought is not beyond controversy as is seen from the way in which E. J. Bond takes 
Jan Narveson to task for the "lumping together" of desire, pleasure, valuing etc., under 
the heading "pro-attitudes" (though Bond does not discuss the view considered in 
chapter 3 above, whereby the motivation for such "lumping" can be placed in the 
world-word direction of fit that distinguishes such pro-attitudes).*^
*** Kenny, 1963, pl20.
** Cf. Hobbes (1968, pi 19):
So that Desire and Love are the same thing; save that by Desire we 
alwayes signifie the Absence of the Object; by Love, most commonly, 
the Presence of the Same.
*" Bond, 1983, ppl 11-112.
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The states of affairs that occasion pleasure are, as noted, typically states of affairs 
that obtain. But, as with desire a more accurate delineation of appropriate objects of 
pleasure will have an epistemic twist. The pleasure of a bridegroom or of a schoolboy 
at the start of his summer holidays have as their objects the felicity they take to await 
them and I am no less pleased by good news because the messenger is, unknown to 
me, lying through his teeth.
What gives us pleasure (or displeasure) is then, or at least is taken to be, a. fait 
accompli, albeit in that wide sense in which a future fact may be, to all intents and 
purposes, a fa it accompli.
6.3. Another and related aspect of pleasure is that it is typically de re. In particular the 
central case of enjoyment, on which for the present, I will concentrate, is invariably de 
re. The primary objects of enjoyment can only be ingredients of one's experience, as 
Gosling notes:
I may enjoy a meal but not if I neither eat it nor smell it and I may enjoy 
a picture but not if I never look at it...it becomes clear that what I enjoy 
is doing or experiencing something, and, of course, doing or 
experiencing it myself.*^
The threat of referential failure may be evaded just as it was with finding beauty by 
observing that we cannot be mistaken about the existence of the object of our de re 
enjoyment- that is, the experience that is the primary object of our enjoyment (though 
as was the case with beauty the stability of our experience will frequently incline us to
Gosling, 1969. p69. Cf the passage from Lewis "Its esse..." quoted above.
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identify the object of enjoyment with a secondary object about which error is possible- 
of which more below).
Some care is in order here. Richard Jeffrey is surely right to take it that the object 
of desire is best specified as a proposition}'^ This does not mean that it is wrong to 
speak of a desire’s having a nomimal object- heaps of money- as well as a 
propositional object- that I possess heaps of money. We can represent desires in 
various ways. The thought is rather that the propositional way of representing them is 
fundamental insofar as something is amiss when we cannot represent a desire in this 
way.
The reasoning involved is simply that desires are surely best individuated hy their 
satisfaction-conditions^^ (cf. 1.5 above) just as beliefs are by their tmth-conditions and 
both may be conveniently conceived as propositional contents. Desires not so 
expressed are usually easy to rephrase appropriately. Thus a desire of mine to 0  is 
typically a desire that 1 0. And my desire for an X is typically a desire that I  have an X  
(or perhaps that an X  be present or that an X  occur). When such paraphrase is not a 
straightforward matter, it would seem to be a sign that we have a problem making 
sense of the desire at all. It is in the rather indeterminate nature of their satisfaction- 
conditions that much of the difihculty over saucers of mud etc. gets generated:
To say "I merely want this" without any characterization is to deprive 
the word of sense; if he insists on having the thing, we want to know 
what "having" amounts to.*®
*'* Jeffrey, 1965. p59-69.
*® For the notion of satisfaction-conditions see fiirther Searle, 1983. pplOf.
16 Anscombe, 1957. p71. Cf. Kenny, 1963. ppl 12ff
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All this is not to say that desire cannot be de re. Thus my desire may be that I 
possess that bicycle, where the thought of the bicycle is de re, though, insofar as the 
object of the desire is taken to be given by the proposition and not by any of its terms, 
the desire remains de dicto.
Enjoyment is rather more complex. In the simplest case we might say that what is 
valenced, what pleases me is, strictly, not merely my experience, but that I experience 
it, that it occurs. Sometimes, however, such a construction of my attitude may seem 
unduly artificial. Nonetheless, some propositional attitudes must surely always be 
bound up M>ith enjoyment as a condition of its imputation making much sense.**
It is important not to over-state this difference between desire and enjoyment. Both 
can demand representation as de re demonstrative thoughts. However, note that the 
(primary) objects of enjoyment are always experiences thought of in just this de re 
manner, while the only things we can M>ant in this way are things other than 
experiences- a woman, a bicycle, a work of art etc.- things perhaps given in experience 
but in experiences necessarily not identical with the further desired experiences of the 
object in question. That is to say, in the sense in which it is legitimate to treat noun 
phrases as giving the object of a pro-attitude (and it is so legitimate providing only 
paraphrase into propositional form is also possible) the (primary) object of enjoyment 
is ahvays a token experience, while the object of desire, where it is an experience, is 
always a type.
6.4. Is pleasure and, in particular, enjoyment a pro-attitude in the sense characterized 
in terms of direction of fit? Well, it seems, in the first place, implausible to regard 
pleasure or enjoyment as purely cognitive (word-world) in direction of fit. For how are 
we representing the world when some experience is enjoyed- what is the content of our
17 Cf. Searle, 1983. pp32-35.
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representation? The most natural answer might be to say that the experiences enjoyed 
possess some peculiar uniform characteristic, that of pleasurableness; and that finding 
an experience enjoyable is just perceiving this characteristic component of it.
But tins line of thought has been widely attacked. Thus Nowell-Smith writes;
When a man feels "discomfort" or "is uncomfortable" he does not have 
two sensations, an itch (or whatever it might be) and a special sensation 
of discomfort; he has only one sensation which is an uncomfortable 
one.*^
Aristotle has an interesting argument in this regard*®, his thought being roughly as 
follows: pleasure in the performance of an activity intensifies it, enhancing that 
performance. Thus I do mathematics better or listen to music with more understanding 
if I am enjoying these activities. But I do not get this result simply by the addition of 
some uniform thing, pleasure, to my doing mathematics- only pleasure in doing 
mathematics will serve. If I am doing mathematics without pleasure and badly, I may 
come to do it less badly if I start enjoying it, but simply to import some pleasure into 
the situation by simultaneously listening to music will be liable to make matters worse 
rather than better. Because it thus makes a difference what kind of pleasure is in 
question there must indeed, thinks Aristotle, be diverse kinds of pleasure.
More generally the kinds of things that are enjoyable are immensely heterogeneous. 
Dozing in the sun after a bottle of good wine, driving rapidly in a post chaise, playing
*" Nowell-Smith, 1954. p96. Cf Kenny, 1963, ppl27-135. 
*® Nicomachean Ethics, X, 5.
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chess with concentration and intent and shooting a waterfall are as phenomenologically 
diverse as experiences can be yet all may and do provide enjoyment/®
Granting this heterogeneity of kinds of enjoyment, might enjoyment nonetheless 
be, if not a uniform intrinsic quality of feeling, then a group of differing such qualities 
of a single typel It might, but it is then incumbent on us to specify what the type in 
question is, what its common denominator is and how it is identified. But meeting this 
demand for any purely descriptive account of enjoyment raises a difficulty indicated by 
Kenny:
...an internal impression can never be a reason for action whereas 
pleasure is always a reason for action. Pleasure, in the nature of things, 
is desirable; but no internal impression could be shown a priori to be 
desirable.^*
It will become clear just how complex is the relation between pleasure, and 
particularly enjoyment, and desire. But the point to be made here is simply that if 
enjoyment is taken to be some intrinsic feature or features of experiences we enjoy, it 
becomes unclear what prevents that feature or features from being present in some 
experience that we fa il to enjoy. Kenny's argument is effectively an open question-type 
argument that brings home to us the irreducibly evaluative character of the concept of 
pleasure.
Enjoying an experience it might then be urged is finding it good- we have an 
experience and we like having that experience. We are not dealing with some 
qualitative sensory or quasi-sensory aspect of experience but with the attitude we have
Cf. Gosling, 1969. pp34-43.
"* Kenny, 1963. pl34.
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to it/^ Aristotle’s point may now be met by stressing that the performance of an activity 
is only enhanced by enjoyment when the enjoyment is directed at that activity and not 
some other. To enjoy an experience is not simply to have an attitude to it but, crucially, 
to have an attitude that is contemporaneous with it- now-for-now, to adapt Hare's 
terminology^  ^(as well as me-for me).
A line of thought that might now suggest itself however would urge that having 
such an attitude^e/s like sometliing and then identify pleasure with the feeling in 
question. But this, it might be replied, is to assume, that we are necessarily aware of 
having an attitude which isn't necessarily so. Indeed, notoriously in the case of 
enjoyment we are always aware of the object of our enjoyment (as noted in the above 
quote from Gosling) but may not always be aware of our enjoyment itself. Such 
awareness may even undermine the enjoyment we feel. Indeed it may plausibly be 
alleged, as it is by Gosling, that:
there are cases where it is a condition of the enjoyment that one should
not recognize its existence/'*
Nonetheless, although enjoyment need not be something we are aware of it is surely 
something that we might be aware of. And the plausibility of this is increased by
It should be noted for the record that Kenny himself rejects the view that 
"enjoyment" is a "pro-word". This view, defended by Nowell-Smith, 1954. ppl 15-6, 
was mooted earlier by Broad in his 1930. pp237-8.
See Hare, 1981. section 5.6, In the interests of brevity I shall use "now-for-now" as 
an abbreviation for what Hare would call "now-for-now and/or then-for-then". I use 
"me-for me" with a similar generality.
1969. p45, q.v. for a characteristically good example. See also Smith, 1987. pp45ff
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reflection on the possibility of second order pleasure whose object- first order 
enjoyment- is necessarily an ingredient of conscious experience.
There is then a phenomenological aspect to enjoyment but it is not a necessary 
corollary of enjoying something that such an aspect be present. Nor does it seem 
helpfiil to concentrate on that aspect in starting a search for the defining characteristics 
of enjoyment. Compare believing. This too has a phenomenological aspect just in this 
same sense that belief states are potential objects of higher order attitudes. I need not 
be aware of believing something (were this necessary a regress would threaten) but I 
can be and it is plausible that belief is necessarily available to consciousness. This is 
not of course to say that believing has a qualitative character in anything like the way 
that visual experience has- not much seems to be involved in being conscious o f 
believing something over and above being conscious that one believes it.
We are left with the thought that enjoyment is to be understood in terms of having 
some experience such that at the time of the experience the experience is made the 
object of a positive pro-attitude (or at least the primary object- see 5.8 above). In the 
cmde language of section 1.5 one thinks "hurrah!". In the language of psychology one 
"valences" it.^ ® In everyday language one likes or values it. Adapting the "finding" 
idiom of chapter 5, one might be said to find it good.
This concept of finding good can, it seems to me, capture the whole range of 
things we speak of ourselves as enjoying- the heterogeneity of such things is not the 
problem it is for quasi-sensory understandings of enjoyment. Finding good, though not 
too narrow a notion to capture what we ordinarily speak of in terms of enjoyment, is 
however perhaps too wide. From the perspective of Lewis's view with which this 
chapter began, that is all to the good given his strictures about the excessive 
narrowness of the notion of pleasure to capture what he meant in speaking of
See Brandt, 1979. p28flf, Railton, 1986. p i73.
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immediate value. A form of hedonism, if we may still call it that, based on finding good 
is thus more plausible than one based on a narrower understanding of pleasure or 
enjoyment. Thus, to employ John Skorupski's examples, the experiences of visiting a 
parent's grave or of reading Kafka, are not, in the ordinary sense, enjoyable but may 
be, in my ^QmQ,foimd good?^ That said, the notion of finding good seems cmcial in 
seeking an explication of enjoyment, as the unifying essential feature of all that we 
understand by the latter. Cases where the valencing of the experience is positive at the 
level of second or higher order valencing (and perhaps only there) may fall outside the 
range of what would normally be deemed enjoyable for that reason and Skorupski's 
examples are plausibly of this kind. In what follows, I will be using "enjoyment" in an 
artificially wide sense synonymous with "finding good".
Naturally I want to tell a similar story about experiences we dislike. Though people 
sometimes write as if "pain" were the precise opposite of "pleasure" this is hardly 
precise- "displeasure" is preferable. "Enjoyment" lacks an exact antonym. Painful 
experiences nonetheless form a part of the range of experiences we may be said to jind  
bad along with such experiences as exposure to music or company not to one's taste, 
which though also found bad, are not properly to be called painful. As is well known, 
some empirical evidence exists to back up the view that it is not a necessary feature of 
experiences with the "feel" of painful experiences that they be found bad- a matter I 
will return to at 6.8 below.^ *
6.5. Understanding pleasure in general and enjoyment in particular as pro-attitudes 
might seem to present a problem. Searle, for example, goes in for just such "lumping-
Skompski, 1989. p301. Cf. Nowell-Smith, 1954. pl21.
Further references are given and the case for an attitudinal understanding of pain is 
ably made out in Hall, 1989.
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together", construing desire and belief rather broadly under the names "Des" and "Bel" 
and proposing the entailment:
,28Being pleased that (p) -> Bel (p) & Des (p)
The trouble with this is that the most familiar ways of characterizing pro-attitudes tend 
to relate them to our dispositions. Accounts of desire, after all, naturally begin from 
our dispositions:
29The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get.
But the object of pleasure, we saw, is a (putative) fa it accompli. And it is in the nature 
of a. fa it accompli that it is beyond our power to change- it is not something we can 
sensibly try to get (or to avert). You can't try to get what you believe yourself already 
to have. This can invite the thought that desire is in some way the more fundamental of 
these two species of pro-attitude, that enjoyment is open to some form of reductive 
analysis in terms of desire.
Plato's Symposium is again a source:
when someone says, "I, being healthy, wish
to be healthy and, being rich, wish to be rich, and desire the
very things I possess", we shall say to him, "You, sir, being in
^ Searle 1983. pp29, 33. Note Searle's wisely refraining from making the entailment 
biconditional so that the Bel & Des analysis is not taken to exhaust the meaning of 
pleasure. Cf. on this matter 6.8 below.
Anscombe, 1957. p68.
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possession of health and wealth and strength, wish to possess these 
things in the friture, since at present you have them whether you wish it 
or not/®
Similar views are commonly expressed: for example by Brandt/* To enjoy something, 
such writers claim, is just to desire its continuation.
An immediate objection to this sort of view may be drawn from everyday 
experience. There are numerous pleasures which I do not in fact wish to prolong. Thus 
perhaps I am enjoying eating ice-cream but wish nonetheless shortly to desist as I 
know satiety to bring diminishing returns and ultimately to sicken. But so far this 
objection does not seem very threatening- the obvious reply is simply to add a ceteris 
paribus clause. To enjoy eating ice cream is simply to desire to continue to do so, 
other things being equal, a condition which the onset of satiety violates.
There are kinds of enjoyment which are less amenable to this move however. Good 
examples are provided by J. C. B. Gosling.Firstly there are kinds of enjoyment where 
it is plausibly held to be essential to the enjoyableness of what is enjoyed that it be 
fleeting and ephemeral as when we enjoy some passing whiff of scent. And secondly 
there are enjoyments which cannot be prolonged.
I may enjoy breaking a certain piece of good news to someone; but it is 
hard to believe that because I enjoy it I must want to go on breaking it.
After all, I know as well as anyone else that I cannot go on breaking the 
same piece of news to the same person.
®^ Symposium, 200c5-d3 (my trans.).
*^ Brandt, 1979. pp40-41.
See his 1969. pp64-66. Cf Kenny, 1963. pl35.
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And of course the impossibility here is of a conceptual variety- it is not like the 
impossibility of having superhuman powers which may indeed, however inadvisedly, be 
coherently wanted, but rather like the impossibility of at once having and not having 
such powers, which may not.
Such counter-examples may seem not to settle the matter. The first sort invites us 
to press for an elaboration of what it is to be essential to something's enjoyableness and 
furnishing this would certainly be a complex matter. The second might be claimed to 
depend for its effectiveness on just how finely the object of pleasure is individuated.
Thus suppose I am enjoying breaking not news but plates. The reductionist here 
takes this as amounting to a wish to continue breaking plates and such a wish is indeed 
a plausible enough concomitant of my enjoyment. At a given point in my plate- 
breaking session I will, however, not merely be breaking plates but breaking some 
particular plate and it would be odd to impute to me, in virtue of my enjoyment, a 
desire to continue breaking that very plate again and again.^  ^But this does not tell 
against my wanting to continue breaking plates rather than some given plate. And the 
same distinction can be made mutatis mutandis in the case of breaking news. When the 
object of pleasure is identified in an appropriate way, it could be claimed, the proposed 
analysis is restored to credibility.
Here the anti-reductionist might accept this point but claim that such fine-tuning of 
the object of enjoyment may play into his hands. For he might now show up the 
weakness of the reductionist case in such simpler instances as my ice-cream example. 
Suppose we were to represent my enjoyment of eating ice-cream at tj  thus:
33 Not here impossible supposing a plate might be broken many times, being repaired 
betweentimes, but it remains highly odd to suppose that, in virtue of my enjoyment, I 
want precisely this.
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H! (I eat ice-cream at tj)
and some desire to be eating ice cream at some succeeding time t2  such as the 
reductionist view would imply thus:
H! (I eat ice-cream at t2 )
The point for the anti-reductionist to make here is simply that these thoughts are 
clearly distinct thoughts, that they have distinct objects and that hence presumably 
there is nothing incoherent in supposing either to be tenable in the absence of the other. 
So, in other words, if we're going to fine-tune the specification of the object 
thoroughly the tenability of this form of reductionism appears to collapse.
Of course the object of my thought in enjoying the ice-cream might not very 
plausibly be taken to be (My eating ice-cream at t%) where "tj" stands in for some such 
designation as "2p.m., G. M. T. on January 5th 1993" for I may very well not think of 
my action in this way. I may well not know what time it is. But we might, instead of 
"t|" and "t2 " write "now" and "some moments hence", or some such locution, for such 
distinctions are plausibly present simply in virtue of my thoughts being tensed.
Alternatively, individuating the object without reference to time, the anti­
reductionist might urge that the pleasure is a pro-attitude to the particular quantity of 
ice cream being eaten at the time of the pleasure and the allegedly equivalent desire is a 
desire for some distinct such quantity.
More generally, the reductionist analysis is involved in some difficulty over the 
matter discussed in 6.3 above- the primary nominal object of the desire being a type 
ice-cream eating experience conceived de dicto, that of the enjoyment a token such
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experience thought of de re- this is hardly helpfiil to anyone who seeks to somehow 
identify the two.
6.6. One might be tempted to reverse the direction of the proposed reduction, 
analysing desire in terms of enjoyment. On such a view it might be supposed that to 
desire to 0  is simply to expect that oing Mùll be enjoyable. Or that oing considered 
together with its expected consequences will be at least less displeasurable than its 
alternatives- thus immediately weakening the more obvious sort of counter-example in 
which people desire things they don't in the least expect to enjoy- such as visits to the 
dentist and other similarly advisable sources of pain.
This would seem to have been the view of Mill who notoriously wrote that:
to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a 
physical and metaphysical impossibility.^ **
This sort of analysis can seem tempting when we consider the two ways in which a 
desirer might be disappointed-
(A) by the desire's being frustrated
and
(B) by no satisfaction ensuing from its realization.
34 Mill, 1962. p293.
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We might speak of the latter kind of case in the language of falsification, saying such 
things as "I always thought I wanted such and such but now I see I was wrong"^  ^The 
following line of thought might then develop. One might have reasoned;
What I want is the best bicycle money can buy; the Boneshaker Mark VIII is 
the best bicycle money can buy- so the Boneshaker Mark VIII is what I want.
One might then find that the Boneshaker Mark VIII was in fact a wreck and hence that 
it was not what one watited. Anything one wants one wants for the sake of the 
enjoyment one believes it will yield and one's want is conditional on the truth of that 
belief, just as one's want for a Boneshaker was conditional upon the truth of a different 
belief about it. So that what the desire for a Boneshaker is to the desire for the best 
bicycle money can buy, all desires are to the desire for enjoyment.
We must be more careful however. I may indeed falsify a belief Ûmi the 
Boneshaker Mark VIII is what, under some other description, I want but I may not 
falsify a want for it. If I don't get what I hoped from getting what I wanted it remains 
nonetheless true that I wanted it. Believing something is what I want and wanting it 
need not be the same. I may want the best bicycle on the market and believe the most 
expensive bicycle on the market is the best bicycle on the market without it being true 
that I want the most expensive bicycle on the market.
I am, it might be urged, irrational if I do not, at least pro tanto have the latter 
want given the antecedent want and belief. If I believe X is Y and I want Y, I ought
33 Cf. Bond, 1983. pp44-45 and Gosling 1969. ppl06-107 on "really wanting". An 
interesting variant on the psychological hedonism here under consideration is Russell's 
view 0921. chapter 3) that we only, in effect, really want whatever turns out to 
extinguish the "discomfort" associated with that wanting.
193
then, at least pro tanto, to want X. Or at least, I ought so to want it conditionally on 
the truth o f my belief The psychological hedonist may now rest his claim on just this 
seeming conditionality of a want on a belief But the point to stress is that this is not 
such that the want can be written out o f my history if the belief is false. It is not the 
case that (if X is Y) then I want X; but rather that I want (X if X is Y) where the 
condition lies within the scope of the verb and the want is no less actual for the failure 
of the belief. But if such conditional status is assumed then all the disappointments we 
had originally been inclined to class as of kind B turn out rather to be of kind A. So 
that imputing such conditionality, as psychological hedonism seems to demand, leads 
to the conclusion that our real wants are never disappointing in this former way. And 
this is most implausible. If I want to go windsurfing expecting that it will be fun and 
my want is construed as conditional upon the truth of that expectation then it will be 
satisfied if and only if I go windsurfing and enjoy it. If windsurfing disappoints, it is not 
then the case that the satisfaction of my want has failed to satisfy me^  ^for the former 
satisfaction has not in fact come aboiit.^ *
Aside from any questions about the plausibility of any assumption that all our 
desires for ends other than enjoyment are, for all our innocence of the fact, conditional 
on our ultimate satisfaction in this way, the trouble with such psychological hedonism 
is simply that there are, besides the easily evaded sorts of counter-examples already 
mentioned, others much less easy to evade, notoriously desires relating to the 
aftermath of one's own death (held by disbelievers in their own immortality) whose 
fulfilment or otherwise we can hardly expect to enjoy. So that the story offered is 
rather less plausible with regard to certain desires than to others.
36
37
See Bond, 1983. p4S, for the distinction between these sorts of satisfaction. 
Cf. Bond. 1983. nSl.
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To a great extent however, this sort of counter-example relates only to the egoistic 
variety of psychological hedonism according to which for me to desire something is 
just for me to believe that it will be enjoyed by me. But the psychological hedonist 
need not be an egoist^ ®: he is equally at liberty to consider the view that to want 
something is to conceive of it as a source of enjoyment to anybody. This view is not as 
absurd as might often be supposed and not, as far as I can see, incoherent but depends 
on the assumption that any want we may have is conditional upon the satisfaction (in 
the sense of realization) of that want giving satisfaction (in the sense of enjoyment) to 
someone. But such an assumption though not incoherent is very plausibly false and 
certainly not a conceptual truth about what desire is}^ There is indeed something 
oddly fanatical® about a desire on my or anybody's part to go windsurfing whether or 
not I or anybody derive any satisfaction from it, an oddity I will be particularly 
concerned to diagnose in chapter 9 below. But to reproach with fanaticism such 
unconditional first order desires is an ethical hedonism quite distinct from any sort of 
psychological hedonism (logical or empirical) which denies their occurrence.
6.7. Such attempts to make enjoyment and desire co-relative as we have been 
considering derive much appeal from their relevance to the problem of making more 
precise our characterization of these very things. To this end yet another and related 
form of co-relativity has been claimed for desire and enjoyment. This seeks to base an 
understanding of our concept of enjoyment on its role in the explanation q/"desire and 
thus of action. As Gosling puts it:
3« Cf. Skompski, 1989. p296.
3® Cf. Bond, 1983. ppl04-106; Skompski, 1989. pp300-303.
'*® I don't have Hare's technical sense of the word primarily in mind here but what I say 
would perhaps be tme enough if it were so read.
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If I claim to play it [golf] because I enjoy it, that serves to assert that 
there is no further reason, that I want to play golf for its own sake, and 
not for the sake of something else. If a person plays golf because he 
enjoys it, this amounts to saying that it is his desire to play golf that 
explains his activities; no fiirther goal is required.'**
Tliis is very much the line taken by Nowell-Smith who claims that:
"Enjoyment"... is primarily a pro-word the function of which is to block 
the question "Why did you do that?'"*^
He later elaborates:
it makes sense to ask whether a mountain climber climbs for the sake of 
climbing or for the sake of getting a view from the top; but it makes no 
sense to ask whether he climbs for the sake of climbing or for the sake 
of the pleasure of climbing.'*^
"Because he enjoys it" does not mean the same as "because he is enjoying it". As 
Gosling observes'*'*, the golfer playing golf because he enjoys it may very well not be 
enjoying it at all at the time in question. It means rather that the person in question
'** Gosling, 1969. p69.
'*2 Nowell-Smith, 1954. pi 15.
"3lbid.,pl22.
'*'* Gosling, 1969. p72. Cf. Kenny, 1963. pl45.
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shows a stable tendency to enjoy the activity in question on most, but not necessarily 
all, of the occasions when he engages in it.
Noting this brings out a point of some importance about explanations of behaviour 
that proceed in terms of enjoyment. This is that such explanations presuppose some 
consistency in what is enjoyed. In the language of chapter 5, such explanations only 
begin to make sense where there is adequate stability o f response and attitude. Given a 
person utterly fickle in what they enjoyed, we might talk of what they were enjoying or 
what pleasing them but hardly of what they enjoyed or what gave them pleasure, 
given that the latter locutions are taken to express settled tendencies. So, where such a 
person was concerned, it would hardly help us to explain either their oing or their 
desire to 0  by alluding to the fact that they enjoyed oing.
We might seek such an explanation in terms of their expectation that they would 
enjoy oing on this particular occasion however fickle they might be generally. But 
what, in the context of such instability of response and attitude, could possibly give rise 
to any such expectation? For without stability of response and attitude nothing could 
be intelligibly characterized as enjoyable except token experiences- of which simply 
"enjoyed" would then be a better description than "enjoyable". Objects and activities 
associated with types of experience could not be so characterized.
This is of considerable significance. For if nothing but token experiences were 
enjoyable then it would indeed be the case that we could speak of nothing but 
experiences as enjoyable. But when some stability is supposed it starts making sense to 
speak of chocolate and country walks as enjoyable, over and above token-experiences 
involving these. And until we do this, it remains wholly obscure how we could fine- 
tune the objects of our enjoyment in the way we in fact do. Thus suppose I am 
enjoying myself at a concert. What I am enjoying is just the experience I am having.
But I want to say that what in particular I am enjoying is the music being played rather 
than the feel of my trouser leg against my knee or the distant noise of traffic (assuming
197
the program is not Cage's "4.33" where the distant noise of traffic is the music (not) 
being played). When stability of response and attitude obtains I may start to say not 
merely that some token experience is enjoyed but that it is enjoyed qua token of some 
type. It is thereby possible to say under what description the experience is enjoyed- to 
say not simply that I am enjoying this experience but that I am enjoying listening to this 
music. And it is only when some such stability characterizes my hedonic life that such 
crucial experience-organizing discriminations can get off the ground.**®
I am relying here on a distinction already introduced in the case of aesthetic 
response; that between the primary and secondary objects of such response. Where we 
are concerned with the objects of hedonic responses considered nominally (as opposed 
to propositionally) a similar distinction is necessary.'*® For although what is enjoyed is 
necessarily an experience, it is natural to conceptualize that experience in terms of "our 
common-sense talk of physical things'"** and not via some experiential protocol- 
language of doubtful possibility.
To blur this distinction is to invite the sort of confusion found in the following 
edifying metaethical exchange:
"I don't make myself disagreeable; it is you who find me so.
"Disagreeable" is a word that describes your feelings and not my 
actions."
'*31 am here rather less sanguine than Kenny (1963. pp 128-131) who rather seems to 
suppose this problem goes away as soon as we stop viewing pleasure as a kind of 
feeling or sensation.
'*® Cf. Broad's helpful distinction between causal and non-causal senses of pleasant in 
his 1930. pp87-89.
'** Quine, 1960, pi.
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"I think it describes the smell of grilled bone"
"Not at all. It describes a sensation in your little nose associated with 
certain finicky notions which are the classics of Miss Lemon's school.""^
But that there is space for such a distinction is, again as we saw in 5.8, a child of 
stability of response. "Disagreeable", without such stability could indeed describe 
nothing but Rosamund's feelings. But the fact of such stability enables it to attach itself 
to just such reliable occasions for such feelings as the smell of grilled bone and Fred's 
behaviour.
Enjoyment requires a primary object- in this sense we can only enjoy experiences. 
But at the same time the experience is typically enjoyed under a description that goes 
beyond what is given in experience. This may be simply a matter of the description of 
the primary object proceeding in ways that transcend, as they must, the immediately 
given."*^  Or it may be a matter of the enjoyment being dependent on beliefs about the 
secondary object that may be false. Thus James Rachels^ ® describes for us one Womag, 
a dupe, who gets much pleasure throughout his life from the apparent love, respect and 
admiration of others who are, unknown to him, staging the whole thing. There is then 
an experience Womag enjoys on some occasion- the experience, say, of being praised 
to the skies in his Nobel citation. What he is more apt to cite as the object of his 
enjoyment is, however, something like "all this admiration". About this later, secondary 
object one may be, as Womag is, mistaken. But there remains something that one 
enjoys- the experience in which the secondary object is, necessarily, mediated.
George Eliot, 1965. pl27.
See e.g. A. J. Ayer, 1976. chapters 4 and 5..
50 Rachels, 1986. pp46-47.
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6.8. Stability of response and attitude is crucial in another way to the very 
intelligibility of our ways of speaking of pro-attitudes. For it is only via stability of 
response and attitude that we secure a link between enjoyment and desire. And this is 
most necessary. We characterized positive now-for-now pro-attitudes and in particular 
enjoyment above in terms of "liking", "valencing", "valuing" "thinking "hurrah"", 
"finding good". But the matter, it might still be felt, remained unclear. Somebody who 
demanded to be told what exactly the difference was between having a given kind of 
experience and liking it and having the same kind of experience and not liking it might 
well feel that they are still waiting for an answer. It was for this reason that we turned 
to consider the possibility of understanding enjoyment in terms of desire which has a 
far clearer conceptual connection to its behavioural manifestation than enjoyment- the 
connection with striving emphasized by Anscombe. But the connections between 
enjoying something and desiring its continuance and between desire and anticipated 
satisfaction I examined above seemed to fall short of being at any rate conceptual 
truths about these concepts.
We can now see why this is so. For stability of response and attitude is far fi*om 
total. I may very well at times enjoy oing and yet have no desire to continue oing; or 
desire to 0  without supposing it enjoyable or even conducive to enjoyment. But these 
cases will be exceptional. On the whole the sort of things I enjoy must also be the sorts 
of things I want. It is only for this reason that enjoyment is clearly linked to a 
behavioural manifestation (other than the mere avowal of enjoyment and the 
bewilderingly heterogeneous physiological and phenomenological corollaries of 
pleasure). Conversely it is only its conceptual link with such hedonic notions as 
discomfort, frustration and satisfaction that keeps desire from being characterizable 
merely in dispositional terms as the sort of thing a thermostat might be said to have. 
Disconnected fi*om desire, pleasure is unintelligible. Disconnected from pleasure, desire 
is bloodless. But the connection need not be total. A background of stability renders
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intelligible pleasures that float free from any surrounding desires and renders rich and 
full-blooded desires that are similarly free-floating. Such local failure of stability 
becomes possible against such a general background of stability but, given such a 
background, they are possible. Hence we can understand more clearly the status of the 
connections between enjoying something and desiring its continuance and between 
desire and anticipated satisfaction. To suppose these connections, as a matter of 
conceptual truth, exceptionless would be a fallacy. But it is also a fallacy the ready 
plausibility of which is readily explained. For the connections in question do indeed 
obtain on the whole, for the most part. And this necessarily so if "enjoyment" and 
"desire" are to have the meanings they do. But it does not follow from their having 
those meanings that either connection holds without exception.
Proper consideration of stability of response and attitude enables us adequately to 
deal with another respect in which the account given of enjoyment as finding good 
might seem unsatisfactory. I noted above a line of thought that having an attitude must 
feel like something and that hence we should construe enjoyment as a kind of feeling. I 
then noted that in fact we may well, as is notorious, fail even to be aware that we are 
enjoying something. This dealt with the objection but a residual implausibility perhaps 
remains. Surely there is a characteristic phenomenology of enjoyment to which justice 
needs be done. In fact supposing no stability of response and attitude it is unclear, 
prescinding from the other problems this supposition involves, how there could be such 
a characteristic phenomenology. But given such stability it turns out that there are a 
certain, admittedly and now unproblematically heterogeneous, range of kinds of 
experience that are typically enjoyable and a similar such range that are typically 
unpleasant. It now becomes possible to say what is right in the view that enjoyment is a 
kind of feeling, namely that it is indeed plausible that enjoyment is to be seen as 
typically bound up vrith what we may properly cdSX feelings o f enjoyment or pleasant 
feelings and that being typically so bound up is essential to what we understand by
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enjoyment..^  ^But that such feelings are distinguished from other sorts not in virtue 
some qualitative feel that is common to them all but in virtue of their typical 
association with enjoyment attitudinally characterized/^
In the case ofpainful experiences this is particularly clear. Certain sensations are 
so consistently found bad, any deviation from this attitude to them being so extremely 
rare, that their unpleasantness can seem to attach to them as a matter of necessity. 
Further confiision is invited by that ambiguity of "pain" which may denote such 
sensations just insofar as they are disliked (as they usually are)- paina call this- or may 
simply denote such sensations whether the response they usually excite is activated or 
not-painp..^o that the simplest, and I think right (see 6.4 above), answer to the much 
discussed question whether pain is necessarily unpleasant is, I think, yes for paitia and 
no for pain p.. In speaking of pleasures we may likewise ordinarily mean pleasure^.- 
such experiences or associated activities as are typically found good, even when they 
aren't, as when I might say "All pleasures have now lost their savour and leave me
Cf. Searle, 1983. p35;
52
Joy and Sorrow are feelings that don't reduce to Bel and Des but... they 
have no Intentionality in addition to Bel and Des.
Cf. Kenny, 1963. pl47:
There must be some criterion of pleasantness for an experience 
independent of whether it is here and now found pleasant. But there 
need not be any criterion independent of what most, or some specially 
qualified people, in general, find pleasant.
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cold"; or pleasure^- such experiences as are enjoyed only insofar as they are enjoyed. 
The considerable stability of response and attitude that actually obtains for most of us 
most of the time makes these pairs of concepts in practice appear mutually co­
extensive, and this serves, I would suggest, to explain much of the attraction of views 
that identify pleasure and pain with sensations or some such qualitative features of 
experience without making the appropriate distinctions. What is called for is just the 
old-fashioned distinction between descriptive and evaluative meaning^ ,^ where the 
pervasiveness of attitudinal stability accounts both for the evaluative charge of our 
descriptions and the descriptive commitments we make in our evaluations: an 
entanglement that opponents of the distinction in question may well, of course, exploit.
We may also, in this regard, note the likelihood, that though we may not always be 
aware of a now-for-now attitude to an experience it is highly likely that such 
enjoyment or displeasure will colour the qualitative character of that experience in 
ways of which we may well not be aware, that experience is value-laden even where 
the valuations are not themselves experienced. Qualitative character and attitude we 
may take to be likewise highly entangled. '^*
This being noted we may observe again the comparison made at 6.4 above between 
enjoyment and belief, both being available to consciousness though not necessarily 
always present to it. Likewise it was noted there that the phenomenology of believing 
may be the rather formal and thin-blooded matter of merely being conscious that one 
has a belief. In spite of this anaemic phenomenology, nonetheless, believing is 
something that can be found good. Thus it might be the case that I enjoy believing that 
the horse I backed has won the Derby. Unsurprisingly so. For, although believing in 
general has an anaemic phenomenology, believing one's horse has won the Derby does
Cf Nowell-Smith, 1954. p p ll5-116. Cf. Hare, 1952. chapter 7. 
Cf. Blanshard, 1961. pp298-299.
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not. The experience in virtue of which my enjoyment arises may thus involve not 
merely my awareness of the belief but also my awareness of the pleasant (pleasantg 
that is) feelings that accompany it. Similarly with second order enjoyment, I find it 
good that I enjoy something, aware not just that I am enjoying it but of more 
phenomenologically full-blooded feelings whose presence, in virtue of stability of 
response, I may explain by reference to my enjoyment, the latter thus being rendered 
the more intelligibly the object of my second-order attitude.
6.9. It is thus when stability of response and attitude obtains and only then that it 
becomes possible to give qualified assent to Anscombe's insistence that:
If a man wants something, he can always be asked what for, or in what 
aspect it is desirable; until he gives a desirability characterization.^^
The assent is qualified because while very dramatic^ ® instability of response and attitude 
is not conceivable (see below), merely local instability is. Wanting saucers of mud, for, 
instance, is intelligible.^  ^And generally, the claim that:
Anscombe, 1957. pviii.
One is tempted to write "total instability". But, of course, "stability of response and 
attitude" like "the uniformity of nature" (see Ayer, 1972. pp20-22) is a complex matter 
of degree. There could never be no such stability, though the predicates needed to 
characterize it might be ever so ad hoc and Goodmanesque.
See 4.4 and 6.3.above.
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anything can be an object of desire; so there can be no need for me to 
characterize these objects as somehow desirable; it merely happens that 
I want them^ ^
is not, pace Anscombe, nonsense. The point is of some significance to my discussion of 
whimsical attitudes in chapter 9 below.
Practical rationality is thus the child of stability. To act for a reason is to perform 
an act because it possesses some feature that makes it worth performing. This need not 
always be anything so full-blooded as what Anscombe appears to mean by a 
desirability characteristic. I may stand on one leg and count to seven simply because 
standing on one leg and counting to seven is an action I happen to want to perform. 
And the latter is a feature of the action that makes it worth performing. This very thin- 
blooded sort of rationality attaches necessarily to any action, and the attitude the 
motivates it need not be a stable one. But a background of such stability must exist. If, 
per impossibile, dramatic instability prevailed, the claim that what I was doing was 
intentionally standing on one leg because I had a desire to do so would, as urged 
above, say no more than that I was standing on one leg because I had a disposition to 
do so, and this much can be said of the chair I am now sitting on which scarcely has 
desires. But given such a background of stability, eccentric and abnormal behaviour 
may be intelligible and perhaps indeed rational.
Most rational behaviour involves reasons more full-blooded than this. In a typical 
case. Parfit writes:
Anscombe, 1957. p71.
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my reason is not my desire but the respect in which what I am doing is 
worth doing, or the respect in which my aim is desirable, worth 
desiring/^
Here there is clearly a question of desirability characteristics in Anscombe's sense and 
the need for stability is clear.
To recapitulate:
(1) It is only given stability of response and attitude that anything can be 
characterized as desirable as opposed merely to desired, as enjoyable as 
opposed merely to enjoyed.
(2) It is only given such stability that things get to be valued- typically desired
\or enjoyed- in virtue q/* falling under some description rather than another.
Hence:
(3) It is only thus that imputations of value acquire descriptive as well as 
evaluative meaning. And hence:
(4) It comes to be because a thing has some descriptive characteristic (perhaps 
just because it is pleasant^) that it is valued- enjoyed, desired or whatever; and 
thus that such characteristics become available for citation in the giving of 
reasons for what we value. And indeed:
(5) It only now becomes possible even to discuss the question of the 
universalizability of such reasons^ ®; or that, closely related, question of the 
siipervenience of the evaluative on the natural. Furthermore:
'"Parfit, 1984, pl21.
See Hare, 1963. p i5:
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(6) The connections between enjoying something and desiring its continuance 
and between desire and anticipated satisfaction, that might tempt us to the 
reductive accounts of pleasure and desire respectively considered above, in fact 
reflect and are explicable in terms of stability of response and attitude. And 
indeed;
(7) Such stability is a precondition for the concepts of pleasure and desire 
making sense at all.
6.10. En route to a better characterization of the good, I have been seeking a better 
characterization of pleasure and enjoyment. This is scarcely a matter of disposing of a 
simple question as a means to making progress with a harder one. "What is pleasure, 
exactly?" is a question as intractable as it is crucial and I don't here pretend to give a 
foil and satisfactory answer to it. Reaching one would involve a long excursus through 
problems in the philosophy (and sciences) of mind whose answers are highly uncertain, 
at least to me. What I hope has emerged fi’om the discussion of the present chapter is 
at least a preliminary characterization sufficiently clear to permit us to proceed with the 
larger question. That characterization is roughly as follows.
There are states of the world, some presently or hitherto realized, some not, that 
we value. Where they are not (believed to be) so realized our valuation of them will 
constitutively involve an intention that, where possible, they come to be realized. 
Where they are (believed) so realized any such intention is absent- what replaces it is 
pleasure, including the special now-for-now, me-for-me, experience-directed case of
the feature of value-judgements which I call universalizability is simply 
that which they share with descriptive judgements; namely the fact that 
they both carry descriptive meaning.
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enjoyment or finding good. Understood descriptively this term indicates at once that 
heterogeneous range of ways of feeling to which empirical accounts of it draw 
attention and a cluster, again heterogeneous, of ways of behaving on which adverbial 
theories are apt to focus. But what unites these is their shared involvement and 
continuity, given an adequate level of stability of response and attitude, vrith our wider 
range of valuations, the fact that the things we enjoy and the things more generally that 
please us are, to a great extent but not wholly, the same things as {type-identical with) 
the things towards which we strive, the objects of our manifestly world-emending 
intentions. To have world-word direction of fit, then, is, we may say, for a thought to 
involve just such valuation/^
The features of pleasure on which empirical and adverbial theories concentrate are 
not merely incidental to it. They are a part of what we mean by "enjoyment" in 
particular and without such behavioural and phenomenological concomitants the 
notion would make little sense. But they do not exhaust what is understood by 
enjoyment. It is also something which is found good, which is liked, and it is as 
concomitants to this that these heterogeneous things are bound together under a single 
concept and only thus. We might try to make the concomitants out to be the whole 
concept, allowing that they give rise to the valuation here stressed but seeing this as 
something extra and inessential. And in fact there is no objection to saying that things 
that are pleasantg and painfiilg respectively cause our pro-attitudinal responses to 
them. This is indeed highly probable though this causal role is perhaps enjoyed in 
virtue q/"other properties than their being pleasant^ or painful^. What is objectionable 
is if it is supposed that such features bring about such responses by a rational process, 
that they give us, by themselves, a reason to like or dislike them (see further 7.3 
below). The untenability of such claims was precisely the upshot of 3.6 above. The
I here modify the account of Humberstone, 1992- see 3.6 above.
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evaluative nature of pleasure is only captured if it is taken as pleasure^. The order of 
causation may indeed go from pleasure^ t^o pleasure^ but the order of conceptual 
priority does not. It is in virtue of the fact that things are (usually) pleasurable^ that 
they are apt for description as pleasurable .^ That things are pleasurable^ moreover does 
provide a reason to desire and pursue them, given and only given stability of response 
and attitude, but, as such, only given the expectation that they will be pleasurable^.
The reason-fiimishing, action-guiding role of pleasure vrithout which its very 
intelligibility would be undermined depends on some things being pleasurable^ and on 
the stability this presupposes. Pleasurableness^ is not, to reiterate, a detachable part of 
the meaning of "pleasure". But this role does not require that any particular things be 
pleasurable;?. The extension oîpleasurablepvm^X, intelligibly enough, be imagined, in 
some world, differing massively from what it is in this. In such a world the pleasurable^ 
things would be the things typically found good, the typically pleasurable^ things, in 
that world. The things which are pleasurable^ in this world'would not be pleasurable in 
that, not even pleasurable;?. So we could say that, in such a world, different things 
were pleasurable, not that pleasurable things affected us in a different way. The 
evaluative force is primary. And, to look ahead to the larger question, the similarity of 
the issue to that raised at 3.4 by juxtaposing 01 and 02 is striking though it will be 
suggested in chapter 10 below that "good" has a rigidity in this respect that pleasure is 
here alleged to lack.
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Chapter 7: Found Goodness I: Some Naturalistic Fallacies
7.1. I began the last chapter with an exposition of the view of C. I. Lewis which 
offered a model for the development of the view of aesthetics given in chapter six to a 
wider picture of value. Lewis, I noted, had a problem with his characterization of what 
he called the immediately valuable and that chapter was taken up with an attempt to 
supply that defect. From that attempt there has emerged a picture of what I have called 
finding good, characterized as a now-for-now, me-for-me pro-attitude of a person to 
some concurrent experience of that person.
But Lewis's naturalism, like other similar naturalisms, has another problem, which 
is clearest if we consider not the sort of value he characterizes as directly found in 
experience but the sort of valuation which he takes to be straightforwardly judgmental- 
"predictions of goodness or badness which will be disclosed in experience" and 
"evaluations of things". In a case like the latter where it is a question of the ascription 
of value to "objects and other existents", "valuable" is to be understood as meaning 
"capable of conducing to satisfaction in some possible experience."^
The obvious objection is that this definiens is without evaluative force. We may 
again invoke an open question-type argument. I can coherently acknowledge that X is 
capable of conducing to satisfaction and deny that X is good. But recall here my 
rejection of that argument in its classical formulation and reconstruction of it in an 
argument for internalism, a position which need not be incompatible with naturalism. 
The favoured internalism, or precisely subjective internalism, was characterized as 
relating value essentially to what motivates us, what matters to us. I noted that what is 
understood by mattering need not be exhausted by motivating. This is important
 ^Lewis, 1946. pp365,414. In chapter XVII Lewis seeks to make this more precise but 
not in a way that is motivated by the problem raised here.
210
because the best known versions of internalism tend to unpack the concept of value in 
terms of desires and I did not want to restrict myself to this sort of formulation which 
is very plausibly wrong-headed/ Lewis's theory in particular is not desire-based.
The difficulty could be captured in terms of the reconstructed version of the open 
question argument by alleging that it is entirely possible, and not at all incoherent, that 
I should simply not care in the least that something is conducive to satisfaction, indeed 
that nobody should care. It likewise needs to be clarified what relation holds between 
the descriptive and evaluative elements of the immediately valuable. It is one thing to 
evaluate what is immediate and another to characterize it as so valued.
What the argument highlights is just that inferential isolation of the evaluative I 
stressed in chapter 1 above. Anticipating the argument of chapter 8, we may say that 
what is wrong with Lewis's position is not just its externalism but also its 
descriptivism. To be capable of conducing to satisfaction is a descriptive predicate. 
Imputations thereof are irreducibly assertoric.
Does this show Lewis to be straightforwardly wrong? Not quite. For there may 
indeed be a close connection between what is capable of conducing to satisfaction and 
what is valuable. What it shows is that any such connection is not going to be a purely 
metaethical matter: is going to obtain only in virtue of the norms of appropriateness for 
evaluation we happen to have, is not going to fiirnish the basis for any redzwtive 
account of value.
This is akin to the problems I diagnosed for various forms of reductive naturalism 
in chapter 2 above. That something is such as to be valued by an ideal responder or 
that it is such as to appear valuable to a normal observer is one thing, that it is good is 
another. Nonetheless the possibility remains open of a non-reductive naturalism: that a
 ^For the case against desire-based conceptions of value see Bond, 1983. esp chapters 
2 and 3; Skorupski, 1989.. pp292, 298.
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view such as Lewis's while it may be a poor account of what valuable means may be 
more impressive as an account of what is, though not as a matter of definition, 
valuable.
The remainder of this thesis will have the following structure. First, after setting up 
some definitions at 7.2,1 will, in the rest of the present chapter, discuss critically what 
I take to be a wrong way of establishing the primacy of the immediately valuable, of 
found goodness. Then, in chapter 8 ,1 will develop the point that not only the strategy 
just discussed but any account of value that is similarly descriptivist must be rejected. 
Thirdly, in chapter 9 ,1 will explain why I think it is that a certain primacy does attach 
to cases of found goodness. What seems to result is a rather modest form of hedonism. 
How modest will become clear in the chapter 10, where I will give reasons why any 
less modest hedonism fails as a theory of value.
7.2, It will help first to distinguish some descriptive notions that are involved with the 
concept of goodness.
1/ Goodp
Let us say of anything that is found good that it is goodg. This is a predicate that is 
immediately applicable only to token experiences, though, given enough stability of 
response, it may be also applicable at least to temporal parts of other particulars. 
"Bado" may be similarly defined, something I will take for granted in the other sort of 
goodness I will here distinguish.
2/ Goodi
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Let us earmark the expression "good%" such that something is good j if and only if 
it is such as to be, apt to be ,^ found good. Here we must assume some stability of 
response as without this, we have seen, nothing could be goodj.^ "Goodi" will thus 
describe a disposition to be so found and not merely the achievement of being so found 
on some occasion.
If I taste some chocolate and enjoy the experience I am at least entitled at least to 
describe it as goodQ. But, in fact, an English-speaking chocolate-eater saying "That is 
good" almost certainly means more than this. He almost certainly means at least to 
characterize the chocolate as goodj. This isn’t surprising, the fact that we describe 
experiences in language that commits us to more than is strictly given by the 
experience being a highly general point of some notoriety.'
As Lewis stresses, we may also use "good" to predict that something will be or 
would be found good, or to surmise that it was or would have been. Such predictions
 ^This choice of diction is guided by Nowell-Smith's usefiil demarcation of " A-words" 
("A" for "aptness"):
that indicate that an object has certain properties which are apt to 
arouse a certain emotion or range of emotions. [1954. p64]
Not only evaluative concepts depend in this way on a certain stability:
If variations in the temperature of the room were sufficiently localized, 
it would make no sense to speak of the room temperature. [Wright,
1980. p24]
' see e.g. Ayer, 1976. chapters 4 and 5.
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of found goodness must presumably refer to at least a minimally settled disposition in 
something to be found good- i.e. to goodness%- in order even to be possible.  ^So again 
we have that dependence on stability so much stressed above.
"Good" in English has even a descriptive meaning too complex to be captured by 
the concepts goodg and good% as I have defined them. But note that "pleasant" does 
not. If what is found pleasant is roughly identified, as is plausible, with what is found 
good, then we may speak of what is thought pleasant in much the way we spoke in 
chapter 5 of what is thought beautifiil, that is to say we may identify what is thought 
pleasant with what is thought good, in the sense of being believed to be good] or 
believed or predicted to be goodQ. Finding pleasant and finding good come to very 
nearly the same thing, as we saw in chapter 6. But what, in a wider sense, we think 
good, seems quite a different matter to what we think pleasant.
3/ Good?
One point of contrast is a comparatively straightforward matter. At 5.2 above we 
stressed a contrast between goodness and beauty whereby the latter but not the former 
has an imtrumental sense. In this respect pleasurableness resembles beauty rather than 
goodness. To think something pleasurable is then to believe it would be or is found 
pleasant without necessarily, concurrently and oneself, so finding it. But to think 
something good will require this further dimension of goodness' being pro tanto 
transmissible to its potential causal antecedents. Thus if X is good and Y is conducive 
to X then Y is itself pro tanto good. Something, we may say, is good2  if it conduces to 
experiences of finding things good- taking goodness^ as a trivial case of goodness2 -
® Compare Nowell-Smith's (1954, pp76-77) distinction of what he calls the "predictive" 
and "generalizing" elements implicit (contextually- see his p72ff) in the use of A words.
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4/ Good]
I will eat some chocolate tomorrow, say, or did so yesterday. I may now entertain 
thoughts about the value o f that experience in two rather different ways. I may make 
predictions, à la Lewis, about whether I will find it good, that is, I may reflect on 
whether it will be goodQ or not. But I may also make my chocolate-eating the object o f 
a distance pro-attitude. I may now have the thought that my chocolate-eating is good, 
valuing this at a time other than that o f my eating it. I may value at one time something 
that happens at another. And this is quite distinct fi-om thinking fi’om such a distance 
that it was/will be goodQ. For a hedonist, o f course, there is something funny about 
holding something good that it is known will be or was in fact badQ. But such things 
do o f course happen:
"By Jove!" says John Smith. "It was magnificent!"
Of course, on the mountain he had not eaten for ten hours, had not 
felt his feet for three, had been soaked to the skin and then fi*ozen solid, 
and for half the day had wished heartily that he were dead. But he does 
not think of these things, John Smith is warm again.''
We may then have pro-attitudes to things more distant from us than our present 
experiences, most notably our past and future experiences and the experiences of 
others. Such attitudes may be represented, albeit somewhat crudely, in a figure such as 
figure 1 below where the vertical lines represent the careers of distinct persons and the 
arrows attitudes starting fi’om the time of the holding of the attitude and the holder and
Borthwick, 1983. pl42.
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ending at the time of the experience that is the object of the attitude and the person 
whose experience it is.
^  6  CL
V figure 1
Finding good is where the arrows loop back on their starting points- now-for-now, 
me-for-me attitudes. The other arrows show distance attitudes. So attitude (1) shows 
B pretty unhappy about the way things are with him at a certain time, this being a 
matter of regret for A (2), who is himself having a rather better time (3) as B in turn is 
later pleased to hear (4). This generous sentiment in turn pleases C (5), who has rather 
earlier had some experience which he anticipated with dread (6) but remembered with 
satisfaction (7).
Let us then initially characterize as "goodg" whatever is the object of such intra- 
and inter-personal distance attitudes to experiences (though not necessarily only to 
these) at some distance fi-om one's own present experiences. Clearly goodnessg will be 
relative both to persons and times.
Where such distance pro-attitudes are concerned, one can believe that a given 
experience is goodQ, is found good (now-for-now, me-for-me), butj^//, fi-om a 
distance, to value it. Indeed, in a sense, this might also be true of a now-for-now, me- 
for-me attitude: imagine a vice squad detective troubled by the enjoyment he catches 
himself feeling in some material his profession requires him to examine. He has a 
negative pro-attitude to his present enjoyment. This, on the view of enjoyment here 
adopted, is a second order pro-attitude, the first-order enjoyment being a valencing of
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the sensory experiences in question. With a distance attitude, on the other hand, one 
can cognize that an experience is enjoyed and fail, at any level, to valence it.
With distance attitudes the more general pro-attitudes we characterize by use of 
the word "good" again come apart from those involved in enjoyment and in aesthetic 
response. Such valencing at a distance of the experiences of other times and other 
people, or perhaps even of things that have no connection with experience (but see 
chapter 9) can hardly be characterized as finding good. And as I've drawn the 
finding/thinking distinction in such a way as to stress the cognitive aspect of thinking 
beautiful, enjoyable or good, I shall not call it "thinking good". I will speak instead of 
holding good to describe all the kinds of pro-attitude shown in figure 1 above, 
distinguishing the cases offinding good (now-for-now, me-for-me) and distantly 
holding good.
We can distantly hold good both past and fiiture experiences. Some such distance 
attitudes, typically but not invariably, fiiture-directed will be desires as characterized in 
chapter 7, desires that the world will be (or is or was) in the valued state, where this is 
uncertain. Others will take the form of being pleased at things. Now-for-now, me-for- 
me pleasure is what we have hitherto being considering under the name of 
"enjoyment". But one can be pleased, at a distance, at things remote from one's present 
experience, elections results in South Africa and so forth. Here we are glad the world 
is in the valenced state where this is believed to be the case. Typically, but not 
invariably, such pleasure at a distance is past-directed and de re.
And it is not just experiences we can hold good. We can hold good objects and 
types of objects as when they are the secondary objects of enjoyment or desire. Or 
when we value them for their goodness^, holding them good because they conduce to 
what is found good. Indeed we can hold such things, or any others, good for any 
reason we like. Or for none.
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5/ Good4
Among distant holdings good we want to make the same distinction as was made 
among findings good between goodQ and goodj. Among things we distantly hold good 
there are some which it will make sense to  say we hold good in virtue o f something, 
that they are in some way apt to be, such as to be, held good. One set o f  ways in which 
this might be so, though not the only such ways, is for them to be thought to be or to 
be likely to  be goodQ, good] or good2- Such things, which are such as to  be held 
good, we will say, are good^, which will be taken as standing to goodg as goodj does 
to goodQ.
GoodQ, good2, good^, goodg and good^ are all descriptive terms such that 
anything that is held good will have at least one o f them applicable to it. I f  I sincerely 
say o f something that it is good, then it may be inferred that it is either goodQ, good%, 
good2, good] or good^. Moreover, on a certain version o f descriptivism, more 
particularly o f what in chapter 2 above, I called positive subjectivism, it may be 
understood that this is indeed all I am saying. But it is not. To find or hold something 
good is very different fi-om thinking it to be either goodQ, good%, good2, goodg or 
good^.
7.3. Thomas Nagel and Irwin Goldstein have both recently urged the view that 
pleasure and pain are objective intrinsic values j  Indeed they have both treated the 
plausibility of this thesis as strong enough to make it the key counter-example to the 
claim that there are no objective intrinsic values.
They formulate this claim in importantly different ways. Nagel glosses pleasure as 
"sensations we immediately and strongly like" (and similarly mutatis mutandis for
See Nagel, 1986. 156-162, Goldstein, 1990.
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painy thus rendering what he says consistent with the attitudinal account of pain and 
pleasure espoused in chapter 6 above. For Goldstein, on the other hand, such an 
account is very much part of what is being rejected. For Goldstein, pain is intrinsically 
bad even where the subject of the pain doemH mind it in the least and pleasure is 
intrinsically good even where the subject is indifferent to it. Clearly it is only because 
he doesn't hold an attitudinal theory that Goldstein finds these possibilities even 
intelligible. In other words, by "pain" he means the pain .^ I distinguished above (6.8) 
and similarly pleasure ,^ by "pleasure". His perplexing claim, then, is that these are 
necessarily bad and good things respectively, that they are such even where the 
standard responses are wholly missing. Those who omit these responses have 
nonetheless a reason to make them in virtue of the intrinsic character of the 
experiences in question.
Given this, the claim, contra Mackie, that "pleasure's goodness as I describe it is 
not queer"^ ® seems frankly incredible. At any rate, far more argument would be needed 
than Goldstein provides to establish such a view of pleasure and pain. What his own 
argument amounts to is largely, as he concedes” a clearing-up of counter-examples by 
means of such unexceptionable but, in the context, hardly sufficient, points as that the 
pains of just punishment, albeit good rjrwa just, must nonetheless also be bad in some 
respect to qualify as punishment at all. He does offer the following however:
Suppose a person has a lobotomy or some other brain adjustment that 
leaves him indifferent to everything. Is he beyond good and evil?
Ethicists who hinge badness upon current disfavour must answer "yes".
"Nagel, 1^6 , pi 58.
Goldstein, 1990. p263, note 7. 
” Ibid., p257.
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Their position generates absurdities: we do nothing bad to this person, 
if, to show medical students a person's insides we wheel him into a 
classroom and dissect him; or to clear his room we slit his throat and 
dump him into a river; or to help non-lobotomized people appease 
aggressive impulses we bind him and use him as a punching bag/^
The trouble with this is that it's unclear how someone who was indifferent to 
everything would qualify as a person at all. Were the condition irreversible we might 
justifiably treat them as, to all practical intents and purposes, dead. Of course we do 
not treat even the dead as "beyond good and evil". We don't use them as punch-bags, 
eat them or place them at the disposal of necrophiliacs. And there is an interesting 
philosophical question how best to make sense of such respect for the deceased. But it 
need not detain us. For whatever the rationalization, if any, that might satisfy us, it is 
nothing to do with sparing them pain. Likewise, the merely unconscious or comatose 
may have stronger rights, for instance not to be mutilated, but this too is not because it 
would hurt. So that the thought-experiment he offers seems scarcely to advance 
Goldstein's case.
Consider next the more plausible Nagelian view that pain^ is intrinsically, 
objectively bad, pleasure^ similarly good. Bringing to bear the distinctions that have 
been made out, it is necessarily true that pain^ is badQ, and that pleasure^ is goodQ. 
This much simply follows from the way these terms were defined above. And when 
there is adequate stability o f response it will also tend to turn out that pain^ is bad% 
and, from many perspectives, bad^ and bad^, and that pleasure^ is good% and, from 
any perspective, goodg and good^. But while there is in fact considerable stability o f 
response in matters o f pleasure and pain, it is not necessarily complete. So that the co­
12Ibid., p26L
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extension o f painful^, badj and bad] and bad^ (from all temporal and personal 
perspectives) and o f pleasant^, good%, good] and good^. (again from all such 
perspectives) cannot be depended on and is by no means either a necessary truth or a 
condition o f rationality.
The conclusion to which we are entitled- that the pleasant^ is necessarily goodQ- is 
very weak. It means that if  at some time I am enjoying oing then at that time my then 
0ing is necessarily something I  then value. This much tautologically, given my readings 
o f  the terms employed. But it is not incumbent on others to  value it. N or is it 
incumbent on myself at any other time. Indeed, I myself may at the time in question 
feel rather bad about my enjoyment o f oing (remember the vice-squad detective 
above). My second order pro-attitudes may oppose their first-order objects. In fact, as 
defined, "goodQ" is not an evaluative term.
But there is an evaluative term tha t is akin to it. Let's write this "goodQ!". To say 
something is goodQ! is a) to  characterize it to be goodQ and b) to express one's holding 
good o f  such things as this that are goodQ. One then holds good just such findings of 
goodness. "GoodQ!" then is what Nowell-Smith call a "Janus-word"^^, having both 
descriptive and evaluative force- in our terms having both directions o f  fit.^ "* In the 
terminology o f chapter 1, it is a mixed evaluative term.
One need not thus consider goodQ I all that one finds good. There might be findings 
o f goodness one failed to hold good. And there are such cases. The pleasures o f 
malice, for example, are the object o f general disapprobation, a classic counter-
Nowell-Smith, 1954. pp89, 95-6.
Cf Cooper on talified "ought"-sentences in 1981. p76. The caveat given at chapter 
3, note 45 is of some pertinence should ward off a misunderstanding that is very 
possible at this point.
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example to hedonism/^ The same applies, generalizing, and anticipating chapter 10 
below, to any pleasures we might find contemptible.
One need not hold good all findings of goodness. And Nagel's claim is not 
established by the fact that, to a considerable but not total extent, one tends to. One 
need not and sometimes does not hold bad one's findings of badness or hold good one's 
findings of goodness. One believes that what is found good is goodQ and often also 
good 2. But that belief in no way commits one to distantly hold good what one 
acknowledges to be so found by other persons or by oneself at other times. Indeed it 
does not commit one to find good (second order) one’s own current finding good (first 
order) of some experience. Distantly believing something good (goodQ), I am saying, 
does not, for anything Nagel has shown, commit one to distantly holding it good.
Others aie involved in a similar difficulty. Parfit, like Nagel, wants to say it is 
intrinsically irrational to desire pain.^  ^And E. J. Bond, in his Reason and Value, 
constructs an elaborate theory of value that depends crucially on supposing distance 
attitudes thus responsible to now-for-now attitudes. Like Lewis, Bond has a particular 
interest in the sort of cases I have characterized finding good, where value is, as he 
sees it, sampled or discovered'm experience.” Like Nagel and Goldstein, moreover, he 
takes pleasure to be inherently good and pain inherently bad”, the view I have just 
given reasons for rejecting. He claims that distance-attitudes must conform to the 
immediate findings of value on which he concentrates. What is goodQ at t 2 must, if
”  See e.g. Broad, 1930. pp233-4.
” See Parfit, 1984. section 46.
” Bond, 1983. pp35-6, 39, 43-4, 46-7, 61-2, 72-3, 86-7, 93-5, 97-8, 120. 
” Ibid., pp98, 102-3, 127-8.
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known to be such, be good] at t2 - Recognition that something has value- is such as to 
be found good- simply creates or generates a desire for it” :
If the agent has a present desire for his fixture well-being, that is 
because reflection reveals it to him as a value worth pursuing. The 
reason which is a reason because it relates to the agent's future well­
being is a reason not because it relates to the agent's present 
desires...but because of its relation to what the agent intellectually 
grasps as a value for him. And this cognition generates the relevant 
desire. ’^’
It is not the case that the latter desire is generated via some antecedent desire of the 
agent's for his future well-being. Nothing of the sort is necessary. The cognition is 
supposed to generate the desire without any such assistance, a supposition whereby 
Bond depends on the second of the two anti-Humean tactics I discussed and gave 
reasons for rejecting at 3.6 above.
For Bond then, as for Lewis, Nagel, Hare^  ^and others, there is something 
especially fundamental about now-for-now me-for-me desires. Cases like this:
19 Ibid., ppl4-5, 19, 36, 44, 59-61, 66-7, 72-3, 94.
^Ibid.,p67.
For Hare see his 1981. pp103-106.
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figure 2
are possible. But they are possible only if the person concerned is ignorant of the fact 
that what he is averse to will be found good. Once such ignorance is removed, 
something has to give and we get:
figure 3
That is, it is the distance attitude that gives way. What we don't end up with afl:er the 
dispelling of ignorance is:
figure 4
where the enjoyment is turned to its opposite on account of its conflict with what was 
antecedently desired. This is because it is only in the now-for-now case that value is 
discovered and because the cognition of such value generates the sort of conformity 
shown in figure 3.
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The weakness of Bond's case I take to have been already shown in the relevant 
passages of 3.6 above and in the foregoing discussion of Nagel. But the similarity 
between his view and Lewis's is significant. Both impute a similarly fondamental place 
to finding good, to attitudes which are me-for-me and now-for-now. In chapter 9 we 
will see how some such imputation might be better motivated.
7.4. The preceding argument is in harmony with what I say elsewhere about the 
untenability of various forms of reductive naturalism, extemalism and descriptivism. 
But we may now recall how it was argued in chapter 3 that there is ultimately only our 
approbation and disapprobation. What value comes down to is a matter of our having 
pro-attitudes, of the fact that we value things and there is no standpoint that transcends 
our values in terms of which they may be judged. There are things that I enjoy. I find 
them good. Yes, we say, in our suspicion of such naturalism, but are they good? And 
yet the denial of an external, transcendent standpoint prevents us from taking such a 
question loo far (though how surprisingly far we can take it will concern us further in 
chapter 10). Iff was, per impossibile^ the globally indifferent creature imagined by 
Goldstein, there would be no sense in putting myself questions about what was good. 
Observing humanity from Mars, I might notice that certain things were goodq, goodj, 
etc. but not be moved thereby to consider them good. As Brand Blandshard puts it;
a man incapable of any glow of admiration or sympathy, or any warmth 
of moral indignation, who viewed the human scene as if it were nothing 
but a set of elaborate intersections of circles and triangles, would 
remain blind to what moral judgements are about.^^
Blanshard, 1961. p79.
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But I am not like this. Rather I am like Hare's existentialist hero manqué (3.5 above) 
who found himself incapable of defection from the game of evaluation in virtue of the 
stubborn fact that he cared a lot about all kinds of things. That, on the one hand 
something is held good (be it so found or distantly so held) by someone at some time 
does not yield the conclusion that it is good. But, on the other hand, I  am someone at 
some time, and what I now hold good necessarily,/or me, now, is good.
What was insisted upon in chapter 3, what I claimed was the upshot of what could 
be salvaged from the open question argument was intemalism- an understanding of 
value that related it essentially to what we care about, to what motivates us. But what 
was exposed there as unsatisfactory, when the open question argument had been 
criticized and revised, was not naturalism but extemalism (see especially 3.5 above). 
Extemalism may come in numerous varieties. But one that is of particular interest is 
the descriptivist conception of value held by an observer of the values prevalent in a 
given society to whom that society and its values are alien. That person can well ask of 
what passes for good in that society whether it really is, insofar as he may well 
question whether he should share their evaluations. But he carmot ask that if he is 
wondering if it is really good in some platonistic, subject-independent sense. For there 
is no such sense.
When he is a participant in the society things are rather different. As an outsider he 
can coherently recognize that Tom, Dick and Harry all value X and not himself hold X 
good. As an insider he cannot of course recognize that Tom, Dick, Harry and himself 
all value X and not himself value X. In the present tense and the first person the 
thought
I (wholeheartedly) find X good and X is not {pro tantd) good.
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though not formally self-contradictory is not a coherent or possible one. Though this is 
not to say one may not doubt one's evaluations, that there is no room for 
acknowledging the possibility of error. This no more follows from these considerations 
than Moore's paradox rules out someone's thinking
I believe that P but possibly P is false.
The analogous
I find X good though X may be bad
is possible if such talk of error is possible in this context at all. The present point is 
that, for a given person at a given time, reflections about what is good only make sense 
when they connect at some point with the their subjective pro-attitudinal set (to adapt 
a phrase of Williams) at that time.^  ^So that in asking of the things the naturalist wants 
us to value, "But are they indeed good?" I can only be requesting that such a 
connection be made out.
7.5. It is a merit of countless naturalistic theories that they relate value very clearly to 
what motivates us, to what we care about- Epicurus, Hume, Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, 
Schlick, Blanshard, Hare, Williams, Brandt, Sprigge, Railton, Richard Taylor,
Harsanyi, David Lewis, among numerous others, all keep C l Lewis company here. 
The over-simplification of which the latter Lewis, again among others, seems guilty is 
that he fails to recognize that I can only understand goodness in this naturalist way 
when I speak from within this pattern of concern. A Martian observer of humanity
^ See "Internal and External Reasons" in his 1981.
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might acknowledge the correctness, insofar as it goes of Lewis reading of "good" as 
what is found good or tends to promote such finding. But from an external perspective 
we can thus arrive at an understanding of good in at best an "inverted commas sense".
Luckily, as I have been stressing, we do not occupy such an external perspective. 
We find ourselves in the thick of our own evaluative activities. And typically, if we are 
happy and well-integrated souls, we find ourselves largely identifying with these 
activities well beyond the horizon of our own ephemeral and personal concerns. One 
tends to want one's experiences and those of others to be found good at the time, and 
distantly held good at others (and by others), to want one's life as a whole, and those 
of others, to be found good overall. And when such wants find themselves satisfied, 
one tends to hold it good that they are.
It was argued in the last chapter that the sort of naturalism under consideration 
needs to assume a certain stability o f response and attitude in order to get off the 
ground. The present contention is that this stability must involve a certain 
wholeheartedness about one's pro-attitudes, a certain identification with the attitudes 
of others and that this identification must characterize not only the community whose 
values the theorist is theorizing about (typically his own) but also the theorist himself 
The species of naturalism under consideration is involved in a substantial evaluative 
claim and is not simply engaged in matters of metaethics. We might thus distinguish the 
descriptive and external goodq, goodp, good2 , goodg and good^ fi'om goodg!, 
goodi !, goodg!, goodg! and good/}! as I will term them. In saying that something is 
good#!, I not only, as we have already seen, say that it is found good, but identify with 
whoever so finds it by valuing it myself. In saying something is goodj !, I not only say
In stressing the importance of such identification and wholeheartedness I am drawing 
on Frankfurt, 1971 and 1987.
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that it is apt to arouse enjoyment but also show that I  myself value it. And likewise 
good2 ! and good^! are the evaluatively charged counter-parts of good2  and good4 .^  ^
The thought entertained by the earlier emotivists may be expressed as the claim 
that "goodness" means what is approved of. This is ambiguous. If it is claimed that 
"goodness" means what is approved of in a purely descriptive sense then that is a meta- 
ethical falsehood. In calling something good I do not merely assert that it is approved 
but express approval of it. In saying that something is goodq!, good} ! aiit cetera, I 
indeed identify with whoever finds it good, but I am again not asserting that I so 
identify. The problem is not just with extemalism as chapter 3 argued, it is also with 
descriptivism. Much argument relevant to this claim has come above but there is more 
to be said and the next chapter will be concerned to say it.
Compare the transition made in Nowell-Smith's analysis from A-words to G-words 
("G" for "gerundive"):
that imply not merely that the relevant person is likely to have a certain 
reaction but that he ought to have it. [1954. pl32]
229
Chapter 8: Expressivism
8.1. In chapter four an open question-type argument was applied to externalist moral 
theory. Such arguments were read as effectively pointing up the failure of some 
proposed amlysans fully to do justice to some philosophical cmalysandiim. In 
particular, it was claimed, the prescriptivity of value cannot be adequately 
accommodated on an externalist theory. The objections made to reductive naturalism 
in chapter 2 may well be read as making a similar point. I now want to complete my 
critique of evaluative realism by arguing that any understanding of evaluative language 
that reads it in a purely descriptive way is likewise untenable, that evaluative 
utterances are best read as expressing states of mind that are not, or not wholly, 
cognitive, that are not beliefs. At 1.5 I have already tried to show how objections to 
non-cognitivism based on the possibilities of embedding evaluative sentences in 
indirect contexts and exhibiting logical relations between them are not fatal. At 3.61 
argued that evaluations are world-word in direction o f fit, a claim that contradicts a 
descriptive reading of them. And I have generally in chapters 2 and 3 sought to 
undermine the credibility of various forms of platonism and reductive naturalism whose 
collective exclusion seems to leave the descriptive naturalist with veiy little ground to 
ocbupy. In arguing for an expressivist understanding of value in the present chapter I 
am then seeking to finish a job that is already well in hand. Here I shall focus mainly on 
two major objections to expressivism prominent in recent literature. The first appeals 
to the assertoric surface syntax of evaluative utterance. The second is that expressivism 
cannot give an adequate account of our more specific evaluative language, of what I 
have called mixed evaluations.
8.2. I urged in chapters 3 and 7 that where value is concerned there is ultimately only 
our approbation and disapprobation, our having of pro-attitudes, our valuing things
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and that there is no standpoint external to such attitudes from which to judge them. 
Saying this much need not however rule out all forms of descriptivism about goodness. 
In particular it does not rule out forms of positive subjectivism of the sort described at 
the close of 7.2 where in saying something is good, I am in effect saying that it is 
valued, or apt to be valued, by me or by others sufficiently like me. In chapter 2 1 
critically considered such views but let us look more closely at one of the difficulties. 
Clearly there is a very close connection between the analysandum "X is good" and 
such an analysans. For me to say that X is good and deny the truth of the analysons 
would strongly indicate a failure to grasp the usual meaning of the word. But in fact 
the analysantes fail to capture what the analysandum conveys. To invoke Moore's 
paradox again, "X is good" is related to "I value X" and "X is valued (by me)" as "P is 
true" is to "I believe P" or "P is believed (by me)". In saying "P is true" one expresses 
a belief that P, one does not say that one has it.^  Likewise saying "X is good", one 
expresses but does not explicitly profess some evaluative attitude. And, as in the case 
of belief, the temptation to identify profession and expression vanishes when we more 
away from first-person present-tense thoughts. There is nothing logically odd about "P 
is true but you don't believe it" or "I didn't formerly value X but X is good".
Consider what at 1.5 above I called pure evaluations. These, it will be recalled 
simply had the form
(l)HI(P)
serving to express a positive pro-attitude to some proposition P. Such boo-hurrah 
notation, following Blackburn, has the merit of lacking even the surface syntax of 
assertion and hence fails even as a candidate for what Crispin Wright terms "minimal
Cf. Gibbard, 1990. p84.
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truth". Its deployment is subject to a certain amount of logical discipline as was seen at 
1.5 but no more, we also saw, than might apply equally, for example, to imperatives. 
There are locutions in natural languages of which the same might be said, such as 
constructions involving the English "boo" and "hurrah". But such locutions are rather 
marginal partly because, I suspect, pure evaluation, strictly speaking, isn't something 
we do much of. Most evaluations are mixed. But one way we might express a pure 
evaluation that had a nominal rather than a propositional object (and a prepositional 
object can be converted to a nominal object by emending the verb to a participle 
construction) is as follows:
(2) X is good.
And this does have the surface syntax of assertion. But it is still by no means clear that 
that's what it is.
Again take an analogy with imperatives. In English, these have, typically, the 
general form:
(3) 0 !
which, more or less uncontrovertiall/, doesn't mean at all the same as:
(4) 0 ing is now commanded by me. 
or as
 ^Though such reductionist views of imperatives have been espoused. References and 
criticisms may be found in Hamblin, 1987. chapter 3.
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(5) I command you to 0 .
Of course, (4) and (5) may be used to convey an imperative but the mere assertion of 
what they assert falls short of an issual of the imperative in question. For
(6) 0ing is now commanded by Lenman
said by someone else asserts everything that is asserted by me in saying (4) or (5) but 
issues no imperative at all? It seems impossible, in English, to find an indicative 
sentence that is anything like equivalent to an imperative such as (3).
But this is surely just a contingent fact about English. Nothing stops us fi’om 
stipulating a new locution of the form:
(7) 0 ing is !!.
which we will say means precisely the same as does (3). (7) unlike (3) does have the 
surface syntax of an assertion. It will also be subject to a considerable amount of 
logical discipline, this being simply parasitic on the logical discipline appropriate to 
imperatives as more ordinarily expressed. Indeed, given the observations about 
imperative logic at 1.5 above, nothing seems to prevent our embedding expressions of 
this form in the antecedents of conditionals that may serve as premises in arguments 
with the form of modus ponens. And indeed there would be a clear but deflationary 
sense in which such expressions are intelligibly characterized as true or false. But such
 ^Though of course it might be put to this use, for instance if said by a loyal 
subordinate of mine to a subordinate of us both.
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expressions are not assertions. For they are, by stipulation, identical in meaning to 
expressions of form (3) and these are certainly not assertions.
It seems clear that "is ! !" is not a descriptive predicate. It is certainly true that the 
descriptive predicate "is now commanded by me" is true of whatever is ! ! and vice 
versa. But we've seen that these predicates are not equivalent. If they entail each other, 
it is only in the pragmatic sense in which
I believe that P
and
entail each other. For a second party (or myself at another time) might acknowledge 
the truth of (4), (5) and (6) and yet not endorse the imperative utterances (3) and (7).
8.3. This leads us to a second point that seems to threaten the admittedly unambitious 
form of cognitivism about expressions like (2) that seems to arise from a minimalist 
view of truth such as Wright's discussed in chapter 1 above. For one of the conditions 
for assertion conceded even for a minimalist picture is characterized as follows:
It is a basic feature of assertion that it transmits justification; specifically 
if another makes an assertion which I am entitled to regard as justified 
in her situation, and if I have no other information bearing on the 
proposition asserted, then I acquire justification for that proposition.
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This condition of transmissibility plausibly fails for (7) and seems to fail also for, at any 
rate, purely evaluative utterance. For it seems that I may perfectly legitimately say 
something is good while you may with equal legitimacy both recognize that legitimacy 
of my utterance and differ from it.
Wright, considering this point apropos of comic discourse, making much of the 
fact that such discourse is disciplined by norms of appropriateness guaranteed by a 
background of "community of comic response". This is true but it doesn't seem to 
suffice for the minimal truth-aptness of such a discourse, in any sense whereby such 
aptness is constmed, as it is by Wright,"* as incompatible with an expressivist 
understanding of a discourse that exemplifies it. After all, the issual of imperatives is a 
practice governed by norms of appropriateness operating against a background of 
community vis à vis our dispositions to such issuals. To the extent that this is so any 
such issual is likely to involve the issuer in an implicit commitment to the claim that the 
norms in question are satisfied. But of course this does not mean that in issuing an 
imperative one is to be understood as simply saying that they are satisfied. The issual is 
warranted if and only if they are but the issuer is doing something different from 
claiming such warrant. In the case of comedy Wright recognizes this:
this presupposition of community does not involve that claims about 
comedy are answerable to a community of response as part of their 
content. The presupposition enters not at the level of a correctness 
condition for the objectified claims but at the level of the constitution of 
the norm...at whose satisfaction comic discourse aims at an optimum.^
Wright, 1992. pplO-11, 35-37.
Ibid., pl05.
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In uttering (7) I do not describe oing either as commanded or as satisfying the norms 
of appropriateness for commands. I simply command its performance. What I say is 
minimally truth-apt insofar as it "has all the overt syntactic trappings of assertoric 
content".^ It is not however minimally truth apt insofar as that is taken to be 
incompatible with expressivism. In a language in which the invented idiom embodied in
(7) existed there might be a school of descriptivists about ! !ness, alleging that to be ! ! 
was to be commanded or to satisfy the norms of appropriateness for commands or to 
possess some strange non-natural property and a school of expressivists saying that in 
spite of its assertoric surface syntax, imputations of I !ness served simply to express 
imperatives; that no descriptive paraphrase would do justice to the import of sentences 
like (7) but that imperative paraphrases might do so. The former would be mistaken, 
the latter correct.
8 .4. But, it might be objected, isn't minimal truth-aptness just a matter of having the 
surface syntax of an assertion and being thereby, in a weak sense, apt for imputations 
of truth and falsity and that the expressivist's supposition that assertoric content is a 
"potentially covert" characteristic of a discourse is empty. Of the surface feature of 
assertoric content, this much is plausibly correct and indeed is in the spirit of the 
concessions to cognitivism of Stevenson, Blackburn and others cited at 1.2 above. But 
Wright wishes also, as I noted there, to insist that the surface syntax of assertion is all 
there is to the matter, and that expressivism about e.g. values is thus forlorn because 
there is no "deeper" notion of assertoric content for the expressivist to appeal to.
I think this is wrong. To see this look at what happens when we try to reverse the 
direction of the sort of stipulative manoeuvre that took us from (3) to (7). Let's 
stipulate that the locution
" Ibid., p29.
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(8) Let "X is square" be AA 
mean exactly the same as
(9) X is square.
(9) has the surface syntax of an assertion, (8) of an imperative. But clearly (8) is not an 
imperative. Nothing is commanded by (8). Thus it no more expresses the command 
"Believe that X is square than (9) does.’' (8) is an assertion just as (9) is. Indeed (8) is 
truth-apt. And it is logically (albeit not grammatically) perfectly apt for 
conditionalization, negation, embedding within propositional attitudes and so on.® (8) 
is not an imperative. It is an assertion. It has the surface syntax of an imperative but is 
not; is, one might pseudo-imperative.
I was attempting a reversal of my earlier manoeuvre, beginning with an assertion 
and stipulating an imperative locution to be equivalent to that assertion. But just 
because the assertion was so equivalent the reverse manoeuvre failed to yield a genuine 
imperative. But though this was impossible with (9) it is not impossible with all 
assertions. In particular it is not impossible with (7). (7) is, by stipulation, equivalent to 
a genuinely imperative sentence, namely (3). While (9) is not seemingly equivalent to 
any sentence that is not an assertion. So that when assertoric content is conceived 
minimally, as Wright proposes, there are, it seems, going to be assertions and 
assertions. Some, like (9), will be irreducibly assertoric. Others, like (7), will not.
And, I would suggest, this enables the expressivist to point up a "well-conceived
 ^Pace Russell- see Hamblin 1987. chapter 3. 
® Wright. 1992. pl29.
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deeper notion of assertoric content"® than minimal truth-aptness supplies. Pure 
evaluations, then, when expressed in the form of assertions, are nonetheless, like (7), 
not irreducibly assertoric.
The required deep notion of assertion is thus to be identified with the proposed 
notion of irreducible assertion. If the question is then raised of what accounts for the 
status in this respect of some syntactically assertoric sentence, the best notion to which 
to appeal seems to be that already in place from chapter 3, namely the notion of 
direction o f fit. So that, it may be suggested, what makes (9) irreducibly assertoric is 
just its word-world direction of fit, while what makes (7) reducibly assertoric is its 
world-word direction of fit. This explains the fruitfulness of using an analogy with 
imperatives to bring out the non-irreducibly assertoric status of evaluations. For 
imperatives resemble evaluations precisely in this contrast with irreducible assertions. 
They share a direction of fit. To note this is not however to identify the two or 
overstate the similarity. After all imperatives also share a direction of fit with, but are 
by no means the same as, optatives.*® I take the relation between evaluations and 
imperatives to a matter of some subtlety and do not propose to examine it here.
It is worth noting here that if we do characterize irreducibly assertoric sentences as 
those whose direction of fit is world-word, this characterization seems to dovetail 
rather well with Dummett's of "assertions proper" (cited at 1.4 above) given that "P" is 
taken as giving the sense of both "IP" and "H!(P)". So we might cautiously but
® Ibid., p36.
*® It is likely that were analytic philosophy written in a language, like classical Greek, 
with an optative mood, we would hear at least as much about it in discussions of the 
logic of evaluative discourse as about the imperative. And it is entertaining to speculate 
what the literature on assertion, expression and prescription would have looked like if 
our language, like classical Chinese, had no grammatical moods at all.
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plausibly identify my own reducibly assertoric sentences with Dummett's quasi­
assertions.
8.5. The inferential isolation of evaluations from beliefs about the wider natural order 
discussed at 1.4 above perhaps makes rather greater sense now that evaluations are 
read as expressing thoughts whose direction of fit is, at least in part, world-word and 
which are hence not irreducibly assertoric in content. For pure evaluations, at any rate, 
would never seem to be entailed by purely descriptive premises. They may be of course 
when the premises are strengthenedhy including norms that govern the 
appropriateness of evaluations. But as such norms are themselves evaluations this does 
not lessen the sid generis, inferentially isolated character of the evaluative. There is no 
need to explain this sui generis character in the way Wright, I think rightly, outlaws by 
appeal to a realm of sui generis states of affairs. Rather it may be explained in the way 
he, I think wrongly, outlaws, by adopting an expressive understanding of evaluation.
Expressivism is subject to the objection that it can seem to represent evaluative 
disagreement as nothing but the clash of arbitrary and divergent wills. In a sense this is 
right. Where you have nothing but a clash of arbitrary and wholly divergent wills you 
have nothing but a clash of arbitrary and wholly divergent wills, in which case such a 
common caricature of a simple moral subjectivism would indeed be the best theory. It 
isn't the best theory because we do not have this. Our wills just do not diverge that 
much. There is enough stability of response and attitude to allow the possibihty of, at 
least ad hominem, rational means to the resolution of such evaluative disagreement as 
stands out against this background of agreement. There is then at least a possibility of 
convergence (Wiggins' second mark of truth it will be recalled) in matters of 
evaluation, providing only that enough convergence is already in place. I'll be saying 
more about this in my last chapter.
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How much convergence may be hoped for is clearly a function of how much 
stability of response and attitude there is. That is to say, of how strong is the discipline 
imposed upon evaluation by the norms of appropriateness we have. This is only in part 
a metaethical matter, so that if points about convergence are taken as relevant to the 
issues of realism and objectivity we may expect a metaethical input from our thinking 
about what are often considered//>'5^-orcfer evaluative questions.
When our norms of appropriateness are very strong and widely shared, enough so 
not merely to constrain but to determine what we may value, then we will not only 
have foil convergence. We will also have foil transmissibility. This gives us a lot of 
objectivity but it doesn't give us descriptivism. For again we may note that a similar 
point can be made, mutatis mutandis, for imperatives.** If the norms that govern 
imperatives were tight enough the same form of objectivity would be enjoyed by them. 
But a descriptive reading of them would still fail. They would still be at best reducibly 
assertoric.
With a descriptive utterance, P, one doesn't just say that the assertions conditions 
of P obtain. One also says that P. At least this is true if one is not a Dummettian anti­
realist about such descriptive utterances.
With expression too, however, it is a error to read one as saying that one's 
utterance is warranted. But here it is a natural error if only because one is saying that 
nothing else. But it is still an error.
** A disanalogy, harmless for my purposes, is the fact that a third party might, in a 
sense, endorse an imperative but not be in a position to issue it for themselves. Thus a 
private might be in agreement with the command of a field marshall to a general. This 
point qualifies any transmissability attaching to imperatives but seems irrelevant to pure 
evaluations.
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(10) The evaluation "H!(P)" is warranted
and
(11) The imperative "0 !" is warranted.
and not equivalent to and do not entail (1) and (3) respectively, even though they may 
successfully mandate (1) and (3) respectively when conjoined with the norms of 
evaluation or command to which they allude.*^  Indeed the latter can do this on their 
own without (10) or (1 l)‘s help.
Evaluations, like imperatives, may enjoy a form of objectivity but this objectivity 
does not transcend the norms that warrant them. Indeed, if these norms are strong 
enough, evaluations will enjoy (subject to a qualification given at 8.8 below) all of 
Wiggins' marks of truth and all of Dummett's for quasi-assertions. The truth aptness 
thus conferred on them fails however to transcend the warranting norms. In this sense 
anti-realism about evaluation is correct.
The point may be developed by considering again Wright's argument against 
deflationism described at 1.2 above vis à vis evaluations and imperatives. Wright 
acknowledges that the argument will not work if we grant the biconditional:
(12) "P" is T if and only if "P" is warrantedly assertible.
For that would rule out the sort of neutrality his argument invokes. He concludes:
I write "mandate" rather than "entail" in the interests of my avowed neutrality about 
the status of the N-principle (and an analogous principle for commands stated at 1.5 
above.
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the DS [deflationary schema], coupled with the principle that every 
statement has a negation, enforces a denial of the biconditional (iv) [i.e. 
my (12)] for all substituends for "P" allowing of neutral states of 
information.*®
This is perhaps a little fast as it is compatible with (12) for there to be states of 
information where we are neutral vis à vis whether a given assertion is warranted. Or 
at least this is true unless warrant is strongly relativized to the states of information and 
epistemic competency of particular subjects at particular times, a relativization that 
would appear to undermine the objectivity- (and hence contentfulness-) securing role 
Wright conceives norms of warrant as providing.*"*
Rather than entangle ourselves in this complex point however, we may note that 
the issue of neutral states of information has a rather different shape when we are 
concerned with quasi-assertions than when we are concerned with irreducibly 
assertoric utterances. If our norms of warrant are strong enough, as noted above, they 
may in fact leave no space for such neutrality, for they may fully determine which 
quasi-assertions we are warranted in making. So much is also true for the norms 
governing irreducible assertions and Wright's argument depends on supposing that in 
fact it is false.
But it's falsity comes to something different in the case of quasi-assertions than in 
the case of assertions. For where our norms of evaluation, say, or command, leave it 
open what to say, then, in effect you can scry what you like. For over and above 
satisfying such norms there is nothing for the rightness of what you say to come to.
*® Wright, 1992, p21.
*"* See ibid., pl7.
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For, with quasi-assertions, once we know all the facts about what is warranted we 
know all the relevant facts and our residual ignorance is not a factual matter. But 
where norms of irreducible assertion are concerned, by saying what you like in such 
circumstances, you still risk being wrong in a way that is not possible with mere quasi- 
assertions. Where the norms underdetermine whether you irreducibly assert P, you're 
in a position of not knowing whether P. Where they underdetermine whether you 
quasi-assert P, you're in a position of not having decided whether P.
To put it another way, irreducible assertions exert cognitive command. Quasi­
assertions do not. I have already, at 1.4 above, argued that the point about cognitive 
command is, in effect, a sophisticated restatement of old and familiar Humean points 
about "is", "ought" and the fact-value distinction. Because there is this extra slack in 
the case of quasi-assertions, it is to be expected that the condition of transmissibility 
cited above will be weakened, that there will be just as much transmissibility as there is 
norm-dependent stability and objectivity and no more.
8.6. Should we accept the deflationary schema when we are concerned with quasi­
assertions? And, in particular, with evaluations? Well, two points may be made.
1/ Consider evaluative quasi-assertions. By analogy with (7) let's stipulate that
(13) "P" is HI!
be equivalent in meaning to (1) above (i.e. to "H!(P)"). Substituting an evaluative 
quasi-assertion into the disquotational schema yields:
(14) ""P" isH!!" is T if and only if "P" is HÜ.
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This is a puzzling looking statement. For the left hand side seems to be an irreducibly 
assertoric statement, which the right hand side is not. Hence any equivalence appears 
problematic. But this isn't obviously right. For if we follow Blackburn in identifying an 
imputation of truth to a quasi-assertion as expressing concurrence in it, then the left 
hand side is going to be just as reducibly assertoric as the right hand side. This 
perhaps leaves the predicate "is T" looking rather strange. For it now looks as if this is 
a descriptive predicate if and only if it is predicated of a descriptive sentence. 
Predicated of "oing is !!", it is no more a descriptive predicate than is "is !!". But this 
is exactly what Davidson's observation quoted at 1.2 above would lead us to expect.
What is special to evaluative words is simply not touched; the mystery 
is transferred from the word "good" in the object language to its 
translation in the metalanguage.
2/ Should we then accept:
(15) "P" is T if and only if P.
for an evaluative P? Well, there is no problem either with this or with the related (12) 
where P is straightforwardly mandated by the norms I endorse. There is a problem in 
cases where P is not so mandated and this possibility seems just to be that of neutrality 
already considered. Which seems to be the end of the matter.
It isn't. For P is an evaluative utterance. And if I sincerely assert it, it is an 
evaluative utterence I endorse. So a comprehensive characterization of the norms I 
endorse will, in that case, include P. And if the class of norms I endorse is taken in this 
inclusive sense, then neither (15) nor (12) will fail in the case of evaluations and
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deflationism will not inflate. The possibility of neutrality only arises when the norms to 
which P is answerable do not themselves include P. This is legitimate with quasi 
assertions for, if neutrality is not ruled out vis à vis P by the norms I endorse, 
excluding P itself, there is nothing more for "P is T" to amount to, for me, than my 
endorsement of P.
This is not the case with irreducible assertions. My endorsement of some such 
assertion about which neutrality is likewise a possibility can be mistaken in a way that 
is not available for a quasi-assertion. It may fail to be true in a substantive sense of 
"truth" that is not so available. And this possibility does not arise with (12) and (15) 
where quasi-assertions are concerned. For if by "is T" is intended this substantive sense 
of "truth", then an evaluative P can never be T. In this sense of truth, there are no 
evaluative truths. But this is not the only sense. We certainly, in English, speak of 
evaluation as being truth-apt. And, given, the objectivity that does attach to evaluation 
in virtue of its norm-governed character it is useful and proper so to speak. But we 
may consistently keep in mind that there is a more substantial sense of truth than this, 
the sense that attaches only to the irreducibly assertoric. But the harmless and 
deflationary Stevenson/Blackburn sense of "truth" attaches to any discourse enjoying 
such objectivity as is consequent upon a degree of norm governance.
8.7. (7) and (13) are reducible to non-assertoric sentences without remainder. But 
things need not always be so simple. Imagine that a culture has norms of 
appropriateness for imperatives and that the predicates "is Nl", "is N2", "is N3", etc. 
are used for stating, of actions, that they satisfy the various norms in question. In the 
language spoken by members of this culture at least two kinds of things might get 
themselves said:
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1/ pure imperatives or assertions reducible without remainder thereto such as 
"oing is il".
2/ irreducible assertions, quite lacking in imperative content, of the form "oing
isN n " .
But where utterances of type 1/ are generally governed by the norms alluded to in 
utterances of type 2/ and utterances of type 2/ are generally forthcoming from persons 
who subscribe to those same norms, the purity involved is unlikely to be very stable. 
Utterances of type 1/ will acquire descriptive force, utterances of type 2/ imperative 
force. This is what I had in mind above in suggesting that pure evaluation wasn't 
something we went in for very much.
This is analogous to the situation where mixed evaluations are concerned. These 
have, in Harean language, both descriptive and evaluative meaning. At a descriptive 
level they assert of some action (say) that it satisfies a certain norm or norms. At an 
evaluative level that norm and hence that action is positively held, at least pro tanto, 
good. What is said at an evaluative level is not irreducibly assertoric, while the 
descriptive ingredient of what is said is.
To dramatize the point, imagine a community, call it "Atlantis" in whose language 
there are only two evaluative words, "boo" and "hurrah", so that all pro-attitudes, all 
expressions of thoughts whose direction of fit is world-word, are captured without 
recourse to the indicative mood. Atlantan moral realists are plausibly thin on the 
ground, while Atlantan admirers of Mackie congratulate themselves and their fellows 
on their wholesale avoidance of the objectifying "error" that writer diagnosed in our 
own evaluative thought and language.
The point to note is that this situation is likely to be stable only i f  nothing else is. 
For suppose Atlantan habits of approval and disapproval, of liking and disliking, 
possess a reasonable degree of stability. To extent that this is true then Atlantan
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evaluations are likely to come to be disciplined by norms of appropriateness just as our 
own are. This is likely to have two consequences. Firstly, that a whole range of 
previously descriptive concepts start to take on additional evaluative force; if "D" is an 
Altantan word denoting some purely descriptive property of which Atlantans have a 
settled tendency to approve, the statement that X is D is likely to become infected with 
that same approval. Suppose, for instance, the Atlantans have a strong tendency to 
dislike habitual and unhesitant tellers of falsehoods. Given this tendency, their word for 
such people, like "liar" in English will come to bear a pejorative tone. Secondly in so 
far as evaluative utterances in the simple "boo'Vhurrah" locution are governed by such 
norms anyone making one will thereby often be taken to convey that the utterance in 
question is warranted by the norms in question. So where before the language 
comprised only pure irreducible assertions and pure evaluations, it now comprises a 
variety of mixed evaluations with a surface syntax that is sometimes assertoric, 
sometimes not. But it is hard to imagine that any kind of evaluative realism where that 
is understood in some way that make it a substantive metaphysical position would 
possibly be rendered more plausible as an account of Atlantan evaluative thought as a 
result of such a change. Someone uttering a mixed evaluation is saying of some norm 
(specified or otherwise) that it mandates (or licenses) some evaluation. But they are 
not just saying that. They are also implicitly avowing their own endorsement of that 
norm (and hence at least pro tantd) of that evaluation. But they are not just doing that 
either. Whatever else they may be doing, they are expressing Xhdix endorsement of the 
norm and that is not the same as simply professing it.
The arrival in the Atlantan language of " Janus-words" with double direction of fit 
might seem to yield candidates for the status of just those "besires" about which, in 
chapter 3 I expressed some scepticism. But not obviously. The thought expressed by 
whatever is the Atlantan for "Fred is a liar" might be supposed of that complex sort a 
relatively simple form of expressivism might read as a conjunction of the descriptive
247
thought "Fred is a falsehood-teller" and the distinct evaluative thought "Boo to Fred's 
being a falsehood-teller!".
But this form of expressivism may plausibly seem too simple when we come to 
consider what has become a classic difficulty for it.*® This is that the way such 
descriptive concepts are applied may well not be expected to remain unchanged after 
their evaluative charging. Once so charged, for instance, the old Atlantan word for 
"falsehood-teller" might come to be applied only reluctantly or in ironic oxymoron to 
special cases of the splendide mendax. Such subtle shifts in the extension of a concept 
in virtue of its evaluative charge clearly threaten the simple analysis.
Since this point is usually developed by means of resources taken from 
Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, it is as well to remind ourselves here of a basic 
point of the same provenance, viz. the essentially social character of language. This 
reminder will allow us quickly to rule out the sort of amendment of a simple analysis of 
some Altantan's use of the Atlantan for "Fred is a liar" that reads it as saying something 
like "Fred is the sort of falsehood-telling person that /  disapprove of and boo to that" 
where "sort of* is only to be unpacked by reference to an inside understanding of the 
speaker's evaluative idiolect.
We may prefer some such reading as "Fred is the sort of falsehood-telling person 
we Atlantans disapprove of and boo to that". Now certainly only someone who 
understands Atlantan and is hence to some extent cognizant of the patterns of approval 
and disapproval prevalent among Atlantans can be in a position to understand 
adequately just how the extension of the Atlantan for "liar" is fixed and hence how 
"sort o f  should be unpacked. But it remains the case that Fred's falling or failing to fall 
within that extension is plausibly a factual matter in the sense that the claim that he 
does so, or fails to, has purely word-world direction of fit and can quite plausibly be
15 See e.g. McDowell, 1981. Williams, 1985. chapter 8.
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understood and made by, say, the sort of alienated Atlantan who perhaps is rather fond 
of liars.^ ® The additional component of the complex thought expressed by the non­
alienated Atlantan who calls Fred a liar may then plausibly be seen as purely evaluative, 
again in the sense of having world-word direction of fit.
8.8. Finally I will return briefly to a matter touched on already at 1.4 above. Wiggins' 
third mark of truth demanded not just convergence on a given candidate for truth, P, 
but also the implication of?  itself in the explanation of that convergence. When this is 
true, the explanation of will be of the kind Wiggins has, in a more recent publication, 
called vindicatory}'' (filbert Harman has argued that the unavailability of such 
explanation in the case of moral beliefs is a powerful consideration in favour of non- 
cognitivism/^ His critics, most notably Nicholas Sturgeon'^ have opposed this with the 
suggestion that moral facts can and do feature in explanation in familiar and 
straightforward ways. I think Hitler was depraved because Hitler was depraved. There 
was a revolution because social conditions were unjust. And so on.
On the expressivist view I am defending, my sincere utterance that Hitler's actions 
were bad is not stating a fact about those actions. Rather I am expressing the fact that I 
hold them bad. Given that I sincerely express this, there is a fact about Hitler's actions 
that is immediately known- the fact that they are now held bad by me, that they are 
badg. This is a fact, a psychological and not a moral one, but not one that is of any 
interest in explaining my opinion of Hitler.
Cf. Gibbard, 1990. ppl 12-117.
Wiggins, 1991. p86.
Harman, 1977. chapters 1 and 2 and 1986. 
Sturgeon, 1985. 1986.
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However if my attitudes enjoy the right sort of stability, it will be possible to say 
more than simply that Hitler's actions were badg. We can say not only that they are 
thought bad but that they are such as to he thought bad, apt to he thought bad. That, 
in other words they are not just badg but bad^. And "bad4 " is indeed explanatory vis à 
vis my lack of approbation for Hitler. The point then to be made against Sturgeon is 
that when someone says
Lenman thinks Hitler's actions were bad because Hitler's actions were bad.
he plausibly tells us nothing o f any explanatoiy interest that is not equally 
communicated by
Lenman thinks Hitler's actions were bad because fhtler's actions were bad^.
"Bad^" is a wholly descriptive term. "Bad", I have argued, is not. And, in explanations 
like the foregoing it is plausibly badness^ that is doing all the explanatory work. So 
that the availability of such explanations does not appear to undermine the 
expressivism I have been defending."®
20The same point is made by Harman, 1986. pp63-4 and Wright, 1992. ppl95-6.
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Chapter 9: Found Goodness H: The Primacy of Found Goodness
9.1. Logic won't take me by the throat and force me to be consistent or stable in my 
thought. Mere consistency moreover is one thing, stability another. It hardly suffices 
for Bond to write:
The recognition of it [prudential value] comes with the recognition that 
every moment of one's present and future life is as important as any 
other; that the time at which one is or will be engaging in activity or 
having experience, is not, in and of itself, relevant to its value. ^
In fact, the avoidance of such fickleness or inconstancy is something for which we have 
a number of reasons which we may pause to consider. Imagine: in January Bobby 
wants to be a concert pianist when he grows up, so day in day out he practices... Until 
February when he decides he wants to be an athlete so he goes training day in day 
out... Until March...Every month Bobby's ambitions in life change and every month he 
turns to a new project for fulfilling them. Clearly, while things go on like this, Bobby is 
not going to make much of a musician or an athlete or anything else. Chesterton makes 
this point with some charm:
let us suppose a man wanted a particular kind of world; say, a blue 
world...If he altered a blade of grass to his favourite colour every day, 
he would get on slowly. But if he altered his favourite colour every day, 
he would not get on at all. If, after reading a fresh philosopher, he
' Bond, 1983. p88.
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started to paint everything red or yellow, his work would be thrown 
away7
Such people are guilty of a foim of self-delusion, diagnosis of which has been 
imputed (rather speculatively I suspect) to the Buddha by John S. Dunne, 
characterizing the insight in question as "the discovery that the will to live all one's 
possible lives is the basic root of unhappiness.”  ^Certainly Buddha's near-contemporary 
Confucius did have such an insight:
to love someone and wish for his life, then to hate him and wish for his 
death, so that having wished for his life, you go on to wish for his 
death, this is inconstancy."^
 ^Chesterton, 1909. ppl93-194. the same point is made by Blanshard (1961. p410), 
citing in illustration Plato's characterization of the democratic man in Book VIII of the 
Republic.
 ^Dunne, 1974. p i26. Dunne refers to the Dhammakakkappavattana Sutta. However, 
unless Dunne knows something about the original I don't, all Buddha is making here is 
his notorious claim to the simpler effect that desire is the root of unhappiness. But the 
idea is of interest whoever its author may be.
 ^Analects, XII, 10 (my translation). "Inconstancy" translates huo on which see fiirther 
10.6 below. Cf. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, VII, 6, 1240b 12-17 (my translation):
In men of low worth, such as the akrates, there is discordance. Whence 
it is held to be possible for a man to be hateftil to himself. But, insofar 
as he is one and undivided he is as he would wish himself to be. Such is 
the good man who is a friend in accordance with virtue; since the bad
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This is partly just the simple, but by no means irrelevant, insight that inconsistent 
desires aren't jointly satisfiable. But there is a depth to this insight that brings it into 
line with Williams observation in his illuminating discussion of relativism that our 
desires and values have a constitnenc)^ which reaches beyond their source:
the ethical thought of a given culture can always stretch beyond its 
boundaries...Each outlook may still be making claims it intends to apply 
to the whole world, not just to that part of it which is its "own" world.®
C. I. Lewis was indeed beforehand in seeing the significance of this for the 
motivation of a certain constancy:
Consistency of thought and action is for the sake of and is aimed at 
consistency in action; and consistency in action is derivative from 
consistency of willing- of purposing, of setting a value on. I f  it were not 
that present valuing and doing may later he a matter o f regret, then 
there would be no point and no imperative to consistency o f any kind.
No act would then be affected by relation to any principle, and no 
thinking by any consideration of validity. Life in general would be free
man is not single but many and on the same day will be found 
inconstant and wavering.
® My use of "constituency" here is also due to Williams- 1985. p75.
® Williams. 1985. pl59.
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of any concern; and there would be no distinction of what is rational 
from what is perverse or silly7
At the inter-personal level in any case such source-transcendence of the 
constituency of our value is a fairly contingent affair. We are social animals but might 
not have been. A world might contain some ten or twenty immortal but otherwise 
fairly human-being-like creatures living thousands of miles apart, each minding their 
own business, never interacting, not caring about the fate of the others. In an 
analogous way, there might be a creature with temporal parts that were mutually 
indifferent. Thus imagine a simple creature that only has two kinds of want relating to 
eating and scratching. Imagine it inhabits a time that falls neatly into discrete units. At 
any given time unit it wants or does not want to eat and wants or does not want to 
scratch for what remains of that time unit. It doesn't sit around planning its future 
meals or resolving that in future it will scratch less than it has in a past it remembers 
with neither relish nor regret.
Our simple creature at a given time has desires that relate only to itself at that time. 
Because it is like this, it is unable to be fickle or inconstant. But we are not. Most of 
our desires have, even on a personal level, a far broader constituency than this. I have 
desires about the sort of day I want to have, the way I want to spend the summer, the 
sort of life I want to lead, the sort of person I want to be. The wider the constituency 
of my desires, the more their possible fiilfilment is undermined if I am fickle. The 
narrower that constituency the more like the simple creature I become a creature the 
poverty of whose life requires no comment beyond noting that in one sense it is only by 
courtesy that we can even describe it as a life or what leads it as a person at all.
Lewis, 1946. pp480-l. Emphasis mine.
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By not resembling the simple creature I acquire a strong pragmatic reason to 
develop a kind of politics of the self whereby my fluctuating desires at given times are 
brought to an order that enables their mutual accommodation. The task is a difficult 
one- sometimes seditious desires fail to fit the pattern I seek to impose on them or are 
stronger than my higher order desires for personal unity and the order is broken: much 
of what we mean by moral weakness is like this. But the task is also worthwhile insofar 
as leading a life (while the simple creature has only a given moment of fiustration or 
satisfaction) and being a person (while the simple creature is more like a succession of 
appetitive monads) are things to which I aspire.
At the interpersonal, social level, a similar coherence is sought to avoid a similar 
impoverishment:
In ancient times when the people originated, in the period before there 
was punishment and administration, the saying went: "Everyone in the 
world has a different morality". Hence for one man there was one 
morality, for two men two, for ten men ten; with the multiplication of 
men what they called morality multiplied too. Consequently a man 
judged his own morality to be morality and other men's not, so they all 
judged each other immoral. Hence within the family father and son, 
elder brother and younger, fell into resentment and hatred, became 
alienated and incapable of co-operating harmoniously.®
What we are being told (here by Mo Tzu) is an immensely familiar story. It is the 
beginning of the edifying tale that has come to be called contractualism which goes on 
to tell how one day all the animals in the forest held a meeting...
Mo Tzu, chapter 11, tr. A. C. Graham- quoted in his 1989. p46.
255
For our ten or twenty lonely immortals of a few paragraphs back no such story 
could be told. None of them has a set of values which "it intends to apply to the whole 
world, not just to that part of it which is its "own" world." But there are in fact no such 
anchorites. Just as our desires extend in time beyond the immediate times at which we 
have them, so they extend beyond ourselves. People who are not myself feature heavily 
in the ways I, like others, would like the world to be. And, insofar as the same is tme 
of them and their desires about how things should be with us differ from mine and from 
each other, there is again a problem of co-ordination, an accommodation to be 
reached.
In both the temporal and the interpersonal cases we see the same thing, that we 
start to have a problem when the constituency of the set of pro-attitudes held from a 
given perspective overlaps with that held from another. For then there is the possibility 
of conflicting, not jointly satisfiable, attitudes arising. And, as was urged at the start of 
this section such conflict is apt rather to undermine the prospects of satisfaction for the 
pro-attitudes in question. There is thus a basis for a higher-order pro-attitude whereby 
miity and consistency of pro-attitudes across time and among persons is valued as 
reducing such conflict. And in its turn such a higher-order attitude will set up a general 
norm of wholeheartedness, that our pro-attitudes be brought into such conformity.
These reflections then motivate such a norm of wholeheartedness. They do not 
however show that adherence to it is rationally required. Believing myself to have a 
desire that conflicts with what I will later want, I may seek their mutual 
accommodation for the reasons given, identifying with my future desiring self. Or I 
may not. All the foregoing argument can do is make sense of a norm of 
wholeheartedness. It cannot render simple bloodymindedness incoherent.
9.2. Demands of minimal rationality, of simple coherence, fail to stipulate that my 
habits of evaluation be at all that such naturalists as C. I. Lewis suppose they should. I
256
appear, at least up to a point, logically free® not to care how much value quality is 
found in experience by my fellow humans and indeed by myself. Nor am I constrained 
to care much about the extent to which my desires at other times than now, let alone 
the desires of others are satisfied. I need not, that is, identify in my present pro­
attitudes with either my pro-attitudes at other times or the pro-attitudes of others.
Such imprudence and egoism may not be refuted by the usual manoeuvres 
concerning the alleged irrelevance of numerical difference. Suppose I don't care about 
any pro-attitudes except my own current ones. I am asked, what is so special about me 
and now that makes these attitudes so significant? But this question is easily answered. 
What is special about my own current pro-attitudes is that it is a necessary truth that I, 
at present, cannot but care about their objects; whereas it is not a necessary truth- is in 
fact a falsehood- that I, at present, cannot but care about more distant pro-attitudes.
While it is possible for someone to be so alienated from the pro-attitudes of others 
and even from their own at other times, it is not perhaps possible for such disharmony 
to be normal. It is plausible that such affective isolationism on a global scale would 
represent a level of instability of response and attitude high enough to undermine our 
capacity to make sense of ourselves. Though once again the distinction must be 
stressed between the global and local cases- even if all the people cannot be so 
alienated all the time, some of them can some of the time.
9.3. There are two kinds of stability it is important to distinguish. Firstly then there is 
stability f  stability offirst order response and attitude. This obtains if, say, at t\  I want 
to 0  at t2 , at t2 1 enjoy oing and at tg I'm glad I oed at t2 - Likewise I will tend to enjoy 
0 ing not just at t2 but, at least for the most part, whenever 10 . Nothing second order 
is involved in such stability for it is not supposed that my positive pro-attitude at a
To borrow a turn of phrase from Cooper-1981. chapter 7.
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given time to my oing at t2  is motivated by my belief that I have (or will have) 
entertained a similarly positive pro-attitude at some other time or times. And of course, 
when any such motivation is subtracted, what remains is rather odd. For we are left 
with a certain consistency among our first-order attitudes but with a vastly reduced 
connection between them. It is no longer true that I want to 0  because I take it I will 
enjoy it and I want to do things I'll enjoy. Or that I enjoy oing in part because I always 
wanted to and it's rather nice getting to do things you always wanted to do. Or that I 
don't enjoy it because I know I'll regret it. The stability is question is present all right 
but all the "because"s in the preceding sentences vanish to be replaced by mere "and"s. 
And this leaves stability 1 looking, to say the least, rather fortuitous.
This is not a problem with stability2 '. here my findings and distance holdings of 
good are in agreement because o f my identification at any given time with myself and 
others at other times. I now value the things I value at times other than the present not 
fortuitously but in virtue of my then valuing them. I don't just hold good (relative to 
one time) what I happen to hold good relative to another. Rather things held good by 
me (at tf) is the description under which I hold them good (at tj). Stability2  then 
involves a kind ofpresumption o f wholeheartedness. If at tj I hold X good, I will tend, 
given stability2 , at t2 , to hold good my holding good of X at t%- and thereby to hold X 
itself good at t2 - Stability2 , in effect, institutes a norm of stability].
Given an adequate level of stability2 , it becomes natural for whatever is good in a 
descriptive sense (as with the goodg, good], good2 , goodg and good/] of chapter 7 
above) to be held good in virtue of that fact. Thus it becomes natural for the things 
which are goodQ to be goodg from various temporal or personal perspectives; and for 
the things which are good] from a given temporal or personal perspective to be good] 
from others. We come to value our valuations. I argued above that it is hard to make 
sense of a general lack of wholeheartedness, of stability2 - And in fact it is plausible that
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a fairly high degree of stability2  is in fact prevalent in most of our evaluative thought 
most of the time.
Although we do not, as argued in chapter 7, inevitably distantly hold good what 
we find good (or bad what we find bad) and hence the failure of the Nagel/Goldstein 
claim about the intrinsic value (or disvalue) of these things fails, it should nonetheless 
be clear that given such prevalence of wholeheartedness, this claim will be true, neither 
necessarily nor totally, but for the most part. What is goodQ, good], good2 , good] or 
good/] will tend, for those reasons, to be held good.
This will help C. I. Lewis towards meeting the difficulties I made for him above. 
For given such stability, we will indeed expect terms such as "immediately valuable" or 
"conducing to satisfaction in some possible experience" or "likely to be found good" to 
acquire evaluative charge in the way described in chapter 8. Given stability2  we will 
tend to value things with just such properties and for those whose thought is so 
characterized a theory like that of Lewis is that much the more plausible as an account 
of what is in fact of value to them.
9.4. We need stability in large part because of that source-transcendence of our pro­
attitudes noted above. This was just how the simple creature differed fi-om the 
inconstantly ambitious Bobby and from Chesterton's lover of the blues. The problem 
with the latter was that their desires, taken over time, had inconsistent satisfaction 
conditions. This was no problem for the simple creature and could not be. But note 
how impossibly simple he was. He had desires about what to do now, but they failed to 
fit a wider pattern of other pro-attitudes, an omission which leaves the simple 
creature's "desires" with rather a Pickwickian look about them.^ ®
10 See chapter 6 above.
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The sorts of attitudes to which such source-transcendency in particular applies are 
distance attitudes. Now these are something of an embarrassment to a theory like 
Lewis's for they are not immediate findings of value in experience. Nor are they 
predictions of such value or imputations of a tendency to conduce to such value. They 
are rather, as explained, valuations at a distance. A theorist who wants to make finding 
good come out as fundamental in much the way it does for Lewis and in which, on my 
account, finding beautiful does, will want to insist that distant holdings of goodness 
are somehow answerable, or secondary, to findings of goodness- that the latter are 
fundamental.
The problem with this insistence will be the possibility noted of having distance 
pro-attitudes that are not concerned in the slightest to accommodate themselves to the 
attitudes of other persons and times. I may want to be in intense pain tomorrow. I may 
want you to be in intense pain. I may want the back of Fred's head to touch his heels 
quite regardless of how much this will hurt him. Cases like the latter shade into those 
of attitudes that are not in any way even about anybody's experience, not even 
indirectly about experience as when we hold things good^!. Thus in the best known 
example I might desire the presence of parsley on the moon. All such distance pro­
attitudes as these that are not responsive to whether their objects are goodQ, good], 
good2  or, from a different perspective, good] or goodz], I will call, following Parfit's 
characterization of the last example, whimsical^  ^pro-attitudes..
Appeal might be made to a norm of wholeheartedness to motivate bringing 
distance attitudes into conformity with now-for-now attitudes. But, as was noted 
above, in discussing the view of Bond, the direction o f accommodation might equally 
be the opposite to this, for all that has so far been said to the contrary.
Parfit, 1985. pl23. The example is taken from Nagel, 1970. p45. Cf. Hare, 1963. 
p32.
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Lewis wants, in effect, to say about goodness, what I have already said about 
beauty- that any sense we make of the idea of thinking something good is parasitical on 
the sense we make o f finding it good, that "good" means either found good or likely to 
be found good or such as to be found good or conducive to such findings- that is to 
say that the possible descriptive meaning for "good" is exhausted by goodQ, good] and 
good% and that goodQ is hence central- for it is in terms of goodQ that good] and 
good2  are defined. I argued in chapter 8 that such descriptive naturalism can never 
take us from these to goodQ!, good] ! and good2 i. That still leaves the possibility o f 
seeing the immediately found good as central in a way that respects the expressivist 
tendency of that and the following chapter. But any such claimed centrality is under 
threat from good].
There would be no threat if  we always held something good] ! just in virtue of 
thinking it goodQ, good] or good2 and plausibly many o f our distance attitudes are 
like this. I want to go windsurfing because I think 111 enjoy it and I want future 
pleasure, i.e. I think it goodQ. I want there to be more wind-surfing boards because I 
think it is fun and I want there to be plenty o f fun around, i.e. I think wind-surfing is 
good] and the boards are good2- But not all distance attitudes are like this. Some o f 
them, as we have seen, are whimsical.
Like Parfit, we need to begin by recognizing that we'd better not be too hard on 
whims if we're to be at all convincing. As such, they are neither wicked nor irrational. 
Some of them may even have a certain aesthetic charm, such as Parfit finds in the lunar 
parsley whim. But surely whims must be exceptional. One could hardly be interested in 
everything hut the character of one's own and others' experience, simply because, as 
we saw in chapter 6, we wouldn't know how to make sense of "interest" here. Once 
again, what is harmless enough at a local level, is nonsense at a global level.
What would be a plausible claim however is that distance attitudes are, on the 
whole, less fundamental, in some sense, than now-for-now, me-for-me attitudes. So
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that while free-floating, whimsical distance pro-attitudes are possible and not, in 
moderation, objectionable, they are an exception, not the rule. And hence that findings 
of goodness or badness are more fiindamental than distance attitudes in a way that 
makes most distance attitudes properly responsive to our beliefs about such findings.
So that it might be argued, as a substantive ethical position, that findings of value are 
something to which distance attitudes should defer. That the normal, though not 
invariable, direction of accommodation should be such as to demand the modification 
to distance attitudes to conformity with immediate ones- figure 3 of chapter 7 rather 
than figure 4.
This position involves a weak form of hedonism. Weak because it is first supposed 
only to hold/o;‘ the most par t and is not taken to exhaust, or to begin to exhaust the 
content of ethics or morals. Weak hedonism recognizes found goodness as a value and 
a central one but leaves space for those qualitative and distributive considerations that 
embarass monistic hedonism. Moreover we can and do have whimsical desires, but a 
certain priority on the part of the now-for-now and me-for-me renders these somehow 
odd and motivates a claim that there is a certain perversity in desires and other distance 
pro-attitudes being, if not quite, as a matter of their content, conditional upon what is 
found good, nonetheless properly responsible to the latter and not the other way 
round.
Let's first note a strong intuitive plausibility that attaches to this weakly hedonistic 
claim. This can be brought out in various ways. The thing that seems to have 
impressed many writers is the point made by E. J. Bond:
hedonic value, and seemingly only hedonic value, is experienced as 
valuable, so that no question of its value can be raised... We can find out
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if a thing is pleasant (or unpleasant or neutral) by sampling it. But this 
seems to be true of no other kind of value.
We may further note how desires and values that are wholly whimsical, in the sense 
of being not just unrelated to what is found good in experience but not related to 
experience at all would indeed seem somewhat perverse. The desire that the number of 
mountains above a certain height on some dead and distant planet be an odd number 
would be, to put it mildly, an odd desire. And there is a similar feeling of perversity to 
whims whose remoteness from experience is perhaps less extreme (examples were 
given above).
Some explanation of the point stressed by Broad is forthcoming when we note that 
my present experiences are things to which I cannot very intelligibly be imagined 
wholly indifferent, and differ in this respect from my experiences at other times. Of 
course I might have a neutral attitude to my present experience but that is not at all the 
same as not caring what it is. Such indifference to the past or future, on the other hand, 
does seem possible. The simple creature I described above was an extreme case, 
globally so indifferent. Odd though the simple creature is, odder still might be a 
creature interested only in its own, or, worse, somethings else's, state at other times. 
The sheer centrifugality of such a pattern of concern is apt to strike us as crazy.
What my pro-attitudes are is something I have some but not total freedom to 
determine for myself. There is in fact considerable ineluctability, considerable 
recalcitrance about many of my attitudes and this is particularly true of immediate 
findings of good and bad. This time I'm going to enjoy the pain, is not a resolution that 
usually has much chance of success, though if painp is intended it is not a senseless 
one. What we value is constrained by our natures, our upbringings, the kinds of
12 Bond, 1983. pl20.
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creatures we are. This recalcitrance recalls that of sense-perception. When an explorer 
moves through a virgin landscape it is not up to him what he sees there. And it is not 
altogether up to him what he thinks of what he sees there. We should remember this 
recalcitrance in what follows. Like it or not, I tend to bring my pro-attitudes into 
harmony in the way shown in figure 3 rather than figure 4 of chapter 7 above. I am 
going to be offering philosophical considerations to try to make sense of this fact. But 
remember firstly that it is a fact. I cannot, in fact, control my now-for-now, me-for-me 
attitudes to the point necessary to force them into conformity with my distance 
attitudes even if some philosophical considerations urged that I should. The first 
reason, then, for the centrality of the now-for-now is just the wholly contingent one 
that that is the sort of creature I am. And, I presume to suppose, you also. It might be 
disputed that considerations like these don’t amount to much as moral arguments. But 
in chapter 10,1 will be arguing that this is a mistake.
9.5. There are other reasons. Given stability2 , the presumption of wholeheartedness, 
we tend to think the things we dislike pro tanto bad, the things we wholeheartedly 
dislike bad simpliciter, the things we like pro tanto good, the things we wholeheartedly 
like good simpliciter. Because we value these things in these ways, we similarly value 
the types of things that we associate with such immediate likings: the types of 
experience we like; the types of things that are typically secondary objects of liked 
experiences; the types of things that are typically causally implicated in such likings.
We value these types of things because of their connection, causal, constitutive or 
whatever, with immediate findings of value. In such findings we value (primarily) not 
types of things but tokens- token experiences.^  ^The valuing of types is what emerges
6.3 above.
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from such token-valuings, given a degree of stability. And it is in virtue q/"these 
connections with valued token experiences that such types are valued.
The valuing of token experiences is fundamental in the above account. Of course, 
given stability of response, such experiences are typically valued under descriptions 
which subsume them under some type. But what is so valued and described is 
nonetheless a token experience, and the type is a valued one just in virtue q/'its 
(stability-established) connection with just such valued token experiences.
Desires, when their objects are experiences or actions are always for types, never 
for tokens of these. Desires that fit the hedonistic scheme just presented will be for 
such things valued in virtue q^ their connection, of whatever kind, with valued token- 
experiences. Thus I may value ice-cream in virtue q/’its connection with token findings 
of gastronomic goodness and so on.
Whimsical desires are not like this. In whimsically desiring something, that all the 
boys in the class die their hair green, say, I desire some type-occurrence in virtue 
q/!..what? In virtue, presumably, of nothing in particular. I just do. Of course my desire 
might be in virtue of something. I might have a whole lot of whimsical desires 
systematically interrelated. But, the present form of hedonism urges, the whole system 
retains an arbitrary, as it were mechanical, feel in virtue of just this radical 
disconnection from immediate valuations.
9.6. This intuitive plausibility of imputing centrality to me-for-me, now-for-now 
attitudes is particularly clear in the interpersonal case, where what is involved is just 
our intuitive valuing of autonomy, that make me-for-me attitudes pro tanto over-riding 
with respect to distance attitudes. Thus Harsanyi writes:
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the interests of each individual must be determined in terms of his own 
personal preferences and not in terms of what someone else thinks is 
good for him/"*
Appealing to the commonly exploited analogy between the interpersonal and intra­
personal levels of organization of our desires and values we might urge a similar 
priority to what somebody at a given time thinks is then good for him over what he, at 
some other time, thinks good for him at the former time/®
Consider two imaginary people whom we will call M. Herzog and Herr Buhl. The 
governing ambition of Herzog's life is that Bühl should reach the summit of Nanga 
Parbat. The governing ambition of Buhl's life is for Herzog to reach the summit of 
Annapurna. Their wants thus rather resemble those of their historical namesakes but 
are rather more "altruistically" distributed. But there is something unsatisfying about 
this altruism quite apart from the fact that, when their wants are "external" in this way, 
they are far less likely ever to be satisfied. In fact we're supposing it a rather funny sort 
of altruism. Herzog doesn't want to see Bühl on Nanga Parbat because Bühl wants this 
for himself he likes the man. He wants this without reference to Bühl's wants. In 
other words, the want is whimsical just as much as a want to get BiihVs rucksack, say, 
up Nanga Parbat. And the same we may suppose applies to Bühl's desire to get Herzog 
up Annapurna.
It might seem obvious what these two men should do. They should make a pact, 
each climbing their respective mountain. Then, presumably, they will both be happy. 
Only we may presume no such thing. For such a presumption restores the centrality of 
the immediately valuable which I am trying to exclude from the case in question. A
*"* Harsanyi, 1977. p51. Cf Dworkin, 1977. p234.
*® Compare Hare's "autofanaticism" in his 1981. p i05.
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certain amount of sense is restored is we suppose that each of them will enjoy having 
his desires satisfied and that they aim for this enjoyment. But to desire something 
whimsically is not to desire it qua source of satisfaction but rather to desire it whether 
or not its realization brings any such satisfaction. When this is underscored the 
dramatization of the oddity of such desires is complete. It makes little sense to identify 
anyone's interests with the satisfaction of such desires unless they are merely whims, of 
marginal status in their total economy of attitudes. In the case of someone for whom 
such desires were the norm, any talk of their having interests at all would start to look 
increasingly strained.*®
9.7. Not all pleasure is as immediate as enjoyment as characterized in chapter 6 .1 may 
be pleased that something is the case that is quite distant from my immediate 
experience. Plausibly such pleasure may be described as differing from desire in having 
2ifait accompli for it's object but differing from ordinary enjoyment in being a distance 
attitude. I can be pleased at your success in climbing Everest or regret my own failure, 
years ago, to get up Arthur's Seat.
Pleasure generally, like enjoyment in particular, is an obviously normative concept 
well in advance of any theorizing we do about it. That you will be pleased if I do 
something can give me a reason to do it. That I will regret an action is a reason to 
avoid it. Typically then (and generalizing slightly), we hold good what is good] and 
hold bad what is bad]. Some stability of response- stability2 is presupposed in this but 
without this much stability2  it's difficult to see what sense attaches to regarding 
distance attitudes as evaluative at all- hard, in effect, to make sense of them, period.
Given such stability, the gap between enjoyment and more distanced forms of 
pleasure narrows. For it will now be the case that we enjoy being pleased by things:
Cf. Williams' "Persons, Character and Morality" in his 1981.
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that the state of mind I am put in by your success on Everest is a state of mind I like 
being in, that I dislike the way I feel about my failure on Arthur's Seat. Varying the 
example, Conrad's Lord Jim is a novel about a man's life being shaped wholly by his 
overwhelming regret and remorse on account of a single youthful and cowardly action.
Now this regret of Jim's presumably looks like this:
figure 5
and not merely like this:
figure 6
That is to say not only does he hold bad something about his past but he is made 
miserable by so holding it. For surely the whole point of Jim's regret is the pain it 
occasioned him. And this it surely does as a constitutive matter, in virtue simply of 
being regret. Regret isn't something we can feel and at the same time be (now-for- 
now) indifferent to feeling it.
Similar considerations attach to desire. Suppose none of my desires is ever satisfied 
and this causes me no distress, even though I am around to experience their shipwreck. 
These desires, we would incline to say, just fail to matter in the usual way. I noted in 
chapter 6 how the concept of desire draws its life-blood from its involvement with
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more immediate hedonic valuations and here need only repeat the point. Desire, 
supposed no longer bound up with the found values and disvalues of satisfaction and 
frustration- the pleasure typical of the former, the discomfort typical of the latter- fades 
to a bare disposition such as might be enjoyed by, say, a compass needle. It ceases, that 
is, save in a Pickwickian sense, to be desire at all.
These points may be amplified in relation to some remarks of Bernard Williams 
discussing the utilitarian "project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes". 
These outcomes
do not just consist of agents carrying out that project; there must be 
other more basic or lower-order projects which he and other agents 
have, and the desirable outcomes are going to consist, in part, of the 
maximally harmonious realization of these projects...Unless there were 
first-order projects the general utilitarian projects would have nothing 
to work on, would be vacuous.*^
What I am suggesting here is that there is a sense in which my concern now for my 
own present well-being is the most basic, lowest order of projects. For without such 
now-for-now, me-for-me pro-attitudes, our non-whimsical distance attitudes would 
likewise have nothing to work on, would enjoy a similar vacuity. It make sense for me 
to care about your well-being and not that of a piece of rock because care about 
your ow>n well-being. And this is not, surely, altogether a separate point firom the one 
we make in saying that there is such a thing as your, as opposed to the rock's, well­
being. And the same applied, mutatis mutandis, to my concern for distant temporal 
parts of myself. This is not, I hope it is obvious, any kind of argument either for egoism
Smart and Williams, 1973. pi 10.
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or for imprudence. It is rather the point that it is only in virtue of our having some 
degree of self-interest that altruism makes much sense.
9.8. On the basis of description, I could respond to the fictitious actions of Dorian 
Gray, holding them bad. Of the beauty of his picture I could, on the basis of 
description, have no idea. But if I was right in chapter 5 to suggest that the contrast 
between beauty and goodness was not as great as might at first have appeared, why 
this difference? Well, there are two aspects of the concept of goodness as so far 
delineated that break the analogy between it and pleasure and both might be checked 
out for explanatory value here. The first is good^- instrumental good. Dorian's acts are 
bad because they are connected to the suffering of persons and the thwarting of their 
happiness, things which, as participants in lives and communities characterized by a 
degree of stability2 , both as a fact and as a norm, we hold to be bad. But, and this 
secondly, we have also noted that we distantly hold things good- those things that are 
thereby good]- without being in experiential contact with them. Of course thinking 
things good2 l was itself a case of thus thinking them good]!, only here we were 
thinking them good] ! in virtue o f their involvement with the immediate interests of 
persons. This is not, however, the only way to think something good] !-1 can distantly 
hold something- the actions of a character in a book, say, bad in ways that simply fail 
to make reference to the upshot as regards the ways in winch men and women respond 
with pain or pleasure to the lives they lead as they are leading them. Logically I am 
quite at liberty to think like this at least some of the time, but, given the role of stability 
(including stability2) in sustaining the significance of the very idea of wanting things, 
not all the time. And given the value we in fact place on stability (and in particular 
stability2), we are justified in viewing such whimsicality of thought about value as 
being- outside such peripheral and contained concerns as amusing oneself with 
fantasies about lunar vegetation- a mark of insanity.
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9.9. The expressivist and internalist metaethics I have defended might seem to favour 
an understanding of value that focuses upon the actual subjective evaluative concerns 
of particular agents, a focus that may well lead to a voluntaristic kind of view most 
characteristically perhaps espoused by writers of existentialist sympathies who are 
inclined to recognize no source of evaluative authority that transcends the particular 
evaluative views decided upon by individual people. The problem with such a position 
is that it can easily seem arbitrary and implausible, leaving us struggling to explain the 
felt defeasibility that seems so basic a feature of the phenomenology of our values and 
thus unable to make sense of the claim that the wholeheartedly depraved are wrong 
and wrong moreover in a less anaemic sense than is involved in their being merely the 
objects of my disapproval.
There are, given such an understanding, only the particular evaluations of 
particular people, this man's fanatical devotion to some political cause, that woman's 
disapproval of terrorists. Such evaluations, it might be supposed, are not beliefs but 
attitudes, world-word in direction of fit and hence, at least in principle, not 
responsible to any feature of how the world is, not so defeasible.
In principle perhaps, but, in practice, one's evaluations are constrained by norms 
and in particular by norms of stability. Given this, the defeasibility of evaluation, 
together with other features plausibly related to objectivity, falls into place. Substantial 
features of the norms that govern evaluation offer a route out of the solipsism of 
indefeasible personal commitment towards less undisciplined forms of evaluative 
thought. But we are constrained to follow such a route not by the metaphysical facts 
about the kinds of things values are but, if at all, by the kinds of values that we have.
An enriched understanding of value, one plausibly favoured by the preceding 
argument, might focus on the subjective concerns of moral subjects (plausibly rather 
more numerous than moral agents) broadly conceived to include all pro-attitudes.
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simple desires and aversions as well as values more narrowly conceived. This may 
plausibly lead to a roughly utilitarian sort of view, best typified perhaps by Hare. My 
preceding argument places me in some alignment with such views given my claim that 
what is fotmd good in the immediate experience of individuals is central to our 
imputations of goodness and hence that the sort of consideration dubbed weakly 
hedonist above had better be a central ingredient in our conception of what, 
substantively, is good. Stability of response and attitude are not rationally obligatory 
but, given that our attitudes are not almost unimaginably narrow in their objects, it 
starts to look pragmatically desirable to have a fair amount of it. When we do have a 
fair amount of it, I will at a given time be inclined, at least pro tanto, to value things 
because they are valued, and, in particular, immediately valued or just liked, at that or 
other times, by myself or other people. Such an inclination motivates the favoured 
weak form of hedonism. Against a background of stability of response and attitude, 
then, and recognizing the primacy of immediate findings of value in experience, there 
will be some pressure to recognize some such utilitarian considerations. I have, 
however, stressed that such stability, though we might take it as in part constitutive of 
rationality in some relatively rich and substantive sense of that term, is hardly rationally 
necessitated in any more formal and logical sense.
Where does this leave objectivity? Let us consider another fictitious community 
which we will call "Utilitas". In Utilitas there is a great deal of stability of response and 
attitude, both stability] and stability2 , resulting in the universal acceptance of a 
utilitarian set of values. In this society then, evaluative language will enjoy the second 
(convergence) of Wiggins' marks of truth (1.3 above), subject to qualifications about 
the explanation of that convergence given at 8.8 above. It will also enjoy all four of 
Wiggins' other marks together with (insofar as these differ) all five of Dummett's 
characterizations of quasi-assertions (1.4). Utilitans, unlike the Atlantans of chapter 8, 
will indeed plausibly tend to favour moral realism insofar as all their moral concepts are
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likely to be "thick" ones- even with "good" the descriptive meaning will be, in Hare's 
language, "entrenched". Utilitan moral anti-realists would be forced to invent their own 
"thin" moral concepts.
But this is not yet a victory for the Utilitan moral realist. Firstly and obviously, in 
Utilitas, platonism is false. The statements in which the Utilitans*® express their 
attitudes and responses may indeed be true but their truth is not independent of the fact 
that the Utilitans happen to have the attitudes and responses that they do.
Secondly and thirdly, both externalism and descriptivism about the evaluative 
language of Utilitas are false. For a Utilitan characterizing something as "good" not 
only characterizes it as having certain natural characteristics which Utilitans agree in 
valuing but expresses his or her own commitment to those same values. What is said 
has a more than merely sociological content and also expresses something of the 
speaker's own pro-attitude to the object of evaluation- good would remain a "Janus- 
word" in just the same way as the Atlantan for "liar" was seen to be. What masks this 
is just the very consensual and non-pluralistic character of Utilitan values. Because the 
internal and external senses of their value-concepts so consistently coincide the 
distinction is so much the less apt even to be noticed.
Nor, and this thirdly, should this coincidence invite scientific realism about values 
since, for reasons given in 8.8 above, such realism is idle.
If the Utilitans did notice this distinction and took to analysing out the evaluative 
and descriptive ingredients of their evaluative utterances they might, like the Atlantans 
of chapter 8, opt to express the latter in some, wholly non-indicative "boo-hurrah" 
construction. Or they might not, preferring an indicative form. Nothing of significant 
philosophical importance can plausibly be supposed to hang on which they do. The 
latter indicative construction will invite perhaps a minimal realist interpretation but I
It would be less ugly to call them "Utilitarians" but this would invite confiision.
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argued above that this was compatible with expessivism. But it will not invite a 
descriptivist one.
This sort of utilitarian view may well seem an advance on a simple voluntarism.
For although in chapter 4 I began to show how evaluations might be distinguished 
from simpler sorts of desires, likings and other pro-attitudes, I nonetheless was 
concerned there and in chapter 3 to render plausible the view that values are 
nonetheless broadly of a kind with other pro-attitudes. So that stability of response and 
attitude will involve our values and our other pro-attitudes conforming to some extent. 
And thus from the point of view of such stability, something will be horribly wrong if, 
in general, getting what one likes and liking what one gets are things one has a 
principled objection to. To have a set of values that simply failed to recognize the 
claims of ordinary human desire and pleasure would be eminently disastrous. That is 
plausibly why of all the alternative types of monolithic ethical theory, theories that wish 
to reduce worthwhile human good to a single qualitative dimension, it is really only the 
broadly utilitarian variety (be it hedonistic or preference-based) that even begins to 
look plausible. Other monolithic theories must simply take on an appearance of ugly 
fanaticism given their commitment to licence the unlimited sacrifice of human (or, 
more broadly, sentient) interests on the altar of whatever it is that is taken as 
axiologically prior to them. Of course a simple and monolithic utilitarianism itself 
allows any human interest to be overridden by others of greater magnitude, a fact 
which leads to all kinds of unpalatable consequences. But though I in fact take this to 
be a serious objection to at least a simple utilitarianism, it is, surely, at least less 
obviously defeated by it than are rival forms of axiological monism.
The defeat of such monistic utilitarianism is less obvious but it is also, I think, real. 
Found goodness must a central ingredient in our conception of the good but it need 
not be the only ingredient and indeed it is plausible that there had also better be such 
other ingredients given the difficulties that plague simple monistic forms of hedonism
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over cases of experience machines, malicious or otherwise debased forms of pleasure, 
pleasure occasioned by false beliefs and so forth. The hedonism defended is advisedly 
weak, in the sense explained above.
A third understanding of value that has been influential is of the conventionalist 
kind I shall consider in the following chapter. This stresses the constitutive role in our 
evaluative thought of what is given by our society, our language, our traditions. 
Holders of such a view tend to look away from the particular concerns of individuals 
to more collective bases for our evaluations. They look to the conventions and norms 
that actually operate in our society and to the traditions by which these are fed. This 
seems richer in many ways than a voluntaristic view according to which what I should 
understand to be good is just what I care about and value, a view somewhat at odds 
with what is widely taught:
He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool; but whoso walketh wisely, he 
shall be delivered.
However, for a simple externalist kind of conventionalism according to which 
what I should understand to be good is what convention determines so to be, there is a 
problem when I myself am not participant in the evaluative outlooks embodied in my 
culture, when I am alienated fi'om the values of my social milieu. It is not plausibly 
meaningless to suppose a whole society, or all but a few members of it, to have gone 
morally awry. The challenge for conventionalism, as was seen in chapter 3 above, is to 
avoid the sort of extemalism that leaves the values in question without any of their
Proverbs, XXVIII, 26. It depends, of course, just who your teacher is. What for 
some is the supreme authority of the individual conscience is for others "The Law of 
the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit" (Hegel, 19771
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needed leverage on the motivation of particular agents who may or may not share 
them. And just as the denial that there is any source of authority or appeal above and 
beyond the values of a given individual can seem to conflict with the felt defeasibility 
of one's personal values, we may also want to recognize that whole cultures and 
societies can go badly wrong in what they, collectively, value. I will address this 
problem in the following, final chapter.
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Chapter 10: Conventionalism. Confucianism and Contingency
10.1. A simple conventionalism and a simple hedonism both face problems, mutual 
confrontation with which occupies much of the time of their respective defenders. We 
need not choose between these problems. Any dichotomy between these over-simple 
views would be false. Social norms and personal concerns offer often competing 
sources of value. Each in practice has a certain poverty judged by the standards of the 
other, a poverty that makes either alone an unwelcome theoretical option. Value 
understood purely externally is dead when we merely know its content without 
additional emotional commitment:
The Master said, "Those who know it are not as those who love it nor
those who love it as those who delight in it."^
On the other hand the sort of solipsistic moral individualism that accords no authority 
to the value judgements of those who make up one's moral environment represents a 
failure of stability of the sort that, as suggested above, though not strictly irrational in 
principle, is nonetheless highly problematic for the sorts of creatures we actually are- 
socially and personally integrated creatures apt to value that very integration. Given 
that we are such creatures, the problem of authority in matters of value, is rendered far 
more tractable. But before this can be seen clearly, we should address the way in which 
a place for convention and tradition is needed to enrich the weak hedonism already 
argued for.
 ^Analects, VI, 20. All translations from this work in the present chapter are my own. 
Compare Aristotle's account of akrasia at Nicomachean Ethics, VII.
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We want to enrich the picture of the sources of evaluative argument given by 
focusing too exclusively on the voluntaristic and hedonistic such sources described 
above, insisting on the role to be played in this respect by both human interests and 
inherited values. We are saying, in effect, that arguments from broadly utilitarian 
considerations need to be supplemented by what is too readily derided as the 
"argument from received opinion" if we are to do justice to the way in which our moral 
thinking does and should work. Why so?
10.2. It is best to begin with the failings of a strong, monistic hedonism or 
utilitarianism. Of the two most powerfiil objections to this, one, it's failure to 
differentiate between distributions of pleasure or utility, does not presently concern 
me. The second, that does, is its failure to make adequate sense of the way we 
differentiate pleasures and preferences qualitatively} To see this consider the sort of 
person we might describe as contemptible"- and as I shall use it this shall be 
something of a term of art. Such are for example the denizens of the "Brave New 
World" described in Huxley's novel of that name. From a strictly utilitarian perspective 
such happiness is all very well. So long as these people are indeedhspyy then there is 
nothing to worry about. It might however seem an inhuman and contemptible thing 
where "contemptible" contrasts with "enviable" and "pitiful" in the following ways.
I will normally think of someone as pitiful if, by their own lights, their life goes 
badly, enviable if it goes well. But these reactions may sometimes fail me, notably if 
their lights and my own are too far apart. Thus consider Teddy who is a gangster, 
motivated by a love of wealth and of the status it brings, anxious above all to be an 
object of fear and envy to those around him (note that being envied, a vicious
 ^The most compelling statements of this objection are those of Charles Taylor. See 
"What is Human Agency" in his 1985 and 1989.
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ambition, differs from being enviable, a natural one). By such lights as he has Teddy 
may fare very well but, given what these lights are, we will not congratulate him or 
aspire to a life at all like his. Someone whose lights are thus deficient we might call 
contemptible.
Ignoring the few dissenters Huxley threw in to provide a plot, the people o ïBrave 
New World appear contemptible as a class. The whole culture, although all very well 
on utilitarian grounds, is a contemptible one. Of course what is contemptible is 
contemptible to someone. There is no "objective", culture-independent standpoint from 
which the denizens of Broshe New World are contemptible. They are so merely to us, 
lying within that jurisdiction of our values that is vrider that their source.^
It is not because my (our) values are "better" in some such objective sense that I 
can find these people contemptible but rather it is a matter of their generality and their 
wholeheartedness which together give them that rigidity that has been stressed by 
various writers following Humberstone and Davies.'  ^This is a fiirther dimension to 
what may be said to distinguish moral and other strongly evaluative attitudes from 
mere attitudes of taste.
A second example may be helpful. Consider two instructive, if rather improbable 
people, Paul and Saul. Both of them have a certain instability of response and attitude. 
Paul, like myself, hates liquorice. Except that is on Tuesdays. On Tuesdays, as it 
happens, he loves the stuff. This isn't really a problem for him. What he does is avoid 
eating liquorice from Wednesdays to Mondays while eating it on Tuesdays. On 
Mondays he cheerfiilly, anticipating his habitual change of taste, places his order with
 ^See 9.1 above.
 ^See Davies and Humberstone, 1980: Smith, 1987. pp303-4; Wiggins, 1987. pp205- 
206.
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the confectioner. On Wednesday's he feels no regret at the indulgence of the previous 
day.
Saul, on the other hand, is constancy itself where liquorice is concerned. He has a 
different problem. Saul is married and loves his wife. His marriage is a basic and 
indispensable ingredient in what he takes to be of value in his life. In Williams' 
language, it is one of Ms "ground projects".^ The values it engages are flindamental to 
the way he feels both about Ms life and about Mmself. All this makes a big difference, 
obviously, to how he lives. Certain tMngs are demanded, others ruled out: adultery for 
example. Except on Tuesdays. On Tuesdays Saul has no trace of a qualm on tMs 
particular score and is disposed happily to avail himself of any adulterous opportunity 
that comes Ms way.
Like Paul, Saul is subject to some instability. But the difference is vast. TMs 
MgMights again the silliness of Friedman's conflation of t astes and values  ^and will 
point up another dimension in wMch the latter are distinguished from the former. For 
clearly, unlike Paul, Saul, to put it mildly, does have a problem. On Tuesdays he is 
disposed to do tMngs wMch on Wednesdays to Mondays he will be intensely unhappy 
about having done. He doesn't just, on a Wednesday, say, dislike what, on a Tuesday, 
he liked. He dislikes himself fox having done it.
My dislike of liquorice, lacking any great wholeheartedness, is entirely conditional 
on its own continuance. If I learnt that I would wake up tomorrow loving the stuff, I 
would feel entirely untroubled. My dislike of Teddy's values is otherwise. To be told 
that I could expect to lead the sort of life Teddy would be disposed to admire would 
depress me and to be told in addition that I would come to value tMs myself would 
make matters worse, not better. Similarly, it is worse for Saul on Wednesday if, on
 ^See Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality" in Ms 1981. 
 ^See 4.3 above.
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Tuesday, he enjoys his adultery. If we are utilitarians, then what is important to us is 
the realizing of our values, whatever that may amount to. But in fact what is important 
is realizing of our values, of our values, if only because (again following Charles 
Taylori) such values are constitutive of just what we value most in our conception 
precisely of ourselves.
The source-transcendent jurisdiction of our values includes our own later selves 
and our descendants. In holding a set of ethical attitudes of appropriate generality we 
adopt a position regarding the proper content of the ethical attitudes of these others.
Of course this position has no validity independent of the contingency of our 
happening to adopt it. But the question is whether there is really anything for such 
independent validity to he and, in chapter 3 ,1 suggested that the answer to this was 
"No". But once the contingency is realized, the dependency is harmless. Understanding 
the contingency of the moral order need not undermine it. What it will do is underline 
our sense of its fragility in a way that serves to dramatize the urgency of the task of 
sustaining and transmitting it by educational means. This urgency of course does not 
itself transcend the values we happen to have. But then what does?
10.3. A similar sense of the contingency of value and linkage to a stress on education is 
found in Aristotle:
So the place for us to start is with what is familiar to us. Therefore for 
the proper hearing about noble and just things and about anything 
concerned with politics, our habits must have been educated in nobility.
For the starting point is what is given and if this is clear enough there is 
no further need for any justification, a person so raised either having
See his 1989. especially chapter 4.
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acquired or being able easily to acquire the starting point. He who can 
do neither should hear the words of Hesiod:
He who knows all things for himself: he is best.
Good too the attentive and compliant student.
But he, ignorant in his own right, who will not 
Hear or weigh counsel, is wholly without worth.®
A comparable, but less familiar stress on the importance of the education of the 
emotions for the sustaining of morality is found in what survives of the thought of 
Confucius. Indeed this somewhat neglected (in the west) philosopher has much to say 
that speaks with great relevance to those aspects of the communitarian strand in 
contemporary moral philosophy that I am here in sympathy with- no less so, I believe, 
than such more familiar points of reference as Aristotle or Hegel. And it is, I think, 
illuminating to understand the main problems for conventionalism and how what is 
right about it, properly understood, avoids them, in terms of the form of 
conventionalism espoused by Confucius.
Basic to moral education, for Confucius, is the role of //, a word usually rendered 
"ritual" or "ceremony". The principle materials of moral education were conceived to 
be twofold. The first was music, including such poetry as was canonically represented 
in the Shih Ching or Book o f Songs. And the second was //.
The Songs uplift us, li establish us, music perfects us.®
® Nicomachean Ethics 1,4, 1095b3-13. My translation.
® Analects, VIII, 8. Cf. Ill, 20; XVII, 9 and XVII, 10 on the importance of the Shih 
Ching. Cf. also XIV, 12; XVI, 5.
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Po-yü, Confiicius' son, is reported as giving the following account of his father:
Once, when he was standing alone, as I was hurrying past the hall, he 
said, "Have you studied the SongsT' "No," I replied.
"If you do not study the Songs, you will have no competence with 
words." I withdrew and studies the Songs.
Another day, when he was again standing alone, as I was hurrying 
past the hall, he said, "Have you studied the rites [/z]?" "No," I replied.
"If you do not study the rites, you will be unable to take a stand." I 
withdrew and studied the rites.
10.4. This preoccupation with li was a central theme in the attacks on Confucianism 
mounted by its main rivals. So in the Tao Te CMng we read that:
when the way was lost there was virtue; when virtue was lost there was 
benevolence; when benevolence was lost there was rectitude; when 
rectitude was lost there were the rites.
The rites are the wearing thin of loyalty and good faith 
And the beginning of disorder."
And in the Mo Tzu:
XVI, 13. Cf. XVII, 9; XVII, 10. 
" XXXVIII, 83-4. Tr. Lau.
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The upholders today of elaborate fiinerals and prolonged mourning 
pronounce: If these are not the Way of the Sage Kings, how to explain 
why the gentlemen of the central states perform them without fail, cling 
to them instead of doing away with them? Master Mo Tzu says: this is 
what one calls getting used to the familiar and taking the customary for 
the right. Formerly, east of Yüeh there was the country of Shai-shu; at 
the birth of the first son they dismembered and ate him calling it an 
obligation to his younger brothers. When a grandfather died they 
carried away the grandmother and abandoned her, saying 'Tt is 
impermissible to live with the wife of a ghost". This was recognized 
policy above and recognized custom below, clung to instead of done 
away with, but is it really the way of the benevolent and the right?^^
These two problems for Confiicianism are also basic problems for conventionalism 
more generally. The first, which we might call the Sourdmtproblen}^, raises the threat 
of the fossilization of social conventions ofi:en remote fi’om more living human 
concerns. The second, the relativism problem, is that a conventionalist understanding 
of value will legitimate anything, just so long as it is sanctioned by convention and 
leaves our actual values with what seems an alarming feel of contingency. i
10.5. The first thing needful here is stressing that, although li, in Confucius, is as close 
to "rites" as to any other English word, it is scarcely to be associated with the notion of 
empty ritual.
Chapter 25. Tr. Graham in his 1989. p40. 
So-called afi:er the librarian in Peake, 1968.
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The Master said, "Should we understand li as merely jade and silk? 
Should we understand music as merely bells and drums?"
As to what more the rites are beyond jade and silk we get a clue at III, 3:
The Master said, "If a man is not jen  ["humane", "benevolent"], what 
has he to do with li or with music."
And we learn more from III, 26 and XIX, 1 :
The Master said, "High office without breadth of spirit; practice of li 
without reverence \ching\, mourning without sorrow [ai]: how can I 
countenance these things?"
Tzu-chang said, "That scholar will be acceptable who, seeing danger, is 
ready to give up his life, seeing the prospect of gain, thinks of what is 
right [z^ ], in sacrifice thinks of reverence [ching] and, in mourning, of 
sorrow [<7z].^ ^
The centrality of jen and the constitutive role therein of properly cultivated 
emotions is here clear. Reverence (ching) is, in Confiicius, the proper emotion of 
people towards their mleri®, of a son to his parents", of a "superior man" (chfm
Analects, XVII, 11. Cf. Ill, 8.
I will be referring to two distinct words that both romanize as "i" and have 
introduced alphabetic superscripts to disambiguate.
Ibid., n, 20.
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to his superiors^ ®, of friend to friend^ ®, basic human relationships in Chinese tradition. It 
is ching that distinguishes the sustenance of parents practised among brute beasts from 
hsiao, the filiality commended by Confiicius.^  ^Ai, "sorrow", on the other hand, is the 
feeling proper to the rituals concerned with mourning and especially with mourning for 
one’s parents.
Tzu-yu said, "Mourning is sufficient when ai is fiilly expressed.
When Tsai Wo, not Confucius favourite disciple, asks if one rather than three years 
mourning is not enough, he is asked if, in such circumstances-
"you would feel comfortable eating your rice and wearing your fine 
clothes?" Perfectly comfortable," he replied. "If you are comfortable, go 
ahead. But the chiin tzu, when in mourning, finds no savour in fine 
foods, no pleasure in music, no comfort in his home. That is why he 
abstains from these things. But if you are comfortable about it, indulge 
yourself.
"  Ibid., H, 7; IV, 18.
This term is desperately hard to translate but signifies for Confiicius the ideal 
character of the virtuous person. Aristotle’s megalopsychos provides a good analogy.
®^ Ibid., V, 16; XV, 38. the centrality of ching Xo public service (shih) appears at I, 5; 
XIII, 19 and XVI, 10.
Ibid., V, 17.
Ibid., II, 7. Cf. II, 8.
Ibid., XIX, 14.
Ibid., XVII, 21.
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Tsai Wo is morally defective in that his emotions are not in accordance with li. He is 
doubly defective in that he fails to recognize that he is. This is what makes him 
unteachable^ "* for it is, for Confucius, the inability to recognize that one is in need of 
teaching that, above all, renders tuition flitile.^ ^
CMng, a feeling of respect in another's presence and ai, one of sorrow at their 
absence, both characterize human emotions as they should be and they constitute the 
feelings proper to the performance of the li by which such relationships and such 
emotions are ordered and which, without such emotions, in virtue of which we are jen, 
are emptied of value.
Li is that body of social convention and ritual that sustains morality, the 
institutionalization of correct behaviour. Another notion at our disposal in modem 
English to which li is close is that of etiquette. We may however be tempted to feel 
that any such assimilation between morality and etiquette as such a comparison would 
suggest could only serve to trivialize the former. Thus when Foot claimed a close 
similarity between the two the project was, as we have seen, a subversive one^\ to 
invite scepticism about the former.
But of course, and this is my main point against the Sourdust problem, what we 
perceive as the pettiness of etiquette is, to some extent, the pettiness of our etiquette 
and what we perceive as its sharp separation from considerations of morality is, to 
some extent, a result of such a divorce prevailing precisely in our owm culture. And, for
See ibid., V, 10.
See ibid., XV, 8. Also H, 17; VHI, 9; VI, 20; IX, 23; IX, 24; XVI, 9; XVII, 3; XVII, 
26.
Cf. ibid.. Ill, 8.
See Foot 1978. plS and 3.8 above.
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Confucius, the separateness in our culture of what we call "morality" from what we 
call "etiquette" would be taken as a sign that things were amiss with us, that our rituals 
had become empty ones divorced from the service of jen. It is a point well made, in 
our own time, by Stuart Hampshire:
The draining of moral significance from ceremonies, rituals, manners 
and observances, which imaginatively express moral attitudes and 
prohibitions, leaves morality incorporated only in a set of propositions 
and computations: thin and uninteresting propositions, when so isolated 
from their base in the observances and manners, which govern ordinary 
relations with people, and which always manifest implicit attitudes and 
opinions/®
Likewise at Analects, I, 12, the disciple Yu Tzu says:
If the realization of harmony is not governed by li, it will be ineffective.
And at VIII, 2 Confucius says:
Respectfulness without li is merely laborious; carefulness without li is 
timidity; courage without li is cantankerousness; frankness without li is 
rudeness.^ ®
^ Hampshire, 1983. p97.
Cf. Analects, XVII, 8; XVII, 23; XVH, 24.
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Such passages as this highlight the richness of Confucius’ conception of the virtues. 
The names of such specific virtues as courage (yiing) relate, for Confucius, to 
dispositions that come to be virtues only when brought to order by such harmonizing 
forces as li, i^ ("fittingness", "rightness"), and hsiieh ("learning"). That these, in turn, 
are only of value insofar as they serve to sustain the virtues, we see from such passages 
as III, 3; III, 8; XIII, 5 and XVII, 11. Zz provide the order and fine-tuning that make 
the virtues possible but conversely it is only when they serve to sustain jen  and ching 
that li are more than "jade and silk".
10.6. Li are the traditional and inherited embodiment of a moral order and Confiicius 
concern with them is the most salient aspect of his deep conservativism, the 
conservativism of a thinker who proudly describes himself as "a transmitter, not an 
innovator" . T o  understand this aspect of Ms thought we might begin by recalling 
David Hall and Roger Ames' relating of Confiicius' notion of z^ - "rightness", 
"fittingness" or, as they render it "sigmfication"- to the imposition of order on the 
self.^  ^They stress at once the cognacity of z^  to the homophomc z -^ "appropriate''^^ 
and the shared normativity involved in both language and etMcs. they argue, is the 
"investment of meaning" in the world accomplished by action in accordance with li and 
it is by such investment that the moral foundations of the social order are sustained and
Ibid., VII, 1. Cf. Vn, 28.
Hall and Ames, 1987. chapter 2.
Ibid., p96. Cf. the Chung Yung, chapter 2:
P  is z^ . The great tiring is to honour men of merit.
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renewed. It is, they go on to suggest, in virtue of such investment that order is imposed 
upon the self, making of "a notion of self-construing identity".
A person, like a word, achieves meaning in the interplay between 
bestowing its own accumulated significance and appropriating meaning 
from its context,
Noticing this, we may, in our turn, seek to relate the notions of and hsin- 
"correct speaking" to the importance of fi'eedom from huo- "doubt", inconstancy", 
"being in two minds". Through hsin we seek that general coherence of our words and 
actions that protects the values these serve to sustain. In the obedience or accordance 
of words is found the key to the successful conduct of public service, ritual and 
political order. Thus the people are enabled to "take their stand"- a blessing it is the 
fimction of ritual to bestow^ ,^ to occupy the roles proper to them, prince, minister, 
father, son; the thoughts of the chiin tzu never straying from the duties proper to his 
office.^  ^In a society characterized by obedience '^', trust {hsittf^ and reciprocity (shiif^, 
the competing good of persons are brought into harmony (ho) by the practice of //:
Ibid., p92. 
'"Ibid.,p95.
See Hall and Ames, pp85ff. Relevant passages in the text are VI, 30; VTTT, 8; XI, 7; 
XVII, 13 (quoted above); XIX, 25. A notable revival of this metaphor is found in 
chapter 2 of Taylor, 1989.
Analects, XIV, 26. Cf. VIII, 14.
Ibid., I, 2; I, 6; I, 11; H, 5; IV, 18; IV, 19; IV, 20; XHI, 6; XHI, 20; XV, 38.
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Yu Tzu said, "In the practice of li the thing that is valuable is 
harmony."''®
The Master said, "The chiin tzu harmonizes without becoming 
standardized."'"
The avoidance of huo- "inconstancy" is that coherence of the person that might be 
taken as analogous to the interpersonal coherence represented by ho, shu, hsin and P.
To love someone and wish for his life, then to hate him and wish for his 
death, so that having wished for his life you go on to wish for his death: 
this is huo}^
From the anger of a single morning to forget one's own life and also 
that of one's parents: is this not huoT^
Ibid., I, 4; I, 5; I, 6; I, 7; I, 8; I, 14; II, 9; II, 13; H, 18; IV, 22; IV, 24; V, 10; V, 26; 
VII, 25; VII, 26; VIII, 16; IX, 25; XI, 3; XI, 7; XI, 20; XIV, 20; XIV, 27; XV, 6; 
XVI, 4; XVII, 6; XIX, 10; XIX, 24.
Ibid., IV, 15; VI, 30; XI, 2; XV, 3; XV, 24.
"®I, 12.
Ibid., Xni, 23.
''"Ibid., XI, 10.
43 Ibid., XI, 21.
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The Master said, "The chiin tzu, applying himself to a wide culture and 
given shape by li can be relied on not to turn against what he has stood 
for/"
Here is urged, in effect, a certain stability such as we might defend, along the lines of
9.8, on purely pragmatic grounds. Thus it was effectively freedom from huo that 
Chesterton urges, for example, in the passage juxtaposed to the above at 9.8. Such 
correct avoidance of huo would be, like so much else, the end product of the proper 
education of the emotion through li.
In the light of this we may approach a sympathetic understanding of what 
Confucius says about hsiao- "filiality". Here we deal with an aspect of his thought that 
is apt to alienate modems. It is also again an aspect that was strongly repudiated by 
Mo Tzu who sought to supplant the Confucian emphasis on the importance of 
particular personal relationships"  ^with an advocacy of the principle of "loving 
universally".
The job being done by freedom from huo in giving continuity to the life of an 
individual is done, it might be suggested, by hsiao in the life of two or more 
individuals, a respect for the tao of one's parents analogous to the respect one lacks, if 
one is huo, for one's own past commitments. Thus a son, for Confucius, has a 
fundamental duty of loyalty to his father's tao\
"" Ibid., XI, 15. And cf. VII, 26; XIII, 22; XIV, 12. Cf. also Psshiot\o,Eudemian 
Ethics, VII, 6, 1240b 12“ 17, Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 4 ,1166b6-29 and Plato, 
Republic, 559D4-562A3..
Again paralleled in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 9, 1159b35-1160a7.
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The Master said, "When the father is alive, look to the will. The father 
being dead, look to the conduct. For there to be no alteration from the 
lao of the father for three years may be called hsiao
Tseng Tzu said, "I heard it said by our Master of the hsiao of Meng 
Chuang Tzu that other men might be able to match it, but that, as 
regards his way of not replacing his father's ministers nor deviating from 
his policy, they would find that difficult to manage."^
The conservative aspect of Confucianism can helpfully be understood in the light of 
such passages on huo and hsiao. Major changes in the tao that governs a given 
community may be taken to be prima facie undesirable as such, because such a change 
constitutes a betrayal of the commitments of the past. The viciousness of a radical 
break with tradition thus parallels the viciousness of being huo. The sort of case cited 
here, it will be recalled, was where, for instance, love and a desire for someone's good 
are displaced at moments of anger by hate and a desire for his ill fortune. Just as the 
unity and harmony of the self is fractured and damaged by such joiutly unsatisfiable and 
conflicting impulses, so the unity and continuity of a social group is marred by 
deviation form the traditional order. Charitably understood, Confucius’ rigorous 
insistence on filial loyalty can be seen as a deepening of that norm of stability of which 
my preceding chapters have made so much."®
Analects, I, 11. The last sentence is repeated at IV, 20. 
Ibid., XIX, 18.
"® Compare Conrad (1963. p430) on Mrs Gould:
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10.7. The authority Confiicius accords to li is enormous:
Yen Yiian asked about jen. The Master said, "To bring one's self to 
order and return to li is to be jen. If, for a single day, one brought one's 
self to order and returned to //, the whole world would recognize one as 
jen. Beingyew comes from oneself, not firom others."
Yen Yiian said, "May I ask you to specify fiirther?" The Master said,
"Do not regard what is not li. Do not hear what is not li. Do not utter 
what is not li. Make no movement that is not //.”
Given his attachment to tradition, it is clear why Confiicius should have accorded li 
this authority as the embodiment of human values. It also comes across that he did not 
see those same values as answerable to some source external to humanity. His ethical 
humanism appeared to run deep:
Man is able to shape the tao. The tao cannot shape man.49
It had come into her mind that for life to be large and full, it must 
contain the care of the past and of the future in every passing moment 
of the present. Our daily work must be done to the glory of the dead 
and for the good of those who come after.
49 Ibid., XV, 29. The verb in the Chinese literally means "broaden". I don't X\nvik 
Confiicius means the tao doesn't "shape" us in the way Taylor (1989. chapter 2) thinks 
it does. After all the chiin tzu is "given shape by //". Rather that its shaping us is 
ultimately just a way in which we shape ourselves. We are constitutive of it in a more
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The tao is shaped by the human beings to whom it is proper and is not something 
that is legislated for us from without. Outside actual human interests and inherited 
values there is no Archimedean point that furnishes a standard by which these may be 
judged (cf. chapter 3 above).^ ®
When men follow a tao that is far from men, it is not the tao.51
Such a recognition highlights again that contingency and fragility of all human 
commitments that, as noted above, is apt to seem disturbing when such views are 
contrasted with more "objective" conceptions of value. Recognizing this contingency 
may well seem to undermine those very commitments and suck us into a kind of 
shoulder-shrugging relativism that leaves us puzzling what authority inheres in a given
basic sense than it of us. Cf. Marx (Critique o f Hegel's Philosophy o f Right, 
Introduction- 1975. p244);
Man makes religion. Religion does not make man.
®^ Cf. Taylor, "What is Human Agency?" in his 1985. It is tempting to relate the 
Confucian conception of a tao that is not far from men to the Aristotelian conception 
of a telos proper to man (see in particular Nicomachean Ethics, I, 7). The similarity is 
perhaps tenuous, but on the thought that goodness is necessarily bound up with human 
interests and desires, see further Hampshire, "Ethics; A Defence of Aristotle" in his 
1972.
Chung Yung, chapter 13. My translation.
Cf. Smith, 1989.
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set of values that could make the project of transmitting and sustaining it as important 
as Confiicius took it to be. This we noted was a fundamental objection levelled by the 
Mohists.
But were extreme relativism a position we might be tempted by were we to 
attempt to view evaluative questions from, as it were, the "point of view of the 
universe", it ceases to look quite so eligible once it is realized that there is no such 
point of view for us to occupy and that rigid strong evaluations play an essential role in 
the way our ethical thought operates.
The sort of conservativism I am discussing here has, needless to say, a rather small 
"c"- we are concerned rather with a philosophical account of value than with any 
specific ideological stance, where the former tells us where to look for the standards by 
which the latter may be appraised. It is a position on which, rejecting Mackie's 
dichotomy^ ,^ morality is neither invented nor discovered. In Burke’s words, "no new 
discoveries are made in morality".^" Moralities are not amenities such that we might 
look forward to the "invention" of novel moralities and the obsolescence of our own in 
the sanguine way we might with technological innovation. Such sanguineness would 
contradict our present sincere commitment to our own actual values. This is not, as we 
will see below, to say that our actual values are simply indefeasible. Rather that the 
constraints on defeasibility are of a different order in the moral case. It is no essential 
part of our factual beliefs to feel any pro tanto disquiet at the prospect of their 
supersession. With imputations of value it is.
One aspect of the distinction between fact and value, it may now be suggested, is 
just that while facts are what we may look to scientific researchers to surprise us with, 
for values it may be more proper to look to a more humanistic category of teacher, of
From the subtitle of his 1977.
Burke, 1968. p i02. cf. 3.8 above and the passages fi*om Walzer there cited.
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which Confucius fiimished China with an ideal, to prevent us from forgetting}^ 
Returning for a moment to utopian fiction, recall how the political culture of 1984 was 
founded precisely upon collective oblivion/® In the case of both fact and value there is 
a possibility of learning, but the learning in the case of values is humanistic rather than 
experimental in character- that, incidentally, being plausibly basic to the humanities 
having much point.
The tao, as Confucius conceived it, is embodied in the actual ethical attitudes, 
practices and institutions of human beings and its survival is contingent upon that 
continuing embodiment. In one of Borges' essays reference is made to;
the fable that says humanity always includes tliirty-six just men- the 
lamed Vovniks- who do not know each other but who secretly sustain 
the universe.®^
The idea this attractive fable suggests, that for goodness to be possible, there must 
always be at least some good men, seems also to be a Confucian one;
Kung-sun Ch'ao of Wei questioned Tzu Kung, saying, "How did 
Chung-ni [i.e. Confucius] get his learning?"
Tzu Kung said, "The tao of Wen and Wu [legendary Sage kings] has 
not yet fallen to the ground. It is present among men. The intelligent
Cf. Analects, II, 11; VII, 1; VII, 28; XIV, 12; XIX, 5.
Such institutionized oblivion is indeed a strikingly common feature of pessimistic 
utopian fiction. Compare the book-burning firemen of Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 
or the censored dictionaries of Jean-Luc Godard's Alpha\nlle.
1964. p34.
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remember the great things and the unintelligent the small things. No one 
is devoid of the tao of Wen and Wu. How could our Master have failed 
to get his learning?"®®
The Master said of Tzu-chien: "A man such as this is truly a chiin tzu. If 
there were no chiin tzu in Lu how could he have accomplished this?"®®
As regards ethics we should precisely not follow Locke in his repudiation of argument 
ad verecundiani. For where it is a question of values, returning to the starting point of 
chapter 3, Plato in the Meno was, in a sense he did not quite intend, right after all. 
Knowledge is indeed recollection. The Way is sustained by being walked upon.®®
10.8. Tradition and convention is then one source of evaluative argument and quite 
properly so, pace Hare. However, given the force of the kind of hedonistic 
considerations characterized in the preceding chapter, it is not plausibly the only one. 
We have seen throughout how desires, tastes and other such relatively crude responses 
differ from values in a stronger sense tlirough such facets as impersonality (chapter 4), 
wholeheartedness (chapter 9) and rigidity (this chapter). Nonetheless they remain in 
fundamental ways o f a kind with such other responses for reasons mainly rehearsed in 
chapters 3 and 4. Given this, something will plausibly be wrong in any society whose 
values are over-scornful of the desires, interests and needs of their members, wrong.
®® Analects, XIX, 22. 
®®Ibid.,V,3.
®® Chuang Tzu, chapter 2.
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moreover, by that society's own lights, given only that something like stability of 
response and attitude is valued there.
Certain interests and concerns indeed are almost universal. We all (or almost all) 
prefer pleasure to pain, success to failure, participation to exclusion, love and 
companionship to isolation, health and longevity to illness and death. If such concerns 
are of a kind with other values, it is fair to say things are amiss when prevailing ethical 
and moral conventions push in directions strongly opposed to them. So that the 
communitarian considerations marshalled above do not leave us at a loss to make sense 
of such moral alienation as must take issue with, say, slavery or female circumcision to 
take relatively uncontroversial (to us, here, now) examples. As MacIntyre puts it, 
discussing Marx:
Appeal to moral principles against some existing state of affairs is 
always an appeal against the limits of that form of society; to appeal 
against that form of society we must find a vocabulary which does not 
presuppose its existence. Such a vocabulary one finds in the form of 
expression of wants and needs which are unsatisfiable within the 
existing society, wants and needs which demand a new social order.^ *
The upshot is that evaluative argument is seen to have not one source but tw>o.
First there are the utilitarian considerations that arise from stability of response in the 
way described in chapter 9. But, secondly, these are constrained by our rigid 
identification with actual values that tell us any old happiness is not enough, there are 
utilities and utilities, higher and lower pleasures. Indeed not, in a way, two sources but 
many. For our society is not a hypertraditional one and the questions, "Winch
61 1966. p213.
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tradition?", "Whose conventions?" and indeed "Who exactly are we?" are quick to 
press upon us when we move from theory to practice.
Given a norm of stability things are as they should be when there is a reasonable 
match between the desires of individuals, the values embraced by individuals and the 
goals and values embodied in tradition and convention. Alienation is the state of crisis, 
social or personal, that arises when this fails to happen. To the extent that this is so, 
one of the criteria by which we may assess which desires and values it is best to have is 
just their aptness to promote such match, A Confucian norm of deference to the 
inherited values of a community is one thing to which this criterion points. But we are 
not left with a fossilized conventionalism. For it also points to a norm, or set of norms, 
whereby the conventions themselves may be assessed in terms of whether they are of a 
kind apt to be intematized and embraced by normal, natural, rational human agents. 
"Normal", "natural", "rational" and "human" are all here undisguisedly and 
unashamedly evaluative terms invoking values held by ourselves and by those with 
whom we can share a common evaluative vocabulary. There is no circularity for we 
are pursuing coherence and accomodation, not reduction.
There is then a pro tanto case for me to seek, albeit critically, to internalize the 
values of my social milieu within my own subjective economy of desires and interests. 
From the point of view of society this is something to be achieved by means of the 
education of my desires and emotions into conformity with what it recognizes as the 
good.
To bring one's self to order and return to li is to be jen,.Bén% jen
comes from oneself, not from others.
It is also however a state of affairs that stands to be promoted by my society's values 
themselves being such as to invite conformity. We have here a further substantive
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evaluative conclusion that may be seen as a child of stability. For, given such stability, 
that coincidence of internal and external, of subjective and conventional alluded to 
above may be seen as itself a good. And certain sorts of evaluative position on the part 
both of individual and society are plausibly more apt to promote such match or 
coincidence than others.
By recognizing a dual basis for our evaluations we lose in simplicity but gain in 
plausibility. Insisting that any old happiness is not enough does away with the 
difficulties that plague the monistic utilitarian- be they Rachels' deluded Womag, 
Huxley's cheerful genetically engineered work-units. Smart and Nozick's neurally 
titillated dreamers or the basic questions of distributive justice. The roles played by 
tradition and convention as well as the fundamental status of found goodness, meet, 
given the right sort of stability, the problem of explaining evaluative defeasibility that 
bedevils the more simple-minded subjectivist. And the insistence that commonly held 
values are open to appraisal, again given the right sort of stability, in terms of their 
aptness to promote match with the values and desires of individuals and by a moral 
bottom line of respect for human welfare, together with the rigidifying move employed 
in interpreting strongly evaluative claims, meet the challenge to a simple 
conventionalism of explaining how a whole society might be imagined to stray from the 
right moral tracks.
What is being said then is, I hope, plausible metaethics. It explains how, given 
stability of response, moral arguments are even possible. But it is also perhaps 
disappointing ethics. For it does not pretend to adumbrate a theoretical perspective 
from which such argument can be at all straightforwardly resolvable. In this regard two 
sources of moral argument is perhaps one too many in the absence of some formula for 
dealing with conflict between them and I have none to offer. For ambitious moral 
theorists with a love of desert landscapes, this conclusion may be disappointing but I 
take it to be correct.
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10.9. In view of this let us return to the issue of moral authority again adopting 
Confucian terms of reference. Consider the man alienated from the values of those 
around liim.®^  Suppose him to value those things Conflicius appears to have valued- 
shu (reciprocity), /gy; (humanity, benevolence) and ching (reverence). To have such 
values is to have values rooted in human community, in human interests, in 
benevolence and in the recognition of the competing attitudes of others as 
commensurable in urgency precisely with one's own. Such values demand a search for 
accommodation with one's culture that seems to carry with it a degree of obligation to 
respect the very values from which one may be alienated. Likewise a culture that is 
characterized by such values must regard just such alienation as an evil and should seek 
on its own part similar accommodations with those who find themselves so excluded.
One's recourse, when so alienated, is, in the first instance, to that recognition of 
others shujen  and ching demand; and it is, I would propose, in the dialectics of such 
mutual recognition that the felt defeasibility of the individual's moral attitudes is best 
located.
Tzu-yu said, "In serving a prince, to be going on and on at him is to 
invite disgrace. To be going on and on at one's friends is to invite 
estrangement."®^
Such alienation poses a serious problem for a simple fonn of conventionalism. Thus 
it is instructive to note the rather heavy weather Lovibond (1983) makes of this matter. 
Analects, IV, 26. Cf. also XI, 23, XIV, 17, XIX, 10.
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In the service of one's parents, remonstrance should be mild. If you 
perceive them unwilling to come into line, you should remain reverent 
{ching), obedient and diligent. You should not be resentfid.®'
When, as here, Confucius makes so much of filiality {hsiad), we are likely to be 
detained by a highly local version of the alienation problem: what his outlook can say 
to a son who has a thoroughly awfiil father- does this son owe anything to his father's 
taol The answer that best fits my reading of Confucius would emphasize the same 
considerations of accommodation, mutual recognition and deference that seem central 
to his thought. It would proceed by asking of such a person, "Awful by whose Hghts?" 
And if the answer is "my own", then that, to a Confucian ear, will have a wholly 
unsatisfactory ring. For the whole point of Confucian ethics is its emphasis on 
deference to and recognition of the lights of others in the shaping of one's own. "He 
that trusteth in his own heart is a fool". And the lights of a father enjoy, at least for 
Confucius, a privileged status among the lights from which one might, in principle, 
choose.
One's recourse, in the second instance, is to that ordering and rectifying of the self 
that is the basis of that te {\’ejy roughly "virtue") whereby that same order is 
communicated to those who surround one. Thus the alienated man can hope, by 
becoming good, to end his alienation and acquire "neighbours".®  ^So at XI, 21, 
Confiicius says:
To combat the evil in yourself, not that in others: isn't this how to 
transform corruption?
®" Ibid., IV, 18.
®® Ibid., IV, 25.
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Moral authority does not, on such a view, adhere to the arbitrary attitudes of the 
individual's will, but rather to the attitudes of an individual whose emotions have been 
educated and ordered into conformity with complex patterns of deference and respect 
such as are expressed and sustained in the ritual and institutional order of a well- 
functioning society. The man who "loves learning" "attends upon such as possess the 
tao and is rectified."®® Possessed of such culture a man is then empowered to transmit 
it to those about him who may well be his pupils, progeny, political subjects. He is also 
competent to adopt critical attitudes to the institutional and ritual order he sees about 
him, as Confiicius in fact did. He may seek accommodation with those from whom he 
differs but the tao he follows will set limits to that accommodation. Likewise he may, 
the more he deepens his ethical culture, exercize this critical capacity in thinking things 
through for himself. But this autonomy is always exercized against a background of 
deference to the tradition that nurtured it and its canonical texts. The chûn tzii "is in 
awe of the words of sages" which the "small man" mocks.®^
10.10. It may be instructive to recall Saul, discussed above, whose adulterous 
inclinations were confined to Tuesdays. Various strategies are available to Saul which 
are instructive here. Firstly o f course he might adopt what we might, recalling the 
Sirens, call a Ulysses strategy^^, spending Wednesday to Monday seeking ways to 
ensure that, on Tuesdays, adulterous opportunities do not come his way. But it is 
unlikely that this will always be feasible.
®® Ibid., I, 14. Cf. I, 6; I, 8; IX, 25; XV, 10; XVI, 4. 
®' Ibid., XVI, 8.
®® A classic discussion is Elster, 1984. chapter II.
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Secondly, although we have supposed that, on Tuesday, he has no principled 
objection to adultery, he may still have an instf umental objection. For he may still be 
averse on Tuesdays to actions which will distress him, for whatever reason, on other 
days. Given enough stability to interest his Tuesday self in the well-being and the 
values of his more normal self even without directly sharing those values, this might 
prove enough to restrain him from actions he will later prefer not to have done. This 
strategy is deferential. On Tuesdays he does not embrace certain values but at other 
times he does- as no doubt does his wife. So because both these people matter to him, 
he respects those of their values that he does not currently share.^
Thirdly, he might seek to disassociate himself from his Tuesday self. This is likely 
to be a desperate strategy if carried to any length. The temporal parts of himself are 
just too intimate to make this possible. They have the same life, the same job, the same 
friends and, of course, the same wife. Will he, so disassociated, take his Tuesday selfs 
amorous behaviour as cuckolding his "other" self? Will be seek consistency through 
the week in the hes he tells his wife, the promises he makes to his mistress?
The strategy of disassociation is hopeless for similar reasons to those that make the 
deferential strategy possible. His temporal parts aie too mutually bound up 
institutionally and physically for instability in their responses and attutudes not to be 
undesirably pragmatically disruptive in ways akin to those described at 9.1 above. 
Divergence in values between the lonely immortals described there is a problem for no 
one. Divergence between the temporal parts of Saul is a problem for everyone 
concerned with him. Once there is enough convergence between them, enough stability
Saul's problems would be increased of course if on Tuesdays he was not only 
unaverse to adultery but had a strongly evaluative commitment to it. This would make 
the pursuit of mutual accomodation between his temporal parts harder and his result no 
doubt more compromised but that need not make it any the less a good for him.
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amongst them to make a certain mutually deferential and accomodating attitude to 
each others' values and desires a good for them, then that convergence may become 
self-reinforcing as the pursuit of more of it becomes itself one of Saul's values.
The values that drive the strategy of deference are relatively thin, relatively free of 
qualitative distinctions; a broadly contractualist recognition of the goods of 
accomodation and broadly utilitarian concern for his own and others' welfare. Such 
values are apt to be most prominent in cases like this when values are in some state of 
crisis- in situations of conflict and confrontation between sharply divergent values. 
When mutually contemptible parties share the same small space and get sick of 
fighting, strongly evaluative qualitative distinctions may play little part, and properly 
so, in the bargaining principles on which they aie able to agree. But this is not the only 
situation to which moral theory is concerned to do justice and its workings do not 
show values that are thin in this way to be either all we have or what we should settle 
for.
10.11. Where have we got? Is all this intended as a defence of evaluative anti-realism? 
Up to a point, yes. Evaluative anti-realism is right insofar as it refuses to recognize any 
sort of objective values that transcend actual human attitudes and responses or to 
measure the latter, taken collectively, against anything other than themselves. It is right 
to in recognizing an essential non-descriptive ingredient in evaluative language, world- 
word in its direction of fit, alongside what may be a highly entrenched descriptive one. 
And it is right to deny the role of values in the "furniture of the universe" where this 
denial is taken to exclude values from any general involvement in the wider causal 
order that is the provenance of physical science. So we are left both with mind- 
dependence and non-cognitivism.
As to whether the anti-realist is right to deny, as some have, all claim to such other 
marks of truth as groundedness and defeasibility, then that, it has been the role in
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particular of later chapters to suggest, is something that depends to a great extent upon 
the contetit of our values themselves. There could be creatures for whom all evaluative 
responses were as simple and as rationally irresponsible as responses of nausea. Such 
creatures would not be guilty of any metaphysical or logical mistake. But given a 
certain stability in what we value- stability j- and given, crucially, our placing a certain 
value on that very stability, - in effect stability2 - and depending on the degree to which 
this takes place, our evaluative thought will indeed be apt to structure itself in ways 
that lend it to interpretations that are "objective"- not in some transcendent platonistic 
sense, but in allowing a distinction to be made between what somebody does value and 
what they should were their competence greater than it is, the sort of distinction I take 
to pose a problem for the sort of crude subjectivism that has by now, presumably, been 
left far behind.
Given such stability a complex picture emerges in which we may see ourselves to 
have reasons to give weight to two sorts of consideration, roughly utilitarian, as 
motivated mainly in chapter 9 and conventionalist, as motivated mainly in the present 
chapter: we have reason, of a utilitarian kind to value just whatever (nonrigidly) is 
valued, as well as reason of another kind to value whatever (rigidly) is valued. We 
value what we value and we are creatures very unlike the denizens of either Atlantis or 
Utilitas.
We should then, I suggest, dispense with the insistence, well stated by Michael 
Smith, that:
so long as we can imagine some hypothetical rational creature to whom 
we cannot justify our moral beliefs, the search for reasons in support of 
them is in place. Thus, we may say, moral beliefs seem to be beliefs 
about some non-relative fact of the matter and the search for reasons in 
support of our moral beliefs seems to be the search for reasons that
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would convince rational creatures as such to take on such beliefs for 
themselves^®
The sort of insistence found in Foot and repeated above by myself that this is not so, 
that our values lack the sort of privileged rational defence Kant sought to provide by 
the categorical imperative, is condemned as leaving our values simply arbitrary :
as to be explained rather than justified; as to be explained, in much the 
same way that loving Leningrad is to be explained, simply in terms of 
M>hen, where and how we were brought upT
The rigidifying move deployed above is considered by Smith and deemed inadequate to 
this difficulty:
it does nothing to remove the arbitrariness of the dislike that is the 
source of the unease. After all, in another world I dislike myself in this 
world for not caring only for myself. How peculiar each of these 
attitudes seems in the context on the other! Far more plausible is the 
idea that my actual attitude towards myself in worlds in which I don't 
care for justice is itself dependent upon my belief that I am, in the actual 
world, possessed of ^  jusiiftcatioft for caring for justice.^^
Michael Smith, 1989. p99. The Leningrad example comes fi-om Foot's "Morality as a 
System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in her 1978.
Smith, 1989. pl03.
Ibid., pl05.
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What Smith is here demanding I take to be wrongheaded. There is actually far 
from being nothing I can do to justify my interest injustice. But that is just the point- 
that there is actually far from nothing. For I actually have the values I actually do and 
to some extent indeed (depending on the precise extension of "we") the values we 
actually do. And, given adequate stability and coherence among these, it might well be 
realistically hoped that some ingredient of this set of values- my interest injustice say- 
is open to justification in terms of those other values that form its background. But it is 
quite another thing to suppose there to be some transcendent Archimedean standpoint 
point from which my (and our) actual values are open to a justification that may appeal 
to none of them. There is not.
There is nothing for us to appeal to vis à vis the phenomenology of our evaluative 
thought that could plausibly be supposed to back up the sort of strongly objective 
conclusions Smith seems to be endorsing. For all such phenomenological appeals can 
deliver is considerations relating to our actual practice, the way we actually think and 
argue about values. And we are simply never called upon to engage in evaluative 
argument with Martians, Daleks, or any other species of rational possibilia. The 
phenomenology of value does indeed powerfially impel us in the direction of the 
unambitious form of objectivity defended above. But that I take it is all it does. And 
again, it may be stressed that this is not a point about values that generalizes across 
worlds. It is a point purely about our values. In a culture with minimal stability there is, 
in effect, minimal objective phenomenology of value. And indeed minimal objectivity. 
The metaethical conclusions about value we have reached fail to be independent of the 
forms of value we happen to have.
We are left then with the fragility and contingency of the values we hold in virtue 
of being the sorts of creatures we in fact are and having the cultural milieu we in fact 
do. Of course both we and our values might have been different. Many of these 
possibilities might well strike us as pretty dreadful but it is idle to think some
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transcendent or absolute standpoint available from which to justify such judgements of 
relative dreadfulness. Nor does this unavailability detract from our possession of 
excellent conceptual resources for justifying this judgement to ourselves. Ultimately 
indeed, it may be suggested, our sense of what it is we value in being the sorts of 
creature we are is inseparable from our rigid identification with the kind of values 
precisely such creatures espouse.
Appreciating music is a manifestation of the life of mankind.^^
I can't live among birds and beasts as if we were of a kind. If I do not 
associate with these human beings, whom would that leave? While the 
tao can be found in the world, I will not change my place with him [i.e., 
the hermit Chieh Ni].’'*
Well, maybe man should get rid of himself. Of course. If he can. But 
also he has something in him which he feels it important to continue.
Something that deserves to go on. It is something that has to go on and 
we also know it. The spirit feels cheated, outraged, defiled, corrupted, 
fragmented, injured. Still it knows what it knows and the knowledge 
cannot be gotten rid of. the spirit knows that its growth is the real aim 
of its existence. So it seems to me. Besides, mankind cannot be 
something else.’®
73 Wittgenstein, 1980. p70. Cf. 5.8 above. 
Analects, XVIII, 6.
’® Artur Sammler in Saul Bellow's 1971. p i89.
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When men follow a tao that is far from men, it is not the tao.
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